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The Overlapping Generations Model

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Public Economics

Part of the book series: Springer Texts in Business and Economics ((STBE))

Abstract

This chapter investigate the standard overlapping generations (OLG) model with two periods. It serves as one of the main tools to study problems in modern public finance such as pensions, unemployment insurance, and debt. The standard OLG model will be shown to be possibly Pareto-inefficient. In addition, we discuss the problem of stability and note that it is less relevant for the large-scale OLG models that we consider in later chapters than for simple two-period models. With the help of an example, we show that the transition in the OLG model might take place over very long time horizons exceeding several decades. In addition, important extensions of the standard two-period OLG model such as bequests and growth are introduced.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In later chapters, we will study different applications with β > 1. Hurd (1989) shows that empirical discount factors are above one if one accounts for mortality risk and bequests.

  2. 2.

    The concept of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is reviewed in Appendix 2.1.

  3. 3.

    You are encouraged to analytically derive this result by taking the total differential of (3.9).

  4. 4.

    In Appendix 2.1, we also show that the result depends on the assumption that non-capital income in period 2 is zero.

  5. 5.

    To understand the RHS of (3.12a), notice that \(\frac {\partial F(K_t,L_t)}{\partial L_t}=\frac {\partial L_t f(K_t/L_t)}{\partial L_t}\).

  6. 6.

    The argument follows Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapter 2.

  7. 7.

    In Appendix 2.1, we demonstrate that this is the case for CES utility functions with an elasticity of intertemporal substitution below one. We also argue that stability is a less important problem in the large-scale OLG models with many periods that we will consider in later chapters.

  8. 8.

    Compare Appendix 2.1 for the analysis of the utility function which is characterized by a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution.

  9. 9.

    For this result, we also assume that the so-called endowment effect is equal to zero. This will be the case if the household receives zero non-capital income in the second period of life. See also Appendix 2.1.

  10. 10.

    In the steady state of the Ramsey model in Chap. 2, consumption is constant over the lifetime.

  11. 11.

    See Section 6.3.4 in Wickens (2011).

  12. 12.

    To be more precise, (3.16) has two solutions for the steady state, k t+1 = k t = k: (1) k = 0, which is unstable, and (2) \(k=\left ( \frac {\beta }{1+\beta } \frac {1-\alpha }{1+n} \right )^{\frac {1}{1-\alpha }}\), which is stable.

  13. 13.

    If you are using a different computer language, e.g., MATLAB, you are encouraged to translate this little simple program into the language that you are using.

  14. 14.

    Notice that (3.25) implies that c t = k t − (1 + n)k t+1 + f(k t). For dk t+1 = dk < 0, dc t = −(1 + n)dk t+1 > 0.

  15. 15.

    Compare this with the Pareto efficiency of the Ramsey model in Sect. 2.3.3.

  16. 16.

    There will be three options: (i) We may introduce a parent-child link. (ii) The government may confiscate accidental bequests. Alternatively, (iii), we may assume a perfect annuities market such that financial intermediaries invest the funds on behalf of the household, which receives a higher return in the event of survival. Otherwise, the financial intermediary will receive the assets.

  17. 17.

    Typically, these models consider households with different income and/or individual productivity levels. We will analyze these types of models in later chapters.

  18. 18.

    For details, see Appendix 3.1.

  19. 19.

    Study how we implemented these conditions in the Gauss program Ch3_turnpike.g.

  20. 20.

    You need to be careful to specify the utility functions in OLG models with economic growth. For an intertemporal elasticity of consumption that is not equal to one, it makes a difference whether utility is specified as a function of individual consumption or individual consumption per efficiency unit. For details see Appendix 3.2.

  21. 21.

    Jagannathan, McGrattan, and Scherbina (2000) note that the so-called equity premium, the difference between the two returns, averaged approximately 7% points during the period 1926–1970 and only approximately 0.7 of percentage points thereafter.

  22. 22.

    However, the validity of the Easterlin paradox is not undisputed; see, for example, Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008).

  23. 23.

    The problem is inspired by the example in Section 3.1 of de la Croix and Michel (2002).

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Appendices

Appendix 3.1: Kuhn-Tucker First-Order Conditions in the Model with Altruistic Bequests

The model with altruistic bequests involves the constraint

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} beq_{t+1} \ge 0.\end{aligned}$$

Households cannot leave negative bequests.

To be more precise, the optimization problem needs to be solved using the Kuhn-Tucker method. The Lagrange function is given by

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}{\mathscr{L}} & = \sum_{t=0}^\infty \frac{1}{(1+R)^t} \Bigg\{ \left[ u(c^1_{t}) + \beta u(c^2_{t+1})\right]+\\& \lambda_t \left[ w_t+beq_t- c^1_t -\frac{c^2_{t+1}+(1+n)beq_{t+1}}{1+r_{t+1}}\right] +\mu_t beq_{t+1} \Bigg\} \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$

with the first-order conditions (with respect to beq t+1):

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1+R} \lambda_{t+1} &= \lambda_t \frac{1+n}{1+r_{t+1}}-\mu_t, \end{aligned} $$
(3.42a)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \mu_{t} \cdot beq_{t+1} &=0, \end{aligned} $$
(3.42b)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \mu_{t}& \ge 0. \end{aligned} $$
(3.42c)

Two cases can be distinguished:

  1. 1.

    beq t+1 > 0: In this case, μ t = 0, and

    $$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1+R} \lambda_{t+1} = \lambda_t \frac{1+n}{1+r_{t+1}}.\end{aligned}$$
  2. 2.

    beq t+1 = 0: μ t ≥ 0, and

    $$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1+R} \lambda_{t+1} \le \lambda_t \frac{1+n}{1+r_{t+1}}.\end{aligned}$$

The conditions are restated in (3.33).

Appendix 3.2: Utility Function and Economic Growth

In the OLG model with economic growth, we assumed the functional form of life-time utility to be represented by (3.36). In this appendix, we study the sensitivity of savings with respect to the choice of the arguments \(c^1_t\) and \(c^2_{t+1}\) in the utility function.

There are basically two definitions of the variables \(c^1_t\) and \(c^2_t\), we might choose from. (1) We can define \(c^1_t\) and \(c^2_{t+1}\) as the per capita consumption of the generation born in period t, \(c^1_t=C^1_t/N_t\) and \(c^2_{t+1}=C^2_{t+1}/N_t\), where \(C^s_t\) denotes total consumption of the s-year old household in period t. This seems to be a natural formulation of preferences. (2) We can employ the arguments \(\tilde c^1_t\equiv C^1_t/(A_t N_t)\) and \(\tilde c^2_{t+1}\equiv C^2_{t+1}/( A_{t+1}N_t )\). We can interpret this alternative behavior in the sense that consumption habits adjust to technological change. The newest computer in 2000 provides the current household with the same utility as the newest computer in 2020 does. As an implication, households do not grow happier over time, which is in accordance with the so-called Easterlin paradox. According to this paradox, a higher level of a country’s per capita gross domestic product does not correlate with greater self-reported levels of happiness among its citizens.Footnote 22

Next, we turn to the question how these two formulations of preferences affect the savings behavior of the household. For this reason, let us generalize life-time utility (3.36) to the case with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1∕σ and (1) let us use individual consumption (or, equally, consumption per household member) as its arguments:

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} U_t = \frac{\left(C^1_t/N_t \right)^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma} +\beta \frac{\left(C^2_{t+1}/{N_{t}} \right)^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma}. \end{aligned} $$
(3.43)

Total savings of the young household with N t members is represented by

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} S_t = A_t N_t w_t -C^1_t,\end{aligned}$$

and total consumption of the household in period 2 is equal to savings plus interest earnings

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} C^2_{t+1} = (1+r_{t+1}) S_t,\end{aligned}$$

such that the intertemporal budget constraint can be formulated in terms of individual consumption \(c^1_t\equiv C^1_t/N_t\) and \(c^2_{t+1}\equiv C^2_{t+1}/N_t\):

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} c^1_t + \frac{c^2_{t+1}}{1+r_{t+1}} = A_t w_t.\end{aligned} $$
(3.44)

Accordingly, we can formulate the Lagrange function of the household as follows:

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned}{\mathscr{L}} = \frac{\left(c^1_t \right)^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma} +\beta \frac{\left(c^2_{t+1} \right)^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma} + \lambda_t \left[A_t w_t -c^1_t- \frac{c^2_{t+1}}{1+r_{t+1}} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

The first-order conditions of the household’s maximization problem follow from the derivation of the above Lagrangean with respect to \(c^1_t\) and \(c^2_{t+1}\):

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \lambda_{t} &= \left(c_t^1\right)^{-\sigma}, \end{aligned} $$
(3.45a)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \frac{\lambda_{t}}{1+r_{t+1}} &= \beta \left(c_{t+1}^2\right)^{-\sigma}, \end{aligned} $$
(3.45b)

and, therefore,

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \left( \frac{c_{t+1}^2}{c_t^1} \right)^{\sigma} = \beta (1+r_{t+1}).\end{aligned} $$
(3.46)

Inserting this first-order condition in the intertemporal budget constraint (3.44), we derive optimal individual consumption

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} c^1_t = \frac{A_t w_t }{1+\beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}-1} } \end{aligned} $$
(3.47)

and, hence, savings

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} s_t & \equiv \frac{S_t}{A_t N_t}\\ & = w_t - \frac{c^1_t}{A_t}\\ & = w_t - \frac{w_t }{1+\beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}-1}}\\ & = \left[ 1- \frac{1 }{1+\beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}-1}} \right] w_t. \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$

Notice that we would have derived the same amount of optimal savings if we had used the arguments \(c^1_t\equiv C^1_t/(A_t N_t)\) and \(c^2_{t+1} \equiv C^2_{t+1}/(A_t N_t)\). In Chaps. 6 and 7, we will use this notation in the life-time utility of the household in a growing economy.

(2) Let us consider the second specification with lifetime utility

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \tilde U_t = \frac{\left(C^1_t/(A_t N_t) \right)^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma} +\beta \frac{\left(C^2_{t+1}/{(A_{t+1}N_{t})} \right)^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma}. \end{aligned} $$
(3.48)

In this case, consumption habits adjust to the level of the current technology A t. Let us now define \(\tilde c^1_t \equiv C^1_t/(A_t N_t)\) and \(\tilde c^2_{t+1}\equiv C^2_{t+1}/(A_{t+1}N_{t})\). With this definition, we can formulate the budgets at age 1 and 2 as follows (using A t+1∕A t = 1 + γ):

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} s_t & = w_t - \tilde c^1_t\\ \tilde c^2_{t+1} & = \frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\gamma} s_t, \end{aligned}\end{aligned} $$

and the intertemporal budget constraint

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} w_t = \tilde c^1_t + \frac{1+\gamma}{1+r_{t+1}} \tilde c^2_{t+1}.\end{aligned} $$
(3.49)

The household maximizes its Lagrangean function

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned}{\mathscr{L}} = \frac{\left(\tilde c^1_t \right)^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma} +\beta \frac{\left(\tilde c^2_{t+1} \right)^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma} + \lambda_t \left[w_t -\tilde c^1_t- \frac{1+\gamma}{1+r_{t+1}} \tilde c^2_{t+1} \right],\end{aligned} $$

with respect to \(\tilde c^1_t\) and \(\tilde c^2_{t+1}\) resulting in the first-order conditions:

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \lambda_{t} &= \left(\tilde c_t^1\right)^{-\sigma}, \end{aligned} $$
(3.50a)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \lambda_{t} \frac{1+\gamma}{1+r_{t+1}}&= \beta \left(\tilde c_{t+1}^2\right)^{-\sigma},\end{aligned} $$
(3.50b)

and, therefore,

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \left( \frac{\tilde c_{t+1}^2}{\tilde c_t^1} \right)^{\sigma} = \beta \frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\gamma}.\end{aligned} $$
(3.51)

Inserting this first-order condition in the intertemporal budget constraint (3.49), we derive optimal individual consumption

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \tilde c^1_t = \frac{w_t }{1+\beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\gamma}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}-1} },\end{aligned} $$
(3.52)

and, hence, savings

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} s_t & \equiv \frac{S_t}{A_t N_t}\\ & = w_t - \tilde c^1_t\\ & = \left[ 1- \frac{1}{1+\beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\gamma}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}-1} } \right]w_t. \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$

Evidently, the two specifications of the lifetime utility (3.43) and (3.48) imply different amounts of savings that are only equal to each other in the case of either no growth with γ = 0 or for σ = 1. Notice that the effect of the utility choice on savings depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1∕σ. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that this elasticity is below one, 1∕σ ≤ 1.0. In this case, specification (3.43) results in lower savings than the alternative (3.48) for positive growth γ > 0.

Problems

3.1

Show that (3.12a) and (3.12b) hold in the case of a production function with constant returns to scale.

3.2

Show that the optimal savings function in the Numerical Example in Sect. 3.2.6 with log-linear utility and Cobb-Douglas production is given by (3.20).

3.3

Consider the Numerical Example in Sect. 3.2.6 with log-linear utility and Cobb-Douglas production.Footnote 23 Analyze whether the allocation in the market economy is efficient.

Next, analyze the effects of a transfer from the young to the old that is administered by a government authority that maintains a balanced budget. Compute the optimal (possibly negative) transfer. How does the transfer depend on the population growth rate? Consider different values n ∈{0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 2.0}.

3.4

Derive (3.35).

3.5

Compute the solution for the transition in the 20-period OLG example model by backward shooting, i.e., starting by providing a guess for k T and finding the solution for k T−1 and so forth.

3.6

Compute the transition in the following 60-period finite-horizon Ramsey model:

Let U be given by a constant elasticity of substitution function

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned}U(C_0, \dots, C_T) := \left \lbrace \sum_{t=0}^T C_t^\varrho \right \rbrace^{1/\varrho}, \qquad \varrho \in (-\infty, 1],\end{aligned} $$

and define \(f(K_t):=K_t^\alpha , \; \alpha \in (0,1)\). Let the household maximize U(C 0, …, C t) subject to the budget constraint

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} K_{t+1} = K_t^\alpha - C_t, \qquad t=0, 1, \dots, T,\end{aligned} $$
(3.53)

implying the first-order conditions

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \left[ \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \right]^{1-\varrho} \alpha K_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} = 1, \qquad t=0, 1, \dots, T-1. \end{aligned} $$
(3.54)

If we eliminate consumption from the second set of equations using the first T + 1 equations, we arrive at a set of T non-linear equations in the T unknowns (K 1, K 2, …, K T):

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 0 &= \left( \frac{K_1^\alpha - K_2}{K_0^\alpha-K_1}\right)^{1-\varrho} - \alpha K_1^{\alpha-1},\\ 0 &= \left( \frac{K_2^\alpha - K_3}{K_1^\alpha-K_2}\right)^{1-\varrho} - \alpha K_2^{\alpha-1},\\ \vdots \\ 0 &= \left( \frac{K_T^\alpha}{K_{T-1}^\alpha-K_T}\right)^{1-\varrho} - \alpha K_T^{\alpha-1}. \end{aligned} \end{aligned} $$
(3.55)

Solve the problem for T = 59, α = 0.35, ϱ = 0.5, k 0 = 0.1 and K 60 = 0.

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Heer, B. (2019). The Overlapping Generations Model. In: Public Economics. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00989-2_3

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