Abstract
This essay examines the theological concept of a habitus, the problems it was intended to solve, and how it was developed by masters of Paris in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. I argue that Peter Lombard and Peter of Poitiers embraced the broad concept of a habitus they found in Augustine’s work: that by which something is done when there is a need. A habitus, then, did not have to be acquired by practice, and it might never be manifest in the agent’s behaviour, because the need for it might never arise. This conception of a habitus was wide enough to encompass both naturally acquired dispositions and God-given dispositions, such as the virtues that theologians thought young children received through the grace of baptism. On the other hand, neither Peter Lombard nor Peter of Poitiers tried to explain how an adult with a virtuous habitus could fail to exercise it when appropriate circumstances arose. Stephen Langton broke new ground in arguing that an adult with a virtuous habitus might still lack the necessary power or strength to resist temptation. Stephen’s effort to account for moral failure by appealing to empirical psychology represents a step beyond the more idealized (and philosophically puzzling) teachings of his predecessors.
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Notes
- 1.
Paris Nat. lat. 3804 A, ed. Lottin (1957, 521): “Dicendum est quod loquendo theologice oportet dicere quod habitus de necessitate precedit omnem operationem bonam. […] [D]icunt theologi quod bonum est infusum a Deo quo dirigete bene operamur. Et sic non sumus solum principium boni, sed nos cum alio. […] Aliter potest dici, et ista solutio est secundum philosophos et non secundum theologos; et tunc dicendum est quod nos sumus principium virtutis tantum; unde voluntas que est in nobis existens et determinata est causa operationis; que operatio causat virtutem; et secundum istum modum dicendum est quod operationes de necessitate antecedunt et nullus habitus antecedit operationes in moralibus.” All translations in this essay are my own.
- 2.
Excerpts from relevant texts are given by Lottin (1949).
- 3.
- 4.
Luther attributes the idea of charity as a habitus to the influence of Aristotle, “a stinking philosopher” (rancidus philosophus). This particular remark has attracted the attention of scholars since the pioneering study of Vignaux (1935). For a recent discussion of it, see Rosemann (2007, 180–183).
- 5.
According to the testimony of Robert de Courçon, quoted by Lottin (1949, 136).
- 6.
During the Middle Ages, even Thomas Aquinas ’s own order, the Dominicans, did not use his (now) famous Summa theologiae as a theology textbook.
- 7.
See Colish (1994, 15–32).
- 8.
For biographical information see Baldwin (1970, 44–45).
- 9.
See Quinto (2011).
- 10.
For a more comprehensive treatment of Augustine ’s concept of habitus, see Isabelle Bochet ’s article in the present volume, p. 47–66.
- 11.
Augustine , De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 73.1 (CCL 44A: 209): ‘[M]ultis modis habitum dicimus: vel habitum animi, sicuti est cuiuscumque disciplinae perception usu roborata atque firmata.”
- 12.
Peter Abelard , Ethica (ed. Luscombe, 129).
- 13.
Augustine, Retractationes 2.22.1 (CCL 57: 107–108).
- 14.
Marriage again became the centre of controversy in 1123, when the first Lateran Council voted to nullify all marriages by priests and monks. This helps to explain why excerpts from Augustine ’s On the Good of Marriage were so often copied and circulated at the time. For additional information on this topic see Kent (2013, esp. 124–125).
- 15.
Augustine, De bono coniugali 21.25 (ed. Walsh , 46): “Continentia quippe non corporis, sed animi virtus est. Virtutes autem animi aliquando in opere manifestantur, aliquando in habitu latent.” Augustine wrote this treatise around 401.
- 16.
Augustine, De bono coniugali 21.25 (ed. Walsh, 46): “Ipse est enim habitus quo aliquid agitur cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi sed non opus est.”
- 17.
Augustine uses these expressions interchangeably.
- 18.
Augustine , De bono coniugali 22.27 (ed. Walsh , 50).
- 19.
It seems to me that vices are the only dispositions recognized by Aristotle but excluded by Augustine. They do not meet Augustine’s description of a disposition, since there can never be any objective need for someone to exercise a vice. Of course, Augustine recognizes that someone with a particular vice might feel that he needs to act in accordance with it. Some texts, especially the Confessions, even suggest that a person might have acted badly for so long that what was once a choice has become a (self-created) “necessity.” However, Augustine associates this subjective kind of need or “necessity” with a habit (consuetudo), not with what he regards as a disposition (habitus). As Prendiville (1972) shows, Augustine tends to use “habit” pejoratively, to mean bad habit.
- 20.
Augustine, De bono coniugali 23.30 (ed. Walsh, 54).
- 21.
Augustine, De bono coniugali 23.28–29 (ed. Walsh, 52–53).
- 22.
Augustine , De bono coniugali 21.26 (ed. Walsh , 48): “[S]icut non est impar meritum patientiae in Petro qui passus est et in Iohanne qui passus non est, sic non est impar meritum continentiae in Iohanne qui nullas expertus est nuptias et in Abraham qui filios generavit. Et illius enim celibatus et illius conubium pro temporum distributione Christo militaverunt; sed continentiam Iohannes et in opere, Abraham vero in solo habitu habebat.”
- 23.
The idea of virtue as rightly ordered love is a central theme of Augustine ’s De civitate Dei. In the same work (19.4) he recasts the cardinal virtues described by philosophers as forms of self-control, or the strength needed to resist temptations in earthly life.
- 24.
Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae 1.6.9 (CSEL 90: 11–12); Contra Iulianum 4.3.19 (PL 44: 747–748).
- 25.
Rosemann (2004 , 127).
- 26.
Peter Lombard, Sent. II, d. 26, c. 10 (ed. Brady , 1: 479); Augustine , Retractationes 1.9.4 (CCL 47: 26).
- 27.
Peter Lombard, Sent. II, d. 26, c. 10 (ed. Brady, 1: 479): “Et ideo virtute male utitur, quia opus virtutis est bonus usus istorum quibus etiam non bene uti possumus.” See Augustine, Retractationes 1.9.4 (CCL 47: 26–27).
- 28.
Peter Lombard, Sent. II, d. 26, c. 11 (ed. Brady, 1: 480): “[A]liud est virtus, aliud opus eius.”
- 29.
Peter Lombard, Sent. II, d. 27, c. 1 (ed. Brady , 1: 480): “Virtus est, ut ait Augustinus, bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur.”
- 30.
Peter Abelard , Ethica (ed. Luscombe, 128): “Ut enim philosophis placuit, nequaquam virtus in nobis dicenda est, nisi sit habitus mentis optimus, sive habitus bene constitute mentis. Quid vero habitum vel dispositionem dixerint, Aristoteles in prima specie qualitatis diligenter distinxit, docendo videlicet eas qualitates non naturaliter nobis insunt, set per applicacionem nostram veniunt, habitus vel disposiciones vocari. Habitus quidem, si sint difficile mobiles, quales inquit, sunt science vel virtutes. Disposiciones vero, si e contra fuerint facile mobiles.”
- 31.
See Agnotti (2015) for discussion of doctrines defended by Peter but widely rejected by later medieval theologians .
- 32.
Peter Lombard, Sent. III, d. 23, c. 2 (ed. Brady , 2: 141), c. 8 (2: 146–147).
- 33.
Augustine , Epistula 167 (CSEL 44: 586–609).
- 34.
Peter Lombard, Sent. III, d. 36, c. 1 (ed. Brady 2: 202).
- 35.
Peter Lombard, Sent. III, d. 36, c. 2, n. 1 (ed Brady, 2: 202).
- 36.
Augustine , Epistula 167.14 (CSEL 44: 601–602): “[S]i autem, quod puto esse verius sacrisque litteris congruentis, ita sunt animae intentiones ut corporis membra, non quod videantur locis, sed quod sentiantur affectibus et aliud inluminatur amplius aliud minus aliud omnino caret lumine, […] ut quisque inlustratione piae caritatis affectus est in alio actu magis in alio minus in alio nihil, sic dici potest habere aliam, aliam non habere, aliam magis minusue habere virtutem.”
- 37.
Peter Lombard, Sent. III, d. 36, c. 2, n. 6 (ed. Brady , 2: 204): “Hic insinuari videtur quod aliquis ea ratione possit dici habere unam virtutem magis quam aliam, quia per caritatem magis afficitur in actu unius virtutis quam alterius; et propter differentiam actuum, ipsas virtutes magis vel minus habere dici potest; et aliquam non habere, cum tamen simul omnes et pariter habeat quantum ad mentis habitum vel essentiam cuiusque. In actu vero aliam magis, aliam minus habet; aliam etiam non habet, ut vir iustus, utens coniugio, non habet continentiam in actu, quam tamen habet in habitu.”
- 38.
Peter Lombard, Sent. IV, d. 33, c. 2, n.1 (ed. Brady 2: 459–460).
- 39.
Peter Lombard, Sent. III, d. 31, c. 1, n. 9 (ed. Brady, 2: 183).
- 40.
Peter Lombard, Sent. III, d. 27, c. 7 (ed. Brady , 2: 167).
- 41.
Peter Lombard, Sent. IV, d. 4, c. 7, n. 5 (ed. Brady, 2: 262–263).
- 42.
Quoted by Brady (1966, 478): “Quorumdam, inquit, opinio est quod parvulis in baptismo tantum dimittantur peccata et nulla virtus conferatur. Et hanc, inquit, sententiarum non improbat Magister in Sententiis. Nos autem, qui audivimus eum, scimus quia erat in contraria sententia, scilicet quod parvulis in baptismo dantur virtutes, sed in munere vel in habitu, non in usu.”
- 43.
Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum libri quinque 3.1 (PL 211: 1041D–1042A).
- 44.
Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum libri quinque 3.29 (PL 211: 1133B–C): “Non enim qui unam virtutem habet necesse est quod statim habeat ejus usum, etiamsi sit adultus. In primaria enim infusione omnes habentur in habitu, non tamen in usu vel actu. Inclinant enim et disponunt animum ad actus suos pro loco et tempore exsequendos. Sed cum virtutes in aliquo sint sine usibus suis, nunquid ideo otiosae? Non; quia, etsi non semper habeant suos usus, tamen semper habent suos effectus, ut distinguatur inter usum et effectum. Semper enim fortitudo facit fortem, temperantia temperatum, prudentia prudentem, id est aptum, dispositum, idoneum perferre molestias, coercere illecebras, praecavere insidias, licet non statim perferat, vel coerceat, vel praecaveat. Quicunque ergo habet unam virtutem in habitu vel in effectu, habet omnes vel in habitu vel in effectu, sive puerulus sive adultus; sed non quicunque habet unam actu vel usu, habet et reliquas in actu vel usu.”
- 45.
Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum libri quinque 5.6 (PL 211: 1233A): “Non enim credit parvulus, nec sperat, nec diligit: habet tamen fidem, et spem et charitatem, sicut habet rationabilitatem, non tamen ratiocinatur, et risibilitatem, non tamen ridet. Unde et haec argumentatio est facta. Iste parvulus habet fidem et non credit; ergo illa fides est mortua, quod esset dicere quod ea fide non esset bonus. Fallacia. Iste scit dialecticam, nec potest disputare posito quod sit mutus; ergo secundum illam non est bonus dialecticus, quod falsum est; habet in habitu, sed non in usu.”
- 46.
Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum libri quinque 3.3 (PL 211: 1049B–C): “Absque virtute non potest opus esse meritorium. Ergo magis est virtus appetenda quam opus virtutis. Item, virtues est quasi arbor; opus est quasi fructus, et sine arbore non potest fructus haberi. […] Item, virtus justificat sine opere, sed non opus sine virtute: justificat enim parvulos et etiam quosdam adultos.” Which adults does Peter have in mind ? I can only guess that he means adults who converted to Christianity but died soon after their baptism .
- 47.
Innocent III, Maiores Ecclesiae causas §410 (Denzinger and Bannwart 1932, 190): “Quod opponentes inducunt, fidem aut caritatem aliasque virtutes parvulis, utpote non consentientibus, non infundi, a plerisque non conceditur absolute […], aliis asserentibus per virtutem baptismi parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri; nonnullis vero dicentibus, et dimitti peccatum, et virtutes infundi, habentibus illas quoad habitum, non quoad usum, donec perveniant ad aetatem adultam.”
- 48.
Stephen Langton, Summa (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen, 164): “Sed quid dicemus de virtutibus theologicis, sub qua specie qualitatis comprehenduntur? Magister Petrus dicit quod sub habitu, quia adveniunt adulto per applicationem animi, puero per applicationem baptismi, quia applicatur a parentibus. Hoc mirum est, cum Apostolus dicat quod virtutes infunduntur in nobis sine nobis, quomodo magister dicat quod veniunt per applicationem.” While Stephen might appear to be quoting St Paul (the “Apostolus”), what he presents is instead a common interpretation of St Paul.
- 49.
Stephen Langton, Summa (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen, 136, 140). As Bieniak (2014, 209) points out, Stephen says one should not put much effort into arguing that whoever has one virtue has them all, because this thesis is so strongly supported by authorities that nobody denies it.
- 50.
Several articles in the present volume, especially the ones by Olivier Boulnois, Kristell Trego, and Can Laurens Löwe (see respectively p. 25–45, p. 87–106, p. 167–184), explore philosophical tensions between the Aristotelian conception of virtuous habitus and freedom of choice.
- 51.
Stephen Langton, Summa (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen, 144): “[O]mnes virtutes habentur in habitu, sed non in usu; sicut rex multos habet milites sub se, qui ei tenentur obsequi, licet non omnes obsequantur. Vel secundum Hieronymum, sicut citharista omnes chordas suas aptat ad citharizandum, licet omnibus non utatur.”
- 52.
Stephen Langton, Summa (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen, 145–146): “[O]mnes virtutes dicuntur haberi in habitu quia iste aptus est ad resistendum cuilibet vitio. […] [D]icimus quod omnes virtutes sunt pares in isto, et tamen non quantum potest resistere etc., quia potentia resistendi non solum est ex gratuitis sed ex naturalibus. Unde quia magis corrupta habet naturalia quoad hoc quam quoad illud, minus potest resistere huic quam illi; sicut isti duo sunt aeque divites et aeque potentes (sit ita), non tamen quantum potest iste resistere hostibus et ille, posito quod unus habeat plures hostes quam alius. Similiter isti duo pugiles sunt aeque fortes, tamen unus pronior est ad casum quam alius, quia alius expeditior est. Item, iste pronior est cadere per libidinem quam per avaritiam.”
- 53.
Kant , however, considers such a person lacking in virtue. For further explanation of his position and passages from relevant texts see Wood (2003, esp. 469–470).
- 54.
A helpful account of the disagreements is given by Choi and Fara (2016).
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Kent, B. (2018). Speaking Theologically: The Concept of habitus in Peter Lombard and His Followers. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_4
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