Abstract
It has long been acknowledged that one of the most original aspects of Ockham’s account of knowledge is his contention that bodies of scientific knowledge are aggregates but without much explanation as to why he holds this view. In this chapter, I argue that a plausible philosophical motivation lies in the inner structure of his mental ontology, namely, in the intellect’s habits, acts, and their objects, which are the true and necessary principles and conclusions of demonstrations. Ockham upholds what I call a “Principle of Object-Act-Habit-Specification,” according to which kinds of habits and their acts are determined by the objects they grasp. This principle entails that if a body of scientific knowledge contains two or more sentences, it can only have aggregate unity. Furthermore, I look at the logical and determinate orders that gather together the sentences of various aggregate bodies of scientific knowledge.
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Notes
- 1.
This chapter is a thorough reworking of parts from Pelletier (2013, ch. 1). All references are to works by Ockham. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
- 2.
In her contribution to this volume (p. 263–283), Magali Roques focuses particularly on the causal relationship between and specification of simple habits and their acts. My contribution, by contrast, concentrates on complex habits and aggregates of habits.
- 3.
See Pascale Bermon’s contribution to this volume (p. 301–319) for an overview of late medieval views on the question of the unity of a science having a plurality of different objects. For a similar concern in the early modern period, see Tarek Dika’s contribution on Descartes (p. 385–401) and finally see Martin Pickavé and Nicolas Faucher’s contributions in this volume (respectively p. 245–261 and p. 107–126) for further discussion on the unity of habits in the moral realm.
- 4.
e.g., Quodl. I, q. 18 (OTh 9: 96.72–73); Quodl. VI, q. 14 (OTh 9: 635.6–7).
- 5.
Exp. Phys., prol. §2 (OPh 4: 4–5): “Circa primum dicendum est quod scientia vel est quaedam qualitas exsistens subiective in anima vel est collectio aliquarum talium qualitatum animam informantium. Et loquor tantum de scientia hominis. Hoc probatur: quia non minus est scientia, quae est habitus, talis qualitas quam actus scientiae; sed actus scientiae est talis qualitas; ergo et scientia, quae est habitus, est talis qualitas. Maior videtur satis manifesta.”
- 6.
Quodl. II, q. 18 (OTh 9: 190): “Aliter accipitur ‘habitus’ stricte pro habitu immediate generato ex actu, qui habitus aliter generari non potest.” It is clear from what follows that the strict definition of “habit” characterizes only habits of the intellect and the will . In a looser sense, Ockham thinks we can talk about habits of the body and the sense appetite, but these fall outside my present scope.
- 7.
Quodl. III, q. 21 (OTh 9: 287): “Nunc autem unus actus est causa habitus, quod patet de primo actu, quia sine eo non potest esse habitus naturaliter; et post habitus est causa, non illius actus sed alterius; et ille actus bene augmentabit illum habitum.”
- 8.
Quodl. III, q. 20 (OTh 9: 283): “Quarto dico quod in intellectu necesse est ponere habitum, quia aliquis post frequentiam actuum intelligendi redditur promptus et inclinatus ad consimiles actus, et nullo modo redditur inclinatus et promptus ante omnem actum.” Cf. Exp. Phys., prol., §2 (OPh 4: 5.19–26).
- 9.
In earlier texts (e.g., Ord.), Ockham claims that the objects of judgement (knowledge, belief, opinion, etc.) are apprehended mental sentences. In later texts (e.g., Quodl. III, q. 8), he argues that the objects of some judgements are apprehended sentences but the objects of other judgements are things themselves. How to understand this latter claim has been the subject of some debate in the literature. On Ockham’s changing views on the objects of judgement, see Boler (1976), Karger (1995), Brower-Toland (2007, 2014), and Panaccio (2009).
- 10.
Exp. Phys., prol., §3 (OPh 4: 9): “[…] obiectum scientiae est tota propositio nota.” Cf. Ord., prol., q. 9 (OTh 1: 266.19–21).
- 11.
Exp. Phys., prol., §2 (OPh 4: 6): “Tertio modo dicitur scientia notitia evidens alicuius necessarii. Et isto modo non sciuntur contingentia, sed principia et conclusiones sequentes.”
- 12.
Exp. Phys., prol., §2 (OPh 4: 6): “Quarto modo dicitur scientia notitia evidens veri necessarii nata causari ex notitia evidenti praemissarum necessariarum applicatarum per discursum syllogisticum.”
- 13.
Quodl. II, q. 18 (OTh 9: 190): “[…] dico quod tanta est distinctio actuum quanta habituum et econverso.” Cf. Rep. III, q. 12 (OTh 6: 402.16–403.2); Quaest. var., q. 7 (OTh 8: 323.9–10).
- 14.
With caution, one could appropriate the contemporary terminology of “type ” vs. “token ” here, but I will retain the more Ockhamistic terminology of “specific” and “numerical” identity/distinction or sameness/difference. On the type-token distinction as applied to Ockham, see Panaccio (2004, 55–58).
- 15.
Quaest. var., q. 7 (OTh 8: 323–324): “Hoc probatur primo, quia omnia individua aeque perfecta inclinativa, sive elicitiva sive receptiva, sit sint eiusdem rationis, possunt in effectus eiusdem rationis, et si non possunt in effectus eiusdem rationis, illa principia non sunt eiusdem rationis; sed habitus generari ex actibus sunt effectus illorum […] et non semper sunt eiusdem speciei nec esse possunt […]; igitur nec actus generativi istorum.” Cf. Quodl. II, q. 18 (OTh 9: 190.41–45).
This argument assumes a correlation between causality and the species identity or distinction of habit and act. On causation and similarity in the context of habits and acts in Ockham’s work, see the contribution by Magali Roques in this volume, see p. 263–283.
- 16.
Quodl. II, q. 18 (OTh 9: 190): “[…] distincti actus specie causant distinctos habitus specie, quod patet ex hoc quod habitus generatus ex istis actibus non inclinat immediate nisi ad consimiles actus et non ad alios; et alius habitus generatus ex aliis actibus inclinat ad alios actus; igitur etc.” Cf. Rep. III, q. 12 (OTh 6: 403.11–16).
- 17.
Quodl. II, q. 18 (OTh 9: 191): “[…] habitus et actus obiectorum eiusdem speciei sunt eiusdem speciei.” Cf. Quaest. var., q. 7 (OTh 8: 325.0–326.65).
- 18.
Quodl. II, q. 18 (OTh 9: 190–191): “Ideo dico quod semper tanta est distinctio actuum quanta habituum et econverso; et ideo si diversorum obiectorum specie sint diversi actus specie, sequitur quod erunt diversi habitus specie. Et si habitus aliquorum obiectorum sint eiusdem speciei, et actus erunt.” Cf. Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219.3–13).
- 19.
Truths about the contingent universe, including the truths of physics, ought to be formulated as conditional or de possibile sentences in order to count as necessary truths, see SL 3–2, c. 5 (OPh 1: 511–514). For the sake of simplicity, I am using categorical, present-tensed example sentences.
- 20.
Quaest. var., q. 7 (OTh 8: 325.41–48 and 326.77); Quodl. II, q. 18 (OTh 9: 190.43–45 and 191.69–71).
- 21.
Summula, praeambula (OPh 6: 139.51–140.66).
- 22.
Ord., prol., q. 9 (OTh 1: 260.1–3): “[…] de eodem subiecto propter diversitatem praedicatorum possunt esse distinctae scientiae.”
- 23.
See Panaccio (2004, esp. 125–133) for a detailed analysis of the origin our concepts in intuitive cognition and their eventual role in mental language and scientific discourse. He emphasizes the importance of the causal connection between object and concept in determining the intentional content of that concept.
- 24.
Ockham argues that an intuitive cognition of one thing cannot cause an intuitive cognition of another thing (Ord., prol., q. 9 [OTh 1: 241.1–14]). Because simple concepts originate in these cognitions, it follows that without the relevant intuitive cognition of some object, no simple concept of that object can ensue. Thus, no intuitive cognition of one specifically distinct object (a human being) can cause a simple concept of another specifically distinct object (a rose). We can, however, acquire complex concepts of objects we have not intuitively cognized.
- 25.
Rep. III, q. 12 (OTh 6: 403–404): “Sciendum tamen quod unus habitus potest inclinare ad actus distinctos specie, ita tamen quod ad unum actum inclinat immediate et ad alium vel multos alios mediate. Quia habitus principii inclinat immediate ad actum elicitum circa principia, et mediante illo actu, inclinat mediate ad actum elicitum circa unam conclusionem, et mediante illo secundo potest primus habitus inclinare ad actum circa aliam conclusionem. Et sic de multis conclusionibus ordinatis. Et tunc primus habitus ad primum actum ordinatur sicut causa immediata ad effectum immediatum, et ad secundum et tertium actum, et sic deinceps ordinatur sicut causa remota ad effectum remotum, et est causa causae.”
- 26.
Summula, praeambula (OPh 6: 138): “Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod unum numero ad praesens dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo stricte et proprie, et tunc dicitur quod unum numero illud quod est per se unum, scilicet simplex vel compositum cuius partes sunt materia et forma vel solo numero distincta et non alterius rationis; et sic iste ignis est unus numero et ista albedo est una numero, et sic de aliis.” Cf. Ord., d. 24, q. 1 (OTh 3: 76.17–77.6).
- 27.
Summula, praeambula (OPh 6: 138–139): “Aliter accipitur unum numero large et improprie pro illo quod est unum aggregatione multorum sive specie sive solo numero distinctorum non facientum unum per se, quomodo acervus lapidum potest dici unus numero quia est unus acervus et non plures acervi; et isto modo Aristoteles exponit unum numero, III Physicorum. Sic etiam potest dici quod haec domus est una numero, et regnum est unum numero et populus est unus numero, quia quamvis sint plures homines, non sunt plures populi.” Cf. Ord., d. 24, q. 1 (OTh 3: 77.5–17). For the mereological discussion and the kind of unity that wholes and their parts have, see Quaest. var., q. 6 (OTh 8: 213.151–214.162). On Ockham’s mereology, see Cross (1999) and Normore (2006).
- 28.
This is the thrust of SL 3-2, c. 21 (OPh 1: 540.26–31). However, Ockham notes in the prologue to the Ordinatio that the premises and conclusions of a syllogism can be understood by one act if they are strung together to form one sentence; see Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 218.20–219.2).
- 29.
Exp. Phys., prol., §3 (OPh 6: 6–7): “Prima est quod metaphysica, similiter mathematica et philosophia naturalis, non est una scientia secundum numerum illo modo quo haec albedo est una numero et iste calor et iste homo et iste asinus.” Cf. Summula, praeambula (OPh 6: 138.23–26); Prooem. (OPh 2: 3.18–4.21); Brev. Phys., prol. (OPh 6: 4.25–33); Ord., prol., q. 1 (OTh 1: 9.16–10.2); Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219.14–17).
- 30.
Ord., prol., q. 1 (OTh 1: 8–9): “Et scientia isto modo dicta [sc. as an aggregate ] continet tam notitiam incomplexam terminorum quam notitiam complexorum, et hoc principiorum et conclusionum; continet etiam reprobationes errorum et solutiones falsorum argumentorum; continet etiam divisiones necessarias et definitiones, ut frequenter.” Cf. Exp. Phys., prol., §2 (OPh 4: 6.57–60).
- 31.
Exp. Phys., prol., §3 (OPh 4: 7): “Hanc probo. Quia metaphysica comprehendit multas conclusiones circa quarum unam potest aliquis errare et ipsemet eodem tempore aliam scire; sicut per certam experientiam patet quod idem primo addiscit unam conclusionem et postea aliam, et tamen aliquando prius erravit circa utramque. Ex hoc arguo sic. Error circa a et scientia circa a formaliter repugnant; sed error circa a et scientia circa b non repugnant formaliter, quia stant simul; ergo scientia circa a et scientia circa b non sunt eiusdem rationis – quia quando aliqua sunt eiusdem rationis, quidquid formaliter contrariatur uni, contrariatur alteri –; sed si non sunt eiusdem rationis, et manifestum est quod neutrum est materia alterius nec forma, ergo non faciunt per se unum numero; et per consequens comprehendens utrumque illorum non est unum numero per se.” Cf. Summula, praeambula (OPh 6: 139.40–45); Prooem. (OPh 2: 4.37–43).
- 32.
Summula, praeambula (OPh 6: 139–140): “Item, actus distincti specie habent habitus distinctos specie correspondentes; sed actus circa distinctas conclusiones specie distinguuntur; ergo etc. […] Dico ergo quod sicut actus distinguuntur ita et habitus generati ex actibus; propter quod sicut alius est actus quo considero unam conclusionem et aliam, ita est alius habitus correspondens.”
- 33.
Exp. Phys., prol., §2 (OPh 4: 6): “Alia distinctio scientiae est quod scientia aliquando accipitur pro uno habitu secundum numerum non includente plures habitus specie distinctos, aliquando accipitur pro collectione multorum habituum ordinem determinatum et certum habentium.” Cf. Ord., prol., q. 1 (OTh 1: 8.20–21); Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219.14–17); Summula, praeambula (OPh 6: 140.70–72); Quaest. var., q. 2 (OTh 8: 51.562–565).
- 34.
Summula, praeambula (OPh 6: 140.70–77): “Similiter ergo dico quod scientia naturalis non est una numero primo modo [per se one] sed secundo modo, quia est una unitate collectionis vel ordinis. Omnes enim partes istius scientiae determinatum ordinem habent inter se qualem non habent cum logica vel morali philosophia, nec aliqua alia scientia; propter quod dicuntur una scientia, sicut multi homines propter determinatum ordinem inter se et ad unum regem dicuntur unum regnum numero, qualiter illi homines et alii sub alio rege – vel regem non habentes – non possunt dici unum regnum.”
- 35.
Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219): “Possunt autem conclusiones habere multiplicem ordinem: vel penes praedicata tantum vel penes subiecta tantum vel penes utraque.” Cf. Quaest. var., q. 2 (OTh 8: 51.566–52.567); Exp. Phys., prol. §4 (OPh 4: 14.115–118).
- 36.
Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219–220): “Exemplum secundi: si passiones communes demonstrentur de primis suis subiectis et de inferioribus, sicut si passiones animalis ostendantur non tantum de animali sed etiam de inferioribus.”
- 37.
Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 219): “Exemplum primi: si de eodem subiecto praedicentur multae passiones ordinatae secundum superius et inferius, sicut de figura possunt ostendi passiones magnitudinis et similiter passiones suae propriae et similiter passiones suorum inferiorum.”
- 38.
Ord., prol., q. 8 (OTh 1: 220): “Exemplum tertii: si passiones animalis praedicentur de animali et passiones specierum contentarum praedicentur de illis speciebus.”
- 39.
I would like to thank Martin Pickavé and Magali Roques for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
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Pelletier, J. (2018). William Ockham on the Mental Ontology of Scientific Knowledge. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_15
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