Abstract
The emphasis on this chapter is manifold. The discussion begins with the means of structuring the mortgage securitisation programme. A number of structuring methods including conduit programmes, pass-through and pay-through structures have been taken into consideration. The discussion then moves onto the mortgage origination process while placing an emphasis on the originator in the capacity of the servicer and substitution of residential mortgages. The rest of the chapter looks into aspects of setting up a special purpose vehicle and the subsequent transfer of lender’s rights, the fund manager, and the credit enhancement pertaining to a securitisation programme. Finally, the discussion engages with the process of issuance of securities in residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) programmes in Australia.
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Notes
- 1.
Such as the structure of the RMBS programme; procedural aspects of the mortgage origination process; the establishment of the SPV and the transfer of the lender’s rights to it; the issuance of the mortgage-backed bonds; the credit enhancement mechanisms that are available; and related operational aspects, such as the appointment of a fund manager or other ancillary service providers.
- 2.
See generally, T. Robinson, ‘Securitisation Update,’ Seventh Annual Credit Law Conference, BLEC, Melbourne, September 1997.
- 3.
Generally, the fund manager is appointed by the trustee to administer and manage the mortgage pool, invest liquid funds, and liaise with bond investors and underwriters.
- 4.
Examples of bank RMBS programmes in Australia include Citibank Pty Ltd’s Securitised Australian Mortgage Trust 2003; AMP Bank Ltd’s Progress 2003 Trust; and Suncorp Metway Bank Ltd’s Apollo 2003 Trust: see Standard and Poor’s, ‘RMBS CDO Activity Leads Australian Securitisation Issuance Growth in 2003’, Credit Ratings Commentary and News (Melbourne, July 2003).
- 5.
By way of example, Macquarie Bank Ltd’s PUMA Fund operates one of the largest conduit programmes in Australia: see M. B. Johnson, ‘Oz Securitisation Gathers Pace’ (March 2001) Asiamoney 47, 48; Anon., ‘PUMA Securitisation Pioneer’ (May 1999) Euroweek 19, 20. This programme is sponsored by the fund manager, Macquarie Securitisation Ltd, which is a subsidiary of Macquarie Bank Ltd. In this particular programme, as well as acting as sponsor and fund manager, Macquarie Securitisation Ltd acts as servicer, and there is a separate mortgage manager. Perpetual Trustee Australia Ltd acts as trustee of the fund: see Macquarie Securitisation Ltd., Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Sub-Fund Series 2014 (Sydney, July 2014) particularly at pp 67–68.
- 6.
For a more detailed discussion, see T. Frankel, Securitization: Structured Financing, Financial Assets Pools, and Asset-Backed Securities (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1991) Ch 6; and M. Boolean, ‘Mortgage Securitisation in the United Kingdom’ in C. Stone, A Zissu and J. Lederman (eds.), Asset Securitisation Theory and Practice in Europe (London: Euromoney, 1991) Ch 42.
- 7.
As explained in Chap. 2, “pass-through” issues are issues of debt securities, such as bonds, in which the interest and principal repayments are “passed through” a trust to the investors on a scheduled “periodic payment” basis, at about the same time as they are received from the pool of initial borrowers. More specifically, the principal and interest repayments by home loan borrowers are collected and paid into a “warehouse” fund on a scheduled basis (most commonly, on a monthly basis), and paid out to bondholders on a scheduled basis (most commonly, quarterly or semi-annually, although the frequency of payment depends largely on the cash flow management requirements of the issuer and fund manager). In this context, the “warehouse” fund is a fund, usually in the name of the programme sponsor, and is established for the purpose of temporarily holding an asset until a downstream intermediary (e.g. the trustee of the SPV) is ready to receive it. See I. Ramsay, ‘Financial Innovation and Regulation: The Case of Securitisation’ (1993) Journal of Banking and Financial Law and Practice 169, 171 for further discussion.
- 8.
As noted earlier, “pay-through” issues may be debt securities (e.g. bonds) or equity securities (e.g. ordinary shares). In the case of bonds, the interest and principal repayments are “paid through” a corporate SPV (not a trust) to the investors on a sometimes scheduled (i.e. regular), and sometimes unscheduled (irregular) basis, from the pool of initial borrowers.
In the case of ordinary shares, the principal and interest repayments made by the initial home loan borrowers are paid to a corporate SPV, which then pays them out again to investors in the form of dividend payments on the shares. These dividend payments may be regular (e.g. if the securities issued were preference shares that guaranteed investors a regular dividend), or irregular, as in the case of dividends paid to ordinary shareholders. In this latter case, it would be unusual for the investors (ordinary shareholders) to receive their dividend payments at or about the same time as they are received from the pool of borrowers.
- 9.
In those jurisdictions where pay-through programmes are used, such the United States, a sponsor’s decision to structure its programme as a “pass-through” or “pay-through” programme will depend on programme costs, investor preferences, and the treatment of type of programme under prevailing corporate and tax laws. The type of programme chosen will be the product of a trade-off between these sometimes-competing considerations. For example, the sponsor may choose to save on programme costs by issuing just one class of securities to one type of investor, rather than different classes of securities to multiple classes of investors. It would choose a pass-through programme, rather than a pay-through programme. While this is cheaper, the sponsor foregoes the additional net revenue it might earn from a pay-though programme in which it would be able to access a wide range of potential investors with different preferences in terms of risk, liquidity, and investment horizon.
Alternatively, the sponsor’s target investors might prefer that the regular (e.g. monthly) home loan repayments from borrowers are reconfigured into different (e.g. quarterly or semi-annual) payment streams. By contrast, investors might prefer, for asset/liability management purposes, that the incoming regular home loan repayments of principal and interest are reconfigured so that, in terms of the bonds issued by the SPV, the principal is paid at maturity in one “bullet payment”, rather than, for example, on a “reducing principal” basis over the term of the bond facility.
- 10.
It is noteworthy that even in a pass-through structure there could be junior and senior note structures similar to a typical pay-through structure. In such a securitisation programme, junior notes will be subordinated to senior notes. We will be discussing some practical examples of a pay-through structure with subordinated junior notes in Chap. 7.
- 11.
Cf. also I.H. Giddy, ‘Alternative Forms of Asset-Backed Securities’, delivered at Workshop on Asset-Backed Securities, New York University, 2001, 2–4, who notes, in a US context:
A basic premise of the pass-through structure is that reconfiguration of the cash flows is not permitted [under US tax law], as it would cause the trust to be deemed a taxable entity. Instead of being taxed directly, the trust’s tax liabilities flow through to the holders of the pass-through certificates. Pass through payments should match the incoming payments on the assets. Imputed or actual principal and interest payments from payer may not be re-characterised, as would be the case, for example, with discount or premium prices paid for loan pools. The interest portion of a payment stream may be divided, for example, among investors and the servicer, or to support credit enhancement, but principal must be passed through to repay investors as received. Thus, in a pass-through security, the economics of the debt instrument issued [are] essentially the same as [those] of the underlying asset or asset pool… [In contrast], investors in a pay-through are no longer [equitable] owners in underlying assets; they have simply invested in a bond backed by some assets. Therefore, the issuing entity can manipulate the cash flows without tax consequences, hence the use of the pay-through structure for CMOs which manipulate the incoming cash flows into separate payment streams. Thus pay-through securities may be structured so that asset cash flows can be reconfigured to support forms of debt unlike those of the underlying assets.
In the market nomenclature, “CMOs” are collateralised mortgage obligations—a basic form of pay-through mortgage-backed security used in the United States.
- 12.
See, Master Information Memorandum PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 2.
- 13.
Sections 710–723 of Ch. 6D of the Corporations Act.
- 14.
Specifically, those debt securities that fall within the definition of “debentures” in section 9 of the Corporations Act, and which are regulated by Ch. 2 L of the Act. See Chap. 6 of this book for further details.
- 15.
See, for example, section 283AA of the Corporations Act and Chap. 6 of this book.
- 16.
For example, one of the conditions might be that the borrower maintains full replacement home owner’s insurance on the mortgaged property.
- 17.
For example, RAMS Home Loans Ltd, Wizard Loans Pty Ltd, or Aussie Home Loans Ltd.
- 18.
This escrow account is set up to absorb any losses from the housing loan defaults or repayment shortfalls.
- 19.
See, for example, see Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Sub-Fund Series 2014 at p 75.
- 20.
Some mortgages that comprise the initial pool will be discharged or enforced earlier than expected, so that the trustee/issuer may miss out on cash flow needed to fund the RMBS issue. The realisation or redemption value to the trustee/issuer in such a situation will reflect the expected foregone repayments from housing loan borrowers, but not any unexpected cash flows (e.g. from unanticipated interest rate changes).
- 21.
The substitution of mortgages can be used to extend the life of a bond issue, making RMBSs more attractive for certain investors and allowing the issuer to spread the recovery of its initial expenses over a longer period, which may be useful for the issuer in managing its tax liabilities.
- 22.
For example, in the context of the PUMA programme, which allows the substitution of mortgages, see Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 4.7.3.
- 23.
Ibid.
- 24.
Id, paragraph 5.2
- 25.
Id, paragraph 4.8.1.
- 26.
These include principal receipts in respect of mortgages of the fund; payments under the lender’s mortgage insurance policies in respect of principal outstanding under mortgages; and any compensation received from a mortgage manager for outstanding principal under any mortgage.
- 27.
For further detail, see S. Gangwani, ‘MBS Structuring: Concepts and Techniques’ (1998) 1 The Securitization Conduit 26, 32.
- 28.
P. Murray and B. Hadaway, ‘Mortgage-Backed Securities: An Investigation of Legal and Financial Issues’ (1986) 11 Journal of Corporation Law 203, 210.
- 29.
(1862) 10 HL Cas 191, 211; [1861] All ER Rep 414, 418 as explained in Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; [1886–90] ALL ER Rep 486 HL; and D. Campbell (ed.), International Asset Securitisation and Other Financing Tools (N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 2000) Ch. 8.
- 30.
Macquarie Bank’s PUMA programme is one such Master Trust fund in Australia: see Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 2.
- 31.
See, for example, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraphs 4.17, 7.4. See also K. N. Klee, and B. C. Butler, ‘Asset-Backed Securitization, Special Purpose Vehicles and Other Securitization Issues’ (2002) 35 (2) Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 23. S. Senarath (2016), Not so ‘“Bankruptcy-Remote”: An insight into Sri Lankan Securitization Practices in a Post_GFC Context’ (Paper presented at the MAC-MME conference, Prague, Czech Republic); Senarath, S. ‘The Dodd-Frank Act doesn’t solve the principal-agent problem in asset securitisation’ (2017) blogs.lse.ac.uk (11 November 2018).
- 32.
For instance, in the context of Macquarie Bank’s PUMA Fund, the ultimate beneficial interest is held by the fund manager Macquarie Securitisation Ltd as capital and income unit holder. See, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Sub-Fund Series 2014, at p 21.
- 33.
These concepts, and their relevance to RMBS issues, are discussed in more detail in Chap. 5.
- 34.
In the context of the Macquarie Bank’s PUMA programme, see, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraphs 5.1–5.3.
- 35.
See D. Glennie and E. Bouter, Securitisation (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998) 4–5.
- 36.
The consequences of the mortgage originator becoming insolvent are discussed in further detail in Chap. 7.
- 37.
While the trustee (or security trustee, if any) of the SPV holds the legal title to the residential mortgage loans, investors in the RMBSs acquire a concomitant beneficial interest by paying a price for the loan receivables equal to their present value. This present value reflects the rate of return the trustee-issuer wants to offer to the investors and must be lower than the inherent rate of return of the loan receivables if the overall transaction is to be profitable.
- 38.
Insolvency-remote in this context means that the SPV is unlikely to be adversely affected by a bankruptcy of the originator. Such insolvency issues are discussed in Chap. 7. See also T. J. Gordon, ‘Securitization of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales’ (2000) 67 (4) The University of Chicago Law Review 1317.
- 39.
L. R. Lupica, ‘Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization’ (2000) 33 Connecticut Law Review 199.
- 40.
G. Engel and A. Koslow, ‘Securitization Advise for Asset-Based Lenders’, in J. Cunningham (ed.), Asset Based Financing (N.Y.: Practising Law Institute, 1996) 479.
- 41.
Bankers Trust, ‘Securitisation in Australia’ (May 1999) Asiamoney 17, 18; Standard and Poor’s, (July 2003); and A. Finch, ‘Securitisation’ (1995) 6 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 247, 262.
- 42.
For example, in the context of the PUMA programme, Macquarie Securitisation Ltd is typically appointed as fund manager: see, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 7.3.
- 43.
The fund manager is typically authorised to withdraw funds from the issuer’s bank accounts for these purposes.
- 44.
See, for example, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Sub-Fund Series 2014, p 99.
- 45.
This management deed may entrust the fund manager with other powers. For example, in Macquarie Bank’s PUMA programme, the fund manager retains the legal right to reset the interest rate and take enforcement proceedings: see, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 5.2. However, the fund manager is itself subject to fiduciary obligations with regard to the manner in which it exercises these powers: see, for example, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraphs 4.1–4.5. Moreover, the trust deed does not typically extend to authorising the fund manager to sell mortgages or release them without the security trustee’s authorisation: see, for example, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 5.2. Furthermore, upon the occurrence of certain events specified in the management deed, the fund manager’s appointment can be terminated and a new manager appointed. Those circumstances include the commencement of winding up of the fund manager, and the appointment of a receiver to the fund manager: see, for example, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 7.1.
- 46.
- 47.
E.g. in entering contacts on behalf of the trustee.
- 48.
David Jones, ‘Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues’ (2000) 24 Journal of Banking & Finance 35; Samantha Menzies, ‘Increased Scrutiny’ (2015) 5 Australian Securitisation Journal 12.
- 49.
Standard and Poor’s, ‘Mortgage-Backed Criteria’ (1999) Structured Finance Australia and New Zealand 38–39; L. Hsu and C. Mohebbi, ‘Credit Enhancement in ABS Structure’ in F. J. Fabozzi (ed.), Accessing Capital Markets Through Securitization (Pennsylvania: FJA Associates, 2001) 35. These risks include credit risk, liquidity risk, and revenue risk. Credit risk is the risk of loss resulting to the issuer if a home loan borrower defaults. Liquidity risk is the risk of delay between the receipt of funds from the home loan borrower, and the due date for payment of interest on the securities and other expenses. Revenue risk can be sub-divided into “interest rate differential” risk (i.e. the risk that the interest payments being made by the home loan borrowers will be insufficient for the issuer to make the interest payments due on the RMBSs issued) and re-investment risk (i.e. the risk that the rate of return on the issuer’s liquid funds will be less than that which is due on the securities issued). Each of these risks can be minimised or managed by various mechanisms, including interest rate futures, options, and swaps. A detailed discussion of these instruments is beyond the scope of this book. However, for a broad overview of these risk management tools in an Australian context, see, for example, G. Pierson et al., Business Finance (Sydney: McGraw-Hill, 2002); S. Bishop et al., Corporate Finance (Sydney: Pearson Education, 2000); or R. Bruce et al., Handbook of Australian Corporate Finance (5th edition, Sydney: Butterworths, 1997).
- 50.
Other methods include over-collateralisation (discussed separately below) and, as noted earlier, third-party guarantees. For a detailed discussion of credit enhancement methods, see L. Hsu and C. Mohebbi (2001) 35.
- 51.
For example, Commercial Union Australia Mortgage Insurance Corporation Ltd (CUAMIC); Housing Loan Insurance Corporation (HLIC); MGICA Ltd; Sun Alliance and Royal Mortgage Insurance Ltd: Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 8.
- 52.
See, for example, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 6.1.
- 53.
Ibid, The Consumer Credit Code is also discussed in further detail in Chap. 5.
- 54.
See, for example, L. Hsu and C. Mohebbi, (2001) 35, 37.
- 55.
See, for instance, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 4.5.
- 56.
Sandaer A Davidson, Wolff L and Ching A, Securitization: Structuring and Investment Analysis (John Wiley & Sons 2003).
- 57.
Again, see, for example, L. Hsu and C. Mohebbi (2001) 35.
- 58.
For example, Macquarie Bank’s PUMA Fund holds a cash reserve known as a “principal cash balance”: see, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraphs 6.4 and 4.4.7. On each issue date, a certain amount of the proceeds of the issue of bonds is held as a principal cash balance, which is invested in authorised investments other than mortgages: see, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 7.5. The fund manager determines the amount to be held as the principal cash balance from time to time. Provided this does not result in a downgrading in the rating of the PUMA bonds, the principal cash balance must not at any time be greater than 2% of the then principal balance of all the bonds: Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7 paragraph 4.4.7. If the collections on housing loans, and any other collections, on a particular payment date are insufficient to meet the expenses of the fund, including interest on the bonds, then the principal cash balance is used to pay those expenses.
- 59.
Or strictly, risk-transfer methods.
- 60.
The value of the collateral in mortgage-backed securities is the liquidation value of the underlying security properties. There are a number of reasons for over-collateralising bonds. First, the cash flow from the residential loans accrues first to the originator, and only then to the pool and ultimately to bondholders. Therefore, there is a risk that balance available from the mortgage pool may not keep pace with the issuer’s obligations in relation to principal and interest payments on the bonds. Second, additional collateral protects bondholders against defaults on individual loans and against any decline in the market value of the security properties between valuation dates. Third, originators typically prefer this arrangement over higher-paying yields to investors as compensation for higher default risk and possible depreciation in the value of security properties. Payments on the excess collateral are reinvested and returned to the originators when the bonds are paid off: see C. Pavel, ‘Securitization’ (Jul-Aug. 1986) Economic Perspective (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) 16, 18. The value of the collateral is reviewed regularly and, when appropriate, re-valued to the market value of the pooled assets. The issuer may be required to “top up” the value of the collateral during the life of the bond issue to cover any prepayments or defaults.
- 61.
See F. Fabozzi, (ed.), The Handbook of Mortgage-Backed Securities (Massachusetts: Probus Publishing Co, 1995) Ch. 16, 263.
- 62.
For example, bonds issued by the trustee of Macquarie Bank’s PUMA Fund are structured as pass-through debt securities, issued by the trustee-issuer as floating rate or fixed rate bonds: see, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraphs 2 and 4.3. The bonds are secured by residential mortgages and other “authorised investments” in the Fund. Bonds will initially be issued in minimum parcels of a least $1,000,000, although each bond has a denomination (or face value) of $10,000. Bonds issued by the trustee of the PUMA Fund are offered to professional investors and accordingly do not need to comply with the disclosure provisions relating to investors in section 708 of the Corporations Act. See, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraphs 1.8 and 1.10. For a further discussion, see Chap. 6.
The bonds are issued in multiple series, with each series giving investors different rights. A series may comprise three classes of bonds: (1) senior bonds, (2) subordinated bonds, and (3) fast prepayment bonds. Principal repayments on senior and subordinated bonds are made on quarterly coupon interest payment dates, and on fast prepayment bonds, they are made on monthly coupon interest payment dates. As a general rule, interest and principal payments on senior and fast prepayment bonds rank ahead of those payments on subordinated bonds: see, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7 paragraphs 4.3.5–4.3.7, 4.8. Senior bonds in each series are divided into tranches, and bear floating or fixed rate coupon interest. Subordinated bondholders are generally subordinated in favour of senior and Fast Prepayment bondholders in relation to both interest and principal. Fast prepayment bonds bear monthly payments of floating rate coupon interest and principal and convert to senior bonds if they are not fully repaid by the first quarterly coupon interest and payment date. These bonds are issued to assist in the funding of redraws of prepaid principal by borrowers and principal increases and further advances on the mortgage loans.
The bonds are typically issued in the form of registered securities. The actual debt obligation is constituted in a separate document from the security itself. In the separate document, the issuer promises to pay the investors, who from time to time appear on a register as a holder of the relevant security. Each bondholder is issued with a “Bondholder Acknowledgement” under which the trustee-issuer acknowledges that the bondholder has been entered in the register as the holder of particular bonds. See, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraphs 4.12 and 4.13.
- 63.
The payment of principal and interest on the bonds themselves is not dependent upon the cash flow of the underlying loan assets. Housing loan repayments typically comprise principal and interest (to reduce the risk of borrowers’ default), but such payments are said to be inconvenient for institutional investors, since the capital and income components of the repayments must be separated for different tax treatments, and the frequency of repayments does not generally match the frequency of payments under the trustee-issuer’s own obligations to investors: see F.J. Fabozzi, ‘Mortgages’, in F.J. Fabozzi (ed.), The Handbook of Mortgage-Backed Securities (Massachusetts: Probus Publishing Co, 1995) 9–10.
- 64.
For instance, under Macquarie Bank’s PUMA programme, the bondholders are entitled to transfer their bonds in the secondary market subject to the following conditions:
-
The offer for sale or invitation to purchase of the bonds is not an offer or invitation that requires disclosure under Part 6D.2 of the Corporations Act.
-
The transfer must be made in compliance with Part 6D.2 of the Corporations Act.
The bonds are only purchased or sold by execution and registration of a Transfer and Acceptance in the prescribed form: see Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraphs 4.12–4.15. The Bond Transfer and Acceptance Form must be duly stamped (if applicable), executed by the transferor and the transferee, and lodged for registration, together with a Bondholder Acknowledgement under which the trustee-issuer acknowledges that the bondholder has been entered in the register as the holder of securities.
The trustee-issuer may refuse registration of the Bond Transfer and Acceptance if it is not duly executed or if it would result in a contravention of terms of the trust deed or relevant legislation. The trustee-issuer is not, under the conditions of the bond issue, bound to provide reasons for any refusal of registration.
Upon receipt of the transfer and acceptance form, the trustee-issuer registers the transferee in the Register of Bond Acceptance Transfers, which under the conditions of the bond issue constitutes passing of title in the bond to the transferee. Until this occurs, the trustee can recognise only the transferor as the holder, and all payment notices are made in the interim to the transferor.
-
- 65.
Secondary market trades are effected by book entry transfers in the Austraclear system, rather than physical delivery of particular bond certificates.
- 66.
See, Master Information Memorandum, PUMA Fund P-7, paragraph 4.19.
- 67.
See Chap. 6 for further detail.
- 68.
See Chap. 4 for a discussion of capital adequacy requirements for Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs).
- 69.
I.e. loans reflected as assets on its balance sheet.
- 70.
For a description of the various structures of securitisation transactions, see D. C. Bonsall (ed.), Securitisation (London: Butterworths, 1990) Ch 1; R. S. Borod (ed.), Securitization – Asset-Backed and Mortgaged- Backed Securities (Boston: Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer, 1995); and J. C. Shenker and A. J. Colletta, (1991).
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Rajapakse, P., Senarath, S. (2019). Structuring and Issuance in Residential Mortgage Securitisation. In: Commercial Law Aspects of Residential Mortgage Securitisation in Australia. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00605-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00605-1_3
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-00604-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-00605-1
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)