The Judiciary in Autonomy Arrangements: Lessons for the Kurdish Case

Abstract

The rigid application of the unitary state model in Turkey has been one of the main obstacles for a satisfactory solution to the enduring problems of the Kurdish people in Turkey. In recent years, the Kurdish political parties have strongly vocalized their opposition towards this model and demanded a solution including non-territorial autonomy (e.g. cultural, linguistic rights, etc.) for Kurdish people and territorial autonomy arrangements (requiring administrative, legislative, judicial power sharing) in the areas mostly populated by Kurds. This paper concentrates on the Kurdish political opposition’s demand for territorial autonomy and, in particular, their demand for judicial autonomy. In so doing, it will primarily look at the scope of this demand from a historical perspective. It then examines various models existing in the world. Although there are many studies exploring the various models for the administrative and legislative power-sharing in countries having autonomous arrangements, there are limited studies exploring the territorial distribution of judicial power between central and local governments. Therefore, the paper aims to examine the judicial systems of the countries having regional autonomous arrangements. In so doing, the paper scrutinizes judicial systems of Canada, Spain, Belgium and the UK (including Northern Ireland and Scotland) with different and distinct models, and their possible application in Turkey’s Kurdish autonomous areas.

I would like to thank Prof. Alfredsson Gudmundur and Prof. Ephraim Nimni for their insightful comments on this chapter.