Tot scibilia quot scientiae? Are There as Many Sciences as Objects of Science? The Format of Scientific Habits from Thomas Aquinas to Gregory of Rimini

Bermon, Pascale

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_16

Tot scibilia quot scientiae? Are There as Many Sciences as Objects of Science? The Format of Scientific Habits from Thomas Aquinas to Gregory of Rimini

Pascale Bermon⁴

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First Online: 13 January 2019

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Part of the book series: Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action ((HSNA,volume 7))

Abstract

The present contribution addresses the problem of the format of the scientific habitus from Thomas Aquinas (1265) to Gregory of Rimini (1345). It shows that the definition of the habitus of science in the propositional format is not an invention of the nominalists (Ockham), but was already discussed at the University of Paris around 1300 in the circle of John Duns Scotus, perhaps as a consequence of the condemnation at Paris in 1277 of propositions containing what can be labelled an “Averroist” theory of science.

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Notes

1.
The terminology of habitus of science was still used by Suárez, but then it disappears. Leibniz tends to say simply “science.”
2.
I have proposed elsewhere to speak of the “format” of the scientific habitus (Bermon 2007, 289–306). This term is used by linguists who are interested in the “deep structure” of sentences. Confronted with the question of the format of the representation of these sentences, they opt for the fundamental operation of “predicating,” which consists of “saying something of something.” The proposition is thus seen as the usual format for the representation of sentences. See Le Ny (1979) and Bermon (2007, 345).
3.
Leibniz , Nouveaux essais, book 4, ch. 21 (“La division des sciences”): “les Nominaux ont cru qu’il y avait autant de sciences particulières que de vérités, lesquelles composaient après des touts, selon qu’on les arrangeait.”
4.
Maurer (1958). Elsewhere, Maurer (1974) compares Ockham with Thomas Aquinas , Henry of Ghent , Peter Auriol , Gregory of Rimini, and modern philosophers. See Pelletier (2013, 26–27).
5.
Livesey (1985) quoted by Pelletier (2013, 27n43).
6.
“I do not see how nominalism demands the corollary that a science has merely collective unity” (Pelletier 2013, 27).
7.
Pelletier (2013, 27).
8.
Pelletier (2013, 25).
9.
As stated in John Duns Scotus , Q. Met., lib. 6, q. 1 (OPh 4: 5n). See Gonsalvus of Spain , Quaestiones disputatae et de quodlibet.
10.
Peter Auriol , Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 3 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 271): “Opinio Henrici Anglici in primo suo, quaestione 3”.
11.
On these Reprobationes, see Friedman (2007, 412–413).
12.
Ed. Piccari (1995). In his commentary on the Sentences, Hervaeus Natalis criticizes Godfrey of Fontaines’s position (on Eucharistic change) using Bernard of Auvergne’s arguments.
13.
Peter Auriol , Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 3 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 270–271); William of Ockham, Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 208).
14.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 1, art. 3, arg.
15.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 1, art. 3, corp.: “Est enim unitas potentiae et habitus consideranda secundum obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem obiecti, puta homo, asinus et lapis conveniunt in una formali ratione colorati, quod est obiectum visus. Quia igitur sacra Scriptura considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata, secundum quod dictum est, omnia quaecumque sunt divinitus revelabilia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti huius scientiae. Et ideo comprehenduntur sub sacra doctrina sicut sub scientia una.”
16.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 1, art. 3, ad 2: “nihil prohibet inferiores potentias vel habitus diversificari circa illas materias, quae communiter cadunt sub una potentia vel habitu superiori, quia superior potentia vel habitus respicit obiectum sub universaliori ratione formali. Sicut obiectum sensus communis est sensibile, quod comprehendit sub se visibile et audibile, unde sensus communis, cum sit una potentia, extendit se ad omnia obiecta quinque sensuum. Et similiter ea quae in diversis scientiis philosophicis tractantur, potest sacra doctrina, una existens, considerare sub una ratione, inquantum scilicet sunt divinitus revelabilia, ut sic sacra doctrina sit velut quaedam impressio divinae scientiae, quae est una et simplex omnium.”
17.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 54, art. 4, arg.: “Videtur quod unus habitus ex pluribus habitibus constituatur. Illud enim cuius generatio non simul perficitur, sed successive, videtur constitui ex pluribus partibus. Sed generatio habitus non est simul, sed successive ex pluribus actibus, ut supra habitum est Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex pluribus habitibus.”
18.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 54, art. 4, corp.: “Si igitur consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem. Sed quia illa multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat.”
19.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 54, art. 4, ad 1: “successio in generatione habitus non contingit ex hoc quod pars eius generetur post partem, sed ex eo quod subiectum non statim consequitur dispositionem firmam et difficile mobilem.”
20.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 54, art. 4, ad 3: “ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens.”
21.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 211–212).
22.
Peter Auriol , Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 1 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 256–258).
23.
John of Reading , In Sent. I, prol., q. 8 (ed. Livesey , 160–161).
24.
See Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum Sententiarum (ed. Trapp and Marcolino, 1: 93n2).
25.
Henry of Ghent , Quodl. IX, q. 4 (ed. Macken, 88–89): “Utrum scientia sit aliquid compositum in intellectu.”
26.
Summary of Henry of Ghent’s opinion by John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (Q. Met.), lib. 6, q. 1 (OPh 4: 8).
27.
Henry of Ghent , Quodl. IX, q. 4 (ed. Macken, 92–93).
28.
John Duns Scotus , Q. Met., lib. 6, q. 1 (OPh 4: 12).
29.
John Duns Scotus, Q. Met., lib. 6, q. 1 (OPh 4: 15–16).
30.
John Duns Scotus , Q. Met., lib. 6, q. 1 (OPh 4: 5n).
31.
Aristotle, NE 6.2, 1139b15–17.
32.
John Duns Scotus , Q. Met., lib. 6, q. 1 (OPh 4: 14).
33.
John Duns Scotus, Q. Met., lib. 6, q. 1 (OPh 4: 15–16).
34.
The Scriptum was composed before the autumn of 1316, but published later. It is certainly earlier than the Parisian lectures of 1316–1317; see Brown (1995). Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 250–284): “Utrum habitus ex theologico studio acquisitus sit unus vel plures.” On Auriol’s conception of habitus, see Spade (1972).
35.
Bernard’s opinion is quoted by Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 1 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 260–261).
36.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 3 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 273). Cf. Hervaeus Natalis , Defensa doctrinae fratris Thomae, pars 1, art. 14 (ed. Krebs, 65).
37.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 3 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 271–272). Buytaert refers here to Henry Harclay, I Sent., q. 3.
38.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 1 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 262–263).
39.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 1 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 262): “Necesse est quod intellectus non cadat super veritatem conclusionis nisi quatenus cadit super veritatem principii.”
40.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 1 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 264): “huiusmodi intellectio, cadens super utramque veritatem est unica et simplex.”
41.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 2 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 268): “scientia proprie dicta non est aliud quam habitus cognitivus omnium conclusionum unius scientiae, cuius quidem habitus actus sunt intellectiones super veritates conclusionum omnium transeuntes.”
42.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 2 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 268–269).
43.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 2 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 269).
44.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 3 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 270–271).
45.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 3 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 274): “tam objectum formale quam medium quam idem lumen exigitur ad habitus unitatem.”
46.
Godfrey of Fontaines , Quodl. XIII (from 1297–1298), q. 1 (ed. Hoffmans, 169–184, 175–176): “non videtur inconveniens quod theologia non sic sit scientia una proprie sicut aliae. Nec tamen est simpliciter plures sicut moralis et metaphysica humana. Immo est una unitate quae congruit scientiae ordinatae ad perfectionem hominis fidelis. […] Sic ergo patet quod scientia quae est propria fidelium debet tractare principaliter de agibilibus et speculabilibus […] et sic […] ea de quibus est theologia […] non faciunt scientias omnino plures et disparatas sed scientiam aliquo modo unam tali unitate connexionis et ordinis ad unum.”
47.
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 3 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 275).
48.
Peter Auriol , Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 4, art. 3 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 276).
49.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 207–225).
50.
On the habitus of science according to Ockham, see Fuchs (1952) and Pelletier (2013, 17–38).
51.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 217 and 224).
52.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 1, art. 3, corp.
53.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 218).
54.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219): “collectio multorum ordinem determinatum habentium.”
55.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219).
56.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219–220).
57.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 221): “notitia principiorum est causa effectiva notitiae conclusionis.”
58.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 224).
59.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 224): “accipiendo unitatem aggregationis pro omni unitate quae non est alicuius unius numero.”
60.
William of Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 225): “Et ita quot sunt conclusiones, tot sunt scientiae.”
61.
Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in I Sententiarum (Lect. I), d. 1, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. Wood and Gál, 1: 199–208).
62.
Adam Wodeham, Lect. I, d. 1, q. 1, art. 2, §14 (ed. Wood and Gál, 1: 206–208).
63.
Adam Wodeham , Lect. I, d. 1, q. 1, art. 2, §14 (ed. Wood and Gál, 1: 207): “Necessario ita est, si ita evidenter assensi, necessitatus ad assentiendum sic esse evidentia demonstrativa vel saltem evidentia necessitante ad assentiendum sic esse. Igitur necessario triangulus habet tres etc.”
64.
Adam Wodeham, Lect. I, d. 1, q. 1, art. 2, §14 (ed. Wood and Gál, 1: 207): “Et firmiter assentiam actu absoluto respectu conclusionis si velim, quia dico quod primus actus talis absolutus subest imperio [voluntatis] sicut actus credendi.”
65.
Adam Wodeham , Lect. I, d. 1, q. 1, art. 2, §14 (ed. Wood and Gál, 1: 207): “Sed tunc dico quod talis actus non erit evidens, sed anima habens illum assentiet evidenter simul cum illo, stante evidentia praemissarum, ita quod evidentia non erit ex illo actu formaliter sed [ex] firmitate adhaesionis et evidentia ex praemisis, vel actu sciendi evidenti primo modo. Non erit igitur evidens evidentia intrinseca sed denominatione extrinseca, quia aliis circumscriptis licet staret firmitas adhaesionis, tamen absque evidentia.”
66.
Adam Wodeham , Lect. I, d. 1, q. 1, art. 2, §14 (ed. Wood and Gál, 1: 207): “Quinta conclusio est quod illa evidentia, qua evidenter assentit geometer trigesimae conclusioni absque hoc quod apprehendat sic esse sicut significatur per priores, non est assensus rectus praecis sed reflexus, habens aliquem actum animae pro objecto, puta querimoniam, quod incipiendo a per se notis ipse deduxit omnes consequenter usque ad istam [cui] tunc assentit.”
67.
Adam Wodeham , Lect. I, d. 1, q. 1, art. 2, § 11 (ed. Wood and Gál, 1: 201–203).
68.
Peter Auriol , Scriptum, prol., sect. 4, art. 1 (ed. Buytaert, 1: 263–265).
69.
Gregory of Rimini, In Sent. I, prol., q. 3 (ed. Trapp and Marcolino, 1: 114).
70.
John of Reading , In Sent. I, prol., q. 10 (ed. Livesey , 191–192): “[A]d cognitionem actualem alicuius conclusionis, sufficit scientificam cognoscere illam precise, et talis cognitio erit scientifica supposito tamen quod habeat notitiam habitualem principiorum per quam potest resolvere illam conclusionem in principia et ipsam deducere ex principiis.”
71.
Gregory of Rimini, In Sent. I, prol., q. 3 (ed. Trapp and Marcolino, 1: 111–112).
72.
Gregory of Rimini, In Sent. I, d. 1, q. 2 (ed. Trapp and Marcolino, 1: 215).
73.
Gregory of Rimini, In Sent. I, prol., q. 3 (ed. Trapp and Marcolino, 1: 108–109.
74.
As suggested in John Duns Scotus , Q. Met., lib. 6, q. 1 (OPh 4: 5n). Gonsalvus of Spain (ca. 1255–1313), who was the master of Duns Scotus, supports a homology of structure between psychology and the plurality of sciences. For him the soul is not the only form of the human compound, but there are in each individual as many forms as there are operations and organs .
75.
This debate on science and inference is still present in John Newman’s An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, completed in 1870.
76.
1277 Condemnation, article 117 (148): “Quod scientia magistri et discipuli est una numero; ratio autem, quod intellectus sic unus est quia forma non multiplicatur, nisi quia educitur de potentia materie.” Cf. Piché (1999, 115).

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CNRS, PSL Research University, Paris, France
Pascale Bermon

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Centre of Excellence in Reason and Religious Recognition, Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
Nicolas Faucher
Laboratoire d’études sur les monothéismes (UMR 8584), Villejuif Cedex, France
Magali Roques

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Bermon, P. (2018). Tot scibilia quot scientiae? Are There as Many Sciences as Objects of Science? The Format of Scientific Habits from Thomas Aquinas to Gregory of Rimini. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_16

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_16
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