Abstract
The aim of my paper is to study the relations between habit and the operation of intellection in Aquinas. I will start with a presentation of the acquisition of intellection and the constitution of intellectual habit. I will then turn to the problem of the reactivation of the “stored” intelligible species, which constitutes the intellectual habit. This reactivation, for Aquinas, is not yet the act of intellection. Indeed, an additional step is required in order for intellection to be achieved, namely an “operation.” I will explain why this additional step is needed. In his later works, following Augustine, Aquinas holds that the operation of the intellect, besides the use of the species, entails the production of another means of cognition: the “word.” I will argue in favour of the view that the later Aquinas does not abandon the first type of intellectual operation, based only on the species, but maintains both operations in parallel, and that his reason for maintaining these two different operations is that the species and the word provide different kinds of cognition. I will then tackle the complicated question as to how this difference of cognition is to be accounted for at the habitual level.
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Notes
- 1.
Recently, this theme has been thoroughly discussed by Pini (2015), whose theses I will present in the course of the argument. For analyses of Aquinas’s theory of cognition in general and of intellection in particular, see Pasnau (1997), Panaccio (2001), Perler (2002, 31–105), as well as Michon (2007; 2009). Note that in contemporary discussions, the main debate on Aquinas’s theory of intellection concerns the epistemological position of his cognitive means (the “intelligible species” and the “word,” on which more will be said below): are they in the foreground of the act of intellection, and is Aquinas an “indirect realist,” as Pasnau, Panaccio and, more recently, Băltuţă (2009–2010) claim? Or are they in the background of the act of intellection, and is Aquinas a “direct realist,” as Perler and Michon argue? In this paper, I intend to stay neutral on this question: my discussion of habit and the operation of intellection is meant to be compatible with both accounts of the way in which the intellect relates to reality, i.e. indirectly or directly.
- 2.
For a recent discussion of Aquinas’s notion of nature or essence, see Brower (2016).
- 3.
This causal explanation has its origins in Aristotle’s De anima. For the relevant texts in Aquinas, see in particular Thomas Aquinas, In De anima and Q. disp. de anima, as well as ST I, q. 78, art. 3; q. 79, art. 3; and q. 84, art. 6. For more on this causal process, see Pasnau (1997), Perler (2002, 31–105), as well as Pini (2015), who quotes many of the relevant texts.
- 4.
Note that I will not treat of Aquinas’s theory of the moral habit. On this question, see Darge and Löwe, both in this volume, respectively p. 143–165 and p. 167–184. For additional discussion on the intellectual habit in Aquinas, see also Bermon, in this volume, p. 304–306.
- 5.
See Aristotle, De an. 2.5, 417a21–b2. On Aristotle’s account of habit, see Boulnois, in this volume, p. 27–34.
- 6.
See Avicenna, Liber de anima, pars 5, c. 6, quoted by Pini (2015, draft version), as well as Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 79, art. 6, and q. 84, art. 7.
- 7.
- 8.
See in particular Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1; ST I, q. 56, art. 1 and q. 85, art. 2, quoted by Pini (2015, 87n18).
- 9.
See for example Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2, which is not restricted to the reactivation of the habitual species, since intellection is compared to sensation, where there is no habit.
- 10.
See again Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2. One passage in which this claim appears rather clearly can be found in the Parma edition of Aquinas’s Sentences commentary at In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1 (Opera Omnia 6: 328a), quoted by Mandonnet in a note on this passage (ed. Mandonnet, 943n1). For other passages, see Solère, this volume p. 205–227. On Aquinas’s acceptance of a sensitive operation that succeeds the reception of the sensible species, see also Cajetan, In ST I, q. 85, art. 2.
- 11.
Note that for Aquinas, an action “in the proper sense” (proprie) is “transitive,” i.e. it “proceeds from the agent in an external thing that it modifies”: see De veritate, q. 8, art. 6, quoted by Schmidt (1966, 154n90). Yet even if cognitive operations do not possess that feature, Aquinas counts them explicitly among “actions.” Indeed, following Aristotle, he states that “actions are twofold” (duplex est actio), cognitive operations being a special kind of action, in the sense that they have no product at all, or have a product that remains inside the agent (see especially ST I, q. 85, art. 2 and De potentia, q. 8, art. 1). Although the term “action” (actio) evokes the term “act” (actus), which, in turn, could refer both to active and passive items, Aquinas seems to count cognitive operations among active ones, as stated in ST I, q. 56, art. 1: “The object united to the potency is related to such action like the form which is the principle of the action in other agents: indeed, just as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire, the species of the seen thing is the formal principle of vision in the eye.” On the account of cognitive operations as actions, see also Pini (2015), who quotes ST I, q. 56, art. 1. For more on the specific characteristics of cognitive actions in Aquinas, see the discussion below.
- 12.
- 13.
Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 55, n. 4; De veritate, q. 10, art. 2, ad 7, and q. 13, art. 3, corp. For the identification of intention and conversion, see Pasnau (1997, 135).
- 14.
- 15.
Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 55, n. 4.
- 16.
See Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 13, art. 3, corp., and Augustine, De Trinitate, esp. 11.2.
- 17.
This is defended in Caston (2001).
- 18.
See Augustine, De musica 6.5 and Solère (2007, 76).
- 19.
See in particular Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1. For a concise presentation of the chronology of Aquinas’s works, see Schmidt (1966, 148nn74–75).
- 20.
See Aristotle, Met. 9.8, 1050a34–35 and, more broadly, Met. 9.6 and 9.8.
- 21.
See Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53; IV, c. 11; De potentia, q. 8, art. 1; and De rationibus fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum, c. 3. Augustine introduces his notion of word in De Trinitate 15.12, quoted and discussed by Lonergan (1997, 7). See also ST I, q. 85, art. 2, ad 3, where Aquinas similarly accepts a productive operation at the sensitive level, for imagination.
- 22.
Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 8, art. 1.
- 23.
On this question, see the interesting discussion in John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, art. 3, analysed by Pini (2015).
- 24.
For a discussion of the phenomenon of authority in the Middle Ages, see the volume edited by Kangas, Korpiola, and Ainonen (2013). In the volume mentioned, on Augustine, see in particular Otto (2013), who insists on his influence in the Middle Ages. Note however that Augustine was not always followed by medieval thinkers, but also sometimes challenged. On the complex medieval reception of Augustine, see Stone (2001).
- 25.
On the fact that “actions,” in Aristotle, “are twofold” (duplex est actio), and that cognitive operations are actions, although of a peculiar kind, see again Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1, as well as ST I, q. 56, art. 1 and q. 85, art. 2, quoted by Pini (2015, 87n18).
- 26.
On the fact that the species must be fully active in order for the intellect to produce a word, see especially Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53 and De potentia, q. 8, art. 1.
- 27.
See Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2; q. 56, art. 1. For the chronology of Aquinas’s works, see again Schmidt (1966, 148nn74–75).
- 28.
Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53, n. 3.
- 29.
Thomas Aquinas, Super Ioannem, c. 1, lect. 1. See also De potentia, q. 8, art. 1 and ST I, q. 85, art. 2.
- 30.
On the different levels of intellection, see Perler (2002, 61).
- 31.
Thomas Aquinas, In I Phys., lect. 1. See also ST I, q. 85, art. 3. Both texts are quoted and discussed by Amerini (forthcoming).
- 32.
Note that this is also how Amerini (forthcoming) explains the opposition between these two cognitive means: he holds that the intelligible species is “the first-impressed, stable but still opaque set of information acquired from a thing via sense-perception and imagination,” and that the word is more distinct than the species. Yet Amerini seems to hold that beside the species and the word, there is another cognitive means in Aquinas, namely the “definition,” which is still more distinct than the word. In my opinion, the definition is not an additional cognitive means, but is the word itself.
- 33.
See Aquinas, De rationibus fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum, c. 3.
- 34.
See also Amerini (forthcoming), who holds that “x is cognized distinctly either when the elements or the principles into which x can be resolved are cognized distinctly or when x cannot be resolved in further elements or principles.”
- 35.
See Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 93, art. 7, quoted by Pini (2015, draft version).
- 36.
See Augustine, De Trinitate 14.7 (ed. Mountain, 434.49). On Augustine’s theory of habit, see Bochet and Trego, both in this volume, respectively p. 47–66 and p. 89–93.
- 37.
This paper was written in the context of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) research project “Dispositions and Relations in Late Ancient and Early Medieval Philosophy” (project no. 152884). A first draft of this paper was presented in October 2015 in Paris at the conference “Habitus in Latin Medieval Philosophy.” I thank the participants for their valuable comments, in particular Gyula Klima, Can Laurens Löwe, Dominik Perler, Martin Pickavé, and Jean-Luc Solère. As well, I thank Magali Roques for her very helpful written comments. Besides, my acknowledgment goes to two anonymous referees for their reviews. I am also grateful to Elena Băltuţă and Paolo Rubini for our numerous discussions on the intelligible species, the word, and their differences in Aquinas. Finally, I thank Nicole Standen-Mills and Ian C. Drummond for checking my English.
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Taieb, H. (2018). Intellection in Aquinas: From Habit to Operation. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_7
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