Abstract
Network Address Translation (NAT) routers aggregate the flows of multiple devices behind a single IP address. By doing so, NAT routers masquerade the original IP address, which is often viewed as a privacy feature, making it harder to identify the communication of individuals devices behind the NAT. De-NAT is the reverse process: re-identifying communication flowing into and out of the NAT. De-NAT can be used for traffic management, security, and lawful surveillance.
We show how DNS requests provide an effective De-NAT mechanism by observing queries to open resolver, in addition to ‘classical’ provider-based De-NAT. This new method allows de-NATing in cases where known schemes fail, e.g., in Windows 8 and 10, and by remote DNS resolvers. We analyze use cases where the suggested DNS based De-NAT is effective, suggest a De-NAT algorithm and evaluate its performance on real (anonymized) traffic. Another contribution is identifying the phenomena of drum beats, which are periodic DNS requests by popular applications and processes; these can allow long-term de-NATing, and also provide fingerprinting identifying specific devices and users. We conclude with recommendations for mitigating de-NATing.
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Notes
- 1.
Statistics at the front page of https://www.opendns.com/.
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Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Amit Klein for his helpful comments. Many thanks to Roland van Rijswijk-Deij for his support during this project. This work was supported by the Israeli ministry of Science, grant number 3-11857. Part of the data that led to this research was provided by SURFnet, the National Research and Education Network in the Netherlands, https://www.surfnet.nl/en/.
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Orevi, L., Herzberg, A., Zlatokrilov, H. (2018). DNS-DNS: DNS-Based De-NAT Scheme. In: Camenisch, J., Papadimitratos, P. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11124. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00434-7_4
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