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Peter Auriol on Habits and Virtues

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Book cover The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy

Part of the book series: Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action ((HSNA,volume 7))

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Abstract

Peter Auriol is a good example of the debate over the nature of habits, moral habits (i.e. virtues and vices) in particular, that raged at the University of Paris in the early fourteenth century. This chapter examines Peter Auriol’s basic understanding of habits and virtues in his quodlibetal questions and his commentary on the Sentences. The first part is devoted to the ontological status of virtues and other habitual dispositions and examines why, according to Auriol, habits are qualities. The second part turns to the unity of virtues. Since Auriol holds that one and the same moral virtue belongs to different psychological powers, the question arises of how to account for the unity of virtues and other similar dispositions. In the last part, the chapter turns to the question of what role virtues and practical habits have in the causation of action. Interestingly, Auriol denies that virtues have any direct causal role.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Good examples of this tendency are the otherwise excellent entries on Peter Auriol in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Blackwell’s Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages. See Friedman (2015) and Nielsen (2002). A notable exception is the recent work by Tobias Hoffmann , see, for instance, Hoffmann (2015).

  2. 2.

    In the following pages, I will translate habitus as “disposition” or “habitual disposition.” “Disposition” is not a perfect translation, for there are many dispositions that are not habitus. For instance, a glass’s ability to break is a disposition but not a habitus. For medieval authors, habitus are, strictly speaking, dispositions that belong to an underlying power (potentia), whereas the glass’s disposition to break is a power in itself, in this case a passive power (potentia passiva). In this sense, the “problem of habitus in later medieval philosophy ” is a set of questions about the existence and nature of those dispositions that belong to certain, more basic powers. Medieval philosophers and theologians are committed to such dispositions for various reasons, the details of which I will not go into here.

  3. 3.

    See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas , ST I-II, q. 49, art. 1. See also some of the other chapters in the present volume, especially Klima’s paper p. 321–331.

  4. 4.

    Giles of Rome , Theoremata de corpore Christi, prop. 27 (1554, fols. 16vb–17ra). See esp. fol. 17ra: “Scientia enim, quae secundum rem est qualitas et est essentialiter in praedicamento qualitatis, habet quendam modum relativum ex eo quod relative refertur ad scibile et inde sumpsit originem.”

  5. 5.

    For this debate see also Nielsen (2000). In his article, Nielsen edits two questions by Peter Auriol. Both questions, from MS Balliol College 63 (Oxford), are so closely related to questions 11 and 15 of Auriol’s Quodlibet that Nielsen considers it possible that they were “either reports of oral lectures or determinations or simply draft versions of what Auriol later put into his Quodlibet” (38). In the same article, Nielsen also discusses Wylton’s views on the ontological status of virtues (58–61).

  6. 6.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 11 (1605, 107b–108b). See also Determinatio fratris Petri Aurioli utrum virtus in quantum virtus sit ens per accidens, edited by Lauge Nielsen (2000, 65–66).

  7. 7.

    See Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 11 (1605, 110a): “Qualitatum quaedam sunt simplices, ut albedo, de quarum cointellectu, consignificatione et definitione ac essentiali coexistentia non sunt determinata subiecta; quaedam vero copulatae quibusdam sine quibus nec definiri, nec significari, nec intelligi, nec essentialiter esse possunt.” See also Determinatio (Nielsen 2000, 67–68).

  8. 8.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 11 (1605, 110a): “Istarum autem quaedam sunt copulatae subiectis determinatis, ut symitas, masculinitas. Quaedam sunt copulatae determinatis respectibus, ut virtus, scientia.”

  9. 9.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 11 (1605, 111b); Determinatio, in Nielsen (2000, 68): “Quando dicitur ‘quandocumque aliquid includit plura etc.’, dicendum, quod includere aliquando est per modum tertii constituti ex hoc et hoc, aliquando includere plura, quia includit unum copulatum alteri. Primus modus arguit ens per accidens sicut patet de albo; secundus modus non, sicut patet de simitate.”

  10. 10.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 12 (1605, 117b): “Praeterea, non minus sunt efficaces actus voluntatis ad generandum habitum in ea per assuefactionem quam intellectus actus vel appetitus, sed ex actibus intellectus delinquitur in ipso habitus et similiter de actibus appetitus. Ergo ex actibus voluntatis delinquitur in ea inclinatio virtuosa. […] Praeterea, non est minus resistentia ad rationem illa, quae oritur ex libertate et dominio, quam quod oritur ex passione.”

  11. 11.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 12 (1605, 117a): “Virtus moralis constituitur ex pluribus inclinationibus fundantis unam conformitatem respectu materiae, inclinationibus quibus existentibus in duabus potentiis, scilicet in voluntate et aliam [lege etiam] in appetitu sensitivo.”

  12. 12.

    See Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 12 (1605, 123a): “Nunc ultimo concludi potest ex praecedentibus solutio cuiusdam quaestionis antiquae, qua consuetum est quaeri utrum virtutes morales sint subiective in voluntate vel in appetitu sensitivo, quibusdam dicentibus quod in voluntate per essentiam et in appetitu sensitivo per redundantiam, quibusdam vero dicentibus quod omnes sunt in appetitu sensitivo per essentiam nec oportet ponere quod sint in voluntate. Dicendum tamen ex praecedentibus quod per essentiam omnis virtus moralis secundum aliquid sui est in voluntate et secundum aliquid sui est in appetitu, vel quod una virtus obedientialis constituitur in esse indivisibili virtutis ex inclinationibus existentibus hic et ibi.” For Aquinas’s view see, e.g., ST I-II, q. 56, art. 4; for Scotus , see Ord. III, d. 33, q. un. The debate about the seat of the moral virtues has been examined by Graf (1934) and more recently by Kent (1995, ch. 5).

  13. 13.

    See Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 12 (1605, 117b): “Sed istud stare non potest […] quia carens altera non dicitur absolute temperatus; propter quod patet quod una sine altera non sufficit ad virtutem, sicut nec tectum sine parietibus sufficit ad domum. Est igitur una virtus ex his duabus inclinationibus indivisibiliter constituta, sicut domus indivisibiliter constituitur ex pariete, fundamento, et tecto.” Although this statement is about the virtue of moderation , the line of reasoning obviously applies to courage as well.

  14. 14.

    Peter Auriol Quodl., q. 12, secunda conclusio (1605, 118b). In the quarta conclusio (119), Auriol explains which circumstances require their own inclinations .

  15. 15.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 12 (1605, 120b). For Auriol’s views on unity see also his Scriptum, d. 1, q. 6 (1952, 367).

  16. 16.

    For the unity of theoretical dispositions, see Spade (1972).

  17. 17.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 12 (1605, 122a): “Sed inclinationes quarum una est in voluntate, alia in appetitu sensitivo concurrunt ad unum plene obedire, unde sicut non concurrit ad sanitatem constitutio media, quae dirigit ad sanitatem nec ad pulchritudinem speculum, licet per ipsum quis dirigatur ad faciem ornandam, sic nec prudentia concurrit ad virtutem moralem, quamvis sit praecipua et directiva respectu eius.”

  18. 18.

    See Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 12 (1605, 122b): “Et si dicatur quod unus actus unius virtutis non elicitur firmiter, utpote iustitia, nisi coassistat alia virtus, scilicet castitas […], dicendum quod iuvat utique removendo prohibens, non autem elicitive per se.”

  19. 19.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 14 (1605, 131b): “Idcirco virtutes istae sumptae in genere dicuntur cardinales; quicquid enim agit virtuosus virtuose reduci habet vel ad iustitiam, vel temperantiam, fortitudinem, seu prudentiam sumpta[s] in genere. Nec sunt cardinales virtutes aliquae speciales virtutes.” For the opposite view, see Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 61, art. 3.

  20. 20.

    Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 14 (1605, 131b–137b). For the bonum rationis as the ratio formalis of prudence see already Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 61, art. 2.

  21. 21.

    This is for instance the key feature of Thomas Aquinas’s derivation of the cardinal virtues in ST I-II, q. 61, art. 2.

  22. 22.

    See Peter Auriol, Quodl., q. 14 (1605, 130a): “Obiectorum quantum ad materiam agibilem, quam coniecturant virtutes morales, quaedam sunt, quae se habent ad homines per modum attrahentis, in quibus difficile est animum moderari secundum rectam rationem. Quaedam vero habent per se modum repellentis et obruentis, contra quae difficile est animum figere et firmare, quando ratio dictat. Quaedam vero sunt, quae nec obruuntur quantum est ex se, nec alliciunt, quia respiciunt tantum alterum, et ideo totum rationis bonum attenditur in bene se habere ad alterum. Omnia autem agibilia in hoc conveniunt quod sub ea cadit et consilium et iudicium et sic de aliis actibus rationibus practicae, in quibus potest esse obliquitas et rectitudo. Igitur hae quatuor differentiae generales […] distinguent essentialiter virtutem in quatuor species generales omnes alias continentes.”

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 49, proem.: “Principium autem intrinsecum [humanorum actuum] est potentia et habitus.”

  24. 24.

    Although Auriol’s treatment is meant to apply to all sorts of dispositions I am interested in it only insofar as it tells us something about practical dispositions and their role in human action. I will thus translate Auriol’s talk of actus as “action” (meaning by it an “interior” action that may or may not manifest itself in a physical event), although the term actus was originally also meant to cover mental acts such as acts of cognition .

  25. 25.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 419a): “Dicunt enim, quod nullus habitus facit ad actum naturae, quoad substantiam, nec quoad circumstantiam; sed est causa sine qua non , sicut approximatio agentis ad passum requiritur ad agendum, et tamen non est principium actionis.”

  26. 26.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 419b).

  27. 27.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 419b): “Propterea dixerunt alii, quod habitus nullam causalitatem activam vel passivam habet ad actum, nisi tantum inclinative. Inclinat enim potentiam ad agendum. Unde est quasi actus primus determinans et inclinans ad actum secundum, sicut gravitas in corpore gravi est inclinatio ad esse deorsum, non tamen est principium motus deorsum. Sed ipsamet forma gravitatis nec est etiam principium receptivum. […] Quod autem habitus solum inclinative se habeat respectu actus, nullam activitatem habendo, patere potest, quia quatuor conditiones, quae attribuuntur habitui, videtur [lege scilicet] facilitas, delectatio, promptitudo et expeditio, salvantur propter solam inclinationem habitus.” The second and third theories discussed by Auriol can be found in John Duns Scotus , Ord., d. 17, pars 1, qq. 1–2 as Scotus’s third and fourth ways. For Scotus, both accounts are plausible explanations of the role of a habit of the will in bringing about an action, and he does not determine which account is more plausible. On this text, see Drummond (2016).

  28. 28.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 420a): “Inquirendum est enim quid sit inclinatio ista, qua potentia per habitum inclinatur ad actum. Aut enim huiusmodi inclinatio est aliquis actus elicitus in potentia ab habitu in ordine ad actum aut est ipsemet habitus actus primus. Non potest poni primum, […] tum quia est eadem difficultas. […] Nec potest etiam dari secundum, quia inclinatio non nominat actum primum, sed actum secundum. Inclinatio enim est actu moveri ad aliquid.”

  29. 29.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 420b): “Quapropter fuit opinio quorumdam, quod habitus habet rationem principii activi respectu actus. Potest enim dici quod est causa partialis activa, concurrens cum ipsa potentia ad ipsam generationem actus. Et sic potentia cum habitu sunt una causa perficiens et totalis, sicut videmus, quod frequenter ad aliquem effectum simplicem concurrunt duae causae partiales, complentes unam causalitatem totalem.”

  30. 30.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 421a).

  31. 31.

    See Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 421b): “Praeterea, habitus nihil imprimit in potentiam, alioquin accidens ageret in substantiam. Sed delectatio, facilitas, promptitudo non sunt subiective in actu, sed in potentia. Nec enim actus delectatur, nec est promptus, sed ipsa potentia. Ergo habitus non causat, nec imprimit ista.”

  32. 32.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 421b): “Quocirca visum est aliis quod cirumstantiae actus et modificationes, quae sunt facilitas, delectatio, promptitudo insunt actui ex habitu, substantia vero actus a potentia. […] Ex quibus colligitur, quod habitus est causa modificationis actus, et non substantiae; potentia vero causat substantiam actus.”

  33. 33.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 421b).

  34. 34.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 421b–422a). Cf. Hervaeus Natalis , Quodl. III, q. 7.

  35. 35.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 422b): “Habitus non habet aliquam causalitatem super actum, nisi reductive, mediante causalitate potentiae. Unde non affert novam causalitatem.”

  36. 36.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 423a): “Sic patet evidenter de stylo in exemplo perforante. Figura enim styli non est principium perforationis aliquo modo, afferendo activitatem ad ferrum, sed ferri activitatem disponendo. Unde non attingit perforationem per se, sed per activitatem ferri, quam modificat et disponit. Et hinc est quod aliqui considerantes quod aliquid perforationem non attingat per se, dixerunt quod non erat causa nisi sine qua non, volentes innuere quod affirmative nullam causalitatem haberet. Hoc tamen dictum est insufficienter, quia licet causalitatem non habeat super actum immediate et directe, habet tamen mediante activitate potentiae, inquantum activitati illi tribuit disponendo.”

  37. 37.

    The classic treatment of the circumstantiae is Gründel (1963).

  38. 38.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 423a–b): “Circumstantiarum quaedam se tenant ex parte obiecti, ut finis, tempus, et multa alia, quae concurrunt ad actum, quaedam vero ex parte agentis, ut facilitas, delectatio et similia. Primae itaque circumstantiae attinguntur a nuda potentia, ita quod non habituatus potest elicere actum, ut Philosophus dicit 2 Ethicorum. Unde ex actibus debito modo circumstantiatis habitus generatur, ut apparet ibidem. Nec enim acquiritur temperantia, nisi ex actu temperato, nec grammatica, nisi ex actu grammaticali, secundum omnes circumstantias profecto, quae se tenent ex parte obiecti. Aliae vero circumstantiae, quae se tenent ex parte agentis inducuntur per habitum.” Cf. Aristotle, NE 2.4.

  39. 39.

    For Scotus on this point, see Kent (2003) and Drummond (2016).

  40. 40.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 423b): “Ista ergo dispositio qua actus redditur facilis, delectabilis, et connaturalis non est dispositio voluntatis ut est activa, quia delectatio non est in eliciendo, sed in recipiendo propriam perfectionem, cum sit coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti, et similiter agens in agendo non habet difficultatem, nisi ex resistentia susceptivi. […] Patet ergo prima pars propositionis, quomodo habitus inducit circumstantias se tenentes ex parte agentis. Inducit enim eas inquantum est dispositio voluntatis ut susceptiva.”

  41. 41.

    See Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 423b–424a): “Intellectus respectu actus speculativi, veridici, et scientifici est in potentia susceptiva. Obiectum enim intelligibile movet intellectum, quia passum trahitur ad diversas impressiones convenientes et disconvenientes secundum praedominium diversorum agentium; media vero circa conclusionem aliquam varia sunt, et unum quod inducit ad falsum, reliquum autem ad verum. […] Idcirco necesse est ex parte intellectus aliquid fieri, quo determinatur ad impressionem veridicorum mediorum, alias super omne medium trahet ipsum aeque ad falsum sicut ad verum. Unde indiget intellectus, qui est potentia susceptiva habitu quodam repugnante actui deceptorio […] et congruente actu scientifico et veridico.”

  42. 42.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 424a).

  43. 43.

    Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 17, art. 4 (1596, 423b).

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

    Martin Pickavé

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  1. Centre of Excellence in Reason and Religious Recognition, Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Nicolas Faucher

  2. Laboratoire d’études sur les monothéismes (UMR 8584), Villejuif Cedex, France

    Magali Roques

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Pickavé, M. (2018). Peter Auriol on Habits and Virtues. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_13

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