Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Weapons of Mass Protection? Rogue Asteroids, Nuclear Explosions in Space, and the Norms of Global Nuclear Order

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Planetary Defense

Part of the book series: Space and Society ((SPSO))

Abstract

Planetary defense scientists frequently consider nuclear explosive devices (NED) among the suitable tools for deflection of near-Earth objects. Despite the convenient physical characteristics of nuclear explosions, this chapter sketches the negative implications of developing any options in this direction for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the global nuclear order as such. Moreover, the author critically unpacks the seemingly objective scientific rationality of these proposals and discusses how support for the NED development de-stigmatizes technology that, similarly to the impact of large asteroids, also carries the risk of destroying human civilization with a non-zero probability. The chapter concludes with a pragmatic attempt to find the middle ground between the NED advocates and critics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Chap. 7 for a comprehensive discussion of NEO-deflection methods.

  2. 2.

    For most relevant countries, the employment of such nuclear explosions would be prohibited under the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which was signed by 183 countries but has not yet entered into force). In addition, the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (usually referred to as ‘Nuclear Ban Treaty’) explicitly prohibits those looking to ‘develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’ (UNGA 2017). However, all the current nuclear-armed countries refused to sign the document and expressed their unwillingness to abide by its terms.

  3. 3.

    See Chap. 14.

  4. 4.

    Nevertheless, it should be noted that many US–Russian R&D initiatives have been suspended after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (see Stone 2016).

  5. 5.

    For different academic perspectives on the global nuclear order and its dynamics, see for example Walker (2000, 2004, 2007b, 2012), Krause (2007), Biswas (2014), Jasper (2016), or Tannenwald (2018)

  6. 6.

    Besides the economic argumentation, some scholars and experts (Rislove 2006) also highlight the importance of the global diffusion of nuclear industry in the context of global climate change.

  7. 7.

    The NPT established two categories of states with different rights and obligations according to the treaty: nuclear weapon states, defined as the ones that tested nuclear weapons before 1967, i.e. the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China; and non-nuclear weapon states, i.e. all the other signatories.

  8. 8.

    The two superpowers also adopted a 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty that would specify the rules of appropriate conduct of PNEs on both sides.

  9. 9.

    Indian behavior was widely interpreted as a breach of the non-proliferation norm among the NPT members, particularly on the side of the United States and Canada, who supplied India with heavy water and a research reactor, respectively, and saw the test as ‘cheating on the basic bargain of the nuclear regime’ (Epstein 1975, 1976; Nye 1981). On the consequences of India’s 1974 nuclear explosion, see Wan (2014).

  10. 10.

    The meaning of this article has been subject to numerous interpretations over the course of the last few decades. There were also many attempts to make the normative prescriptions and proscriptions more specific, most prominently in the ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’ adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the ‘Thirteen Steps’ in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the 2010 NPT Review Conference ‘Action Plan.’ Nuclear disarmament, as the fundamental norm of the global nuclear order, was also formally validated in the 1996 ruling of the International Court of Justice and in numerous resolutions of the UNGA and other international bodies. On July 7th, 2017, the UNGA adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as the first international agreement banning nuclear weapons and providing framework for their elimination.

  11. 11.

    Admittedly, this US practice of restraint may now be reevaluated in the light of the President Trump’s forthcoming 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

  12. 12.

    On the 1960s negotiations leading up to the signature of the NPT, see for example Burns (Burns 1969), Epstein (1976), Unger (1976), Shaker (1980), Nye (1981), Müller et al. (1994), Bourantonis (1997), Paul (2003), Krause (2007), Bunn and Rhinelander (2008), Walker (2012), and Popp et al. (2016).

  13. 13.

    On ‘indefinite nuclearism’ and its incompatibility with the culture of human rights, see Booth (1999a, 1999b); on the perils of nuclear status quo, see also Hanson (2002) and Thakur (2000).

  14. 14.

    For an alternative interpretation of the logic underpinning the nuclear non-use norm, see Paul (2009, 2010), Press et al. (2013), or Sagan & Valentino (2017a, 2017b).

  15. 15.

    E-mail conversation with David Morrison and Nikola Schmidt, December 2017.

References

  • Abraham, I. (1998). The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb : Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State. London: Zed Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Abraham, I. (2006). The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories. Osiris, 21(1), 49–65. doi:https://doi.org/10.1086/507135

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Abraham, I. (2010). ‘Who’s Next?’ Nuclear Ambivalence and the Contradictions of Non-Proliferation Policy. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(43), 18–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Acton, J. M. (2009). The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading. Survival, 51(1), 119–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Artemieva, N., & Morgan, J. (2017). Quantifying the Release of Climate-Active Gases by Large Meteorite Impacts With a Case Study of Chicxulub. Geophysical Research Letters, 44(20), 10,180-10,188. doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/2017GL074879

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barbee, B. W., Syal, M. B., Dearborn, D., Gisler, G., Greenaugh, K., Howley, K. M., et al. (2018). Options and uncertainties in planetary defense: Mission planning and vehicle design for flexible response. Acta Astronautica, 143(August 2017), 37–61. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2017.10.021

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Birch, D. (2013a). Hunting Rogue Asteroids Could Be A New Use For Nuclear Weapons| HuffPost.

    Google Scholar 

  • Birch, D. (2013b). The Plans to Use Nuclear Weapons to Blow Up Incoming Asteroids, 1–16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Biswas, S. (2014). Nuclear desire : power and the postcolonial nuclear order. University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bolton, D. (2016). Russian scientists discover best way to destroy asteroids with nuclear weapons|The Independent.

    Google Scholar 

  • Booth, K. (1999a). Nuclearism, human rights and constructions of security (part 1). The International Journal of Human Rights, 3(2), 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Booth, K. (1999b). Nuclearism, human rights and constructions of security (part 2). The International Journal of Human Rights, 3(3), 44–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Borrie, J. (2014). Humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and the logic of a ban. International Affairs, 90(3), 625–646.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bourantonis, D. (1997). The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968: A Note. The International History Review, 19(2), 347–357. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1997.964078

  • Bucknam, M., & Gold, R. (2008). Asteroid Threat? The Problem of Planetary Defence. Survival, 50(5), 141–156. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330802456502

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bunn, G., & Rhinelander, J. B. (2008). Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now. Arms Control Today, (July/August 2008), 1–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burns, E. L. M. (1969). The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects. International Organization, 23(4), 788–807.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dearborn, D. S., Patenaude, S., & Managan, R. A. (2007). The Use of Nuclear Explosives To Disrupt or Divert Asteroids. In Planetary Defense Conference. Washington, D.C.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demeritt, D. (2001). The construction of global warming and the politics of science. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 91(2), 307–337. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/0004-5608.00245

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Department of Energy. (2013). United States, Russia Sign Agreement to Further Research and Development Collaboration in Nuclear Energy and Security|Department of Energy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dhanapala, J., & Rydell, R. (2005). Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An insider’s Account. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • DoD. (2010). Nuclear Posture Review Report (2010).

    Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, W. (1975). Nuclear proliferation: The failure of the review conference. Survival, 17(6), 262–269. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396337508441575

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, W. (1976). The last chance : nuclear proliferation and arms control. Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fields, J., & Enia, J. S. (2009). The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. The Nonproliferation Review, 16(2), 173–196.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gerber, L. G. (1982). The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War. Diplomatic History, 6(1), 69–96. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1982.tb00364.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grzelczyk, V. (2012). Failure to relaunch? the United States, nuclear North Korea, and the future of the six-party talks. North Korean Review, 8(1), 8–21. doi:https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.8

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hanson, M. (2002). Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security. International Relations, 16(3), 361–379.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, A. W. (2015). A Global Approach to Near-Earth Object Impact Threat Mitigation – Final Report.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huntley, W. L. (2006). Rebels without a cause: North Korea, Iran and the NPT. International Affairs, 82(4), 723–742.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Interfax. (2013, March). Megaton bomb may destroy large asteroid - Rosatom.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaipal, R. (1977). The Indian Nuclear Explosion. International Security, 1(4), 44–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jasper, U. (2016). Dysfunctional, but stable – a Bourdieuian reading of the global nuclear order. Critical Studies on Security, 4(1), 42–56. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1106426

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, R. (2014). The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons: an Imperative for Achieving Disarmament. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 25(1), 59–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplinger, B., Wie, B., & Dearborn, D. (2012). Earth-Impact Modeling and Analysis of a Near-Earth Object Fragmented and Dispersed by Nuclear Subsurface Explosions. The Journal of the Astronautical Sciences, 59(1–2), 101–119. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s40295-013-0008-3

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kienzle, B. (2014). The Exception to the Rule? The EU and India’s Challenge to the Non-proliferation Norm. European Security, 24(1), 36–55. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2014.948863

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krause, J. (2007). Enlightenment and nuclear order. International Affairs, 83(3), 483–499.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lantis, J. S. (2018). Nuclear Cooperation with Non-NPT Member States? An Elite-driven Model of Norm Contestation. Contemporary Security Policy advance online publication 30 January, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1398367. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1398367

  • Latour, B. (1987). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDonough, D. S. (2006). Nuclear Superiority: The „New Triad‟ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mellor, F. (2007). Colliding Worlds. Social Studies of Science (Vol. 37). doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312706075336

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mellor, F. (2010). Negotiating uncertainty: asteroids, risk and the media. Public Understanding of Science, 19(1), 16–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, J., Artemieva, N., & Goldin, T. (2013). Revisiting wildfires at the K-Pg boundary. Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 118(4), 1508–1520. doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/2013JG002428

    Google Scholar 

  • Morrison, D., & Teller, E. (1994). The Impact Hazard: Issues for the Future. In T. Gehrels (Ed.), Hazards due to Comets and Asteroids (pp. 1135–1143). Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, J. E. (2010). Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, H. (2010). Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime. Strategic Analysis, 34(2), 189–201. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160903542740

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Müller, H., Becker-Jakob, U., & Seidler-Diekmann, T. (2013). Regime Conflicts and Norm Dynamics: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. In H. Muller & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, H., Fischer, D., & Kötter, W. (1994). Nuclear non-proliferation and global order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • NASA. (2007). Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives. Report to congress. Washington D.C. http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/171331main_NEO_report_march07.pdf

  • National Research Council. (2010). Defending Planet Earth : Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies. National Academies Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nordyke, M. D. (1998). The soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Science & Global Security, 7(1), 1–117. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/08929889808426448

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nye, J. S. (1981). Maintaining a nonproliferation regime. International Organization, 35(01), 15–38. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300004069

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ogilvie-White, T. (2010). The Defiant States: the Nuclear Diplomacy of North Korea and Iran. The Nonproliferation Review, 17(1), 115–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Onderco, M. (2017). Why nuclear weapon ban treaty is unlikely to fulfil its promise. Global Affairs, 0(0), 1–14. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1409082

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paul, T. V. (2003). Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16(1), 135. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757032000075753

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paul, T. V. (2009). The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paul, T. V. (2010). Taboo or tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics. Review of International Studies, 36(04), 853–863. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001336

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pollack, J. D. (2011). No exit : North Korea, nuclear weapons, and international security. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popp, R., Horovitz, L., & Wenger, A. (2016). Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty : Origins of the Nuclear Order. Oxon: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Potter, W. C. (2017). Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty. Survival, 59(4), 75–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Press, D. G., Sagan, S. D., & Valentino, B. A. (2013). Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. American Political Science Review, 107(1), 188–206.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rauf, T., & Johnson, R. (1995). After the NPT’s indefinite extension: The Future of the global nonproliferation regime. The Nonproliferation Review, 3, 28–42. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709508436604

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rislove, D. C. (2006). Global Warming v. Non-Proliferation: The Time Has Come for Nations to Reassert Their Right to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 24, 1069–1098.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritchie, N. (2009). US Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War: Russians,’Rogues’ and Domestic Division. Oxon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sagan, S. D. (1996). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. International Security, 21(3), 54–86. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sagan, S. D., & Valentino, B. A. (2017a). Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants. International Security, 42(1), 41–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sagan, S., & Valentino, B. A. (2017b). The nuclear weapons ban treaty: Opportunities lost. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. C. (2005). An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima (Nobel Prize Lecture). The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 365–375.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shaker, M. I. (1980). The nuclear non-proliferation treaty : origin and implementation 1959-1979. Oceana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smetana, M. (2015). Nuclear infrastructure, strategic hedging, and the implications for disarmament. In N. Hynek & M. Smetana (Eds.), Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives (pp. 44–60). Oxon: Routledge. doi:https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315735856

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Smetana, M. (2016). Stuck on disarmament: The European Union and the 2015 NPT Review Conference. International Affairs, 92(1), 137–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stone, R. (2016, October). Russia suspends nuclear R&D pact with United States. Science.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tannenwald, N. (2005). Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo. International Security, 29(4), 5–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tannenwald, N. (2007). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tannenwald, N. (2013). Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. Ethics & International Affairs, 27(3), 299–317.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tannenwald, N. (2015). Delegitimizing the Bomb: The Normative Strategy for Disarmament. In N. Hynek & M. Smetana (Eds.), Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political and Regional Perspectives. Oxon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tannenwald, N. (2018). The Great Unraveling: The Future of the Nuclear Normative Order. Daedalus, (forthcoming).

    Google Scholar 

  • Teller, E. (1995). The Need for Experiments on Comets and Asteroids. In Proceedings of the Planetary Defense Workshop (pp. 5–6). Livermore: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thakur, R. (2000). Envisioning Nuclear Futures. Security Dialogue, 31(1), 25–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • UNGA. (2017). Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Unger, B. (1976). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: An Unsuccessful Attempt to Stem the Tide. World Affairs, 139(2), 87–111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walker, W. (2000). Nuclear Order and Disorder. International Affairs, 76(4), 703–724.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walker, W. (2004). Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order. The Adelphi Papers, 44(370), 9–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walker, W. (2007a). Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment. International Affairs, 83(3), 431–453.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walker, W. (2007b). International nuclear order: A rejoinder. International Affairs, 83(4), 747–756. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00650.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walker, W. (2012). A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order. Oxon: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wan, W. (2014). Firewalling nuclear diffusion. International Studies Review, 16(2), 217–228. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12133

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Welsh, S. B. (1995). Delegate perspectives on the 1995 NPT review and extension conference. The Nonproliferation Review, 2(3), 1–24. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709508436589

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wie, B. (2013). Hypervelocity nuclear interceptors for asteroid disruption. Acta Astronautica, 90(1), 146–155. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2012.04.028

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wie, B., Barbee, B., Pitz, A., Kaplinger, B., Hawkins, M., Winkler, T., et al. (2014). Final Technical Report of a NIAC Phase 2 Study. Graduate Research Assistants: Alan Pitz (M.S.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wunderlich, C. (2017). Delegitimisation à la Carte: The ‘Rogue State’ Label as a Means of Stabilising Order in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Carmen. In S. Gertheiss, S. Herr, K. D. Wolf, & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), Resistance and Change in World Politics: International Dissidence (pp. 143–186). Springer.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Nikola Schmidt, David Morrison, and Daniel Porras for useful comments and ideas. I acknowledge funding by the Charles University Research Centre program UNCE/HUM/028 (Peace Research Center Prague/Faculty of Social Sciences).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Peace Research Center Prague, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

    Michal Smetana

Authors
  1. Michal Smetana
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michal Smetana .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

    Nikola Schmidt

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Smetana, M. (2019). Weapons of Mass Protection? Rogue Asteroids, Nuclear Explosions in Space, and the Norms of Global Nuclear Order. In: Schmidt, N. (eds) Planetary Defense. Space and Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01000-3_15

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation