Abstract
Although Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) tools are increasingly capable, modern multi-tenant cloud providers are hesitant to expose the sensitive hypervisor APIs necessary for tenants to use them. Outside the cloud, VMI and virtualization-based security’s adoption rates are rising and increasingly considered necessary to counter sophisticated threats. This paper introduces Furnace, an open source VMI framework that outperforms prior frameworks by satisfying both a cloud provider’s expectation of security and a tenant’s desire to run their own custom VMI tools underneath their cloud VMs. Furnace’s flexibility and ease of use is demonstrated by porting four existing security and monitoring tools as Furnace VMI apps; these apps are shown to be resource efficient while executing up to 300x faster than those in previous VMI frameworks. Furnace’s security properties are shown to protect against the actions of malicious tenant apps.
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Notes
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2017 Roundup of Cloud Computing Forecasts, https://goo.gl/pJ9uj2.
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Microsoft Virtualization-Based Security: https://goo.gl/eixiqr.
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BitDefender Hypervisor Introspection: https://goo.gl/MrZFQj.
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This list is an expansion of the five framework problems described by CloudPhylactor.
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Similarly, while Furnace was developed on Xen, it can also support KVM when equipped with a KVM-compatible \(L_2\) component.
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Lambda represents container-based sandboxes in part because it is routinely audited.
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While this precludes multithreaded apps, Sect. 6.2 shows performance is acceptable. Heavy processing is better accomplished by the app ’s backend, which lacks this restriction.
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Acknowledgement
We thank the anonymous reviewers, William Enck, Nathan Hicks, Luke Deshotels, and Isaac Polinsky for their comments.
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Bushouse, M., Reeves, D. (2018). Furnace: Self-service Tenant VMI for the Cloud. In: Bailey, M., Holz, T., Stamatogiannakis, M., Ioannidis, S. (eds) Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses. RAID 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11050. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00470-5_30
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