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Protean Signature Schemes

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Book cover Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11124))

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Abstract

We introduce the notion of Protean Signature schemes. This novel type of signature scheme allows to remove and edit signer-chosen parts of signed messages by a semi-trusted third party simultaneously. In existing work, one is either allowed to remove or edit parts of signed messages, but not both at the same time. Which and how parts of the signed messages can be modified is chosen by the signer. Thus, our new primitive generalizes both redactable (Steinfeld et al., ICISC ’01, Johnson et al., CT-RSA ’02 & Brzuska et al., ACNS ’10) and sanitizable signatures schemes (Ateniese et al., ESORICS ’05 & Brzuska et al., PKC ’09). We showcase a scenario where either primitive alone is not sufficient. Our provably secure construction (offering both strong notions of transparency and invisibility) makes only black-box access to sanitizable and redactable signature schemes, which can be considered standard tools nowadays. Finally, we have implemented our scheme; Our evaluation shows that the performance is reasonable.

This research was supported by European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 644962 prismacloud, No 653454 credential, No 783119 secredas and No 321310 percy.

K. Samelin—Part of this work was done while the third author was also at IBM Research – Zurich.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Strictly speaking, there are approaches with additional secret keys, but they are not required for our construction [37].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Vienna, Austria

    Stephan Krenn & Daniel Slamanig

  2. ISL & Chair of IT-Security, University of Passau, Passau, Germany

    Henrich C. Pöhls

  3. TÜV Rheinland i-sec GmbH, Hallbergmoos, Germany

    Kai Samelin

  4. TU Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Kai Samelin

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  1. Stephan Krenn
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Correspondence to Kai Samelin .

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  1. IBM Research - Zurich, Rüschlikon, Switzerland

    Jan Camenisch

  2. KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

    Panos Papadimitratos

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Krenn, S., Pöhls, H.C., Samelin, K., Slamanig, D. (2018). Protean Signature Schemes. In: Camenisch, J., Papadimitratos, P. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11124. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00434-7_13

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