Abstract
Comments on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations should be respectful and not defensive: they should follow his own guidelines whenever possible, but critically, not in blind admiration. And they should include explicitly discussions of critics of his philosophy and their impact. Their natural starting point is the generally agreed on: the book says something new about rules. He first deemed the rules (of logic) meaningless, even though they are understood and should be obeyed; in his Philosophical Investigations he changed: he says there, following some rules is right, and this makes them (not meaningless, TLP, §85, but) empirical (PI, §84)!
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Notes
- 1.
It is advisable to ignore the sub-standard contributions to any given literature. This is not always easy, as leading and highly influential contributions to a literature may be sub-standard. That Schlick , Neurath and Carnap cared more about the politics of the Circle than about the possible validity of Popper’s criticism of its major tenets is the paradigm case here. It is time to stop sweeping it under the carpet.
- 2.
Leading commentators have spent much ink on the question, on what, if on anything, did the later and the young Wittgenstein disagree? Many of them say, he did not change his mind. Hintikka 1996 , 47, 52 says, he underwent an essential change, yet he almost never gave up any explicit assertion of his: he only reinterpreted his early philosophy later in life. The great change in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, Hintikka added, is his readiness to “involve … human activities”. Involve!
- 3.
PI, §84 may allude to Robert Louis Stevenson’s Kidnapped Ch. 4 that describes the hero standing before a door that opens into an abyss and escaping disaster by sheer luck. In his very last work, On Certainty, Wittgenstein spoke of degrees of certainty and of the possibility of erroneous feeling of certainty. Russell had said (“A Free Man’s Worship”, 1903), “… let us remember that they are fellow-sufferers in the same darkness, actors in the same tragedy with ourselves. And so, when their day is over, … be it ours to feel that, where they suffered, where they failed, no deed of ours was the cause; but wherever a spark of the divine fire kindled in their hearts, we were ready with encouragement, with sympathy, with brave words in which high courage glowed.”
- 4.
Psychologism and radicalism support each other. The reactionary tradition that began soon after the French revolution with Edmund Burke’s critique of it that was hostile to both.
- 5.
It is possible of course to view debates as a language game. This adds very little.
- 6.
- 7.
PM 30, 66–7, 71, 162. Quine 1981 , Chapter 5 disproves it – together with behaviorism.
- 8.
Copleston 2002, 7 ff . Gellner 1992 , 47, 84–5 et passim. The famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis takes better care of the difference between languages and structures than Wittgenstein’s theory of life forms. The ideas implicit in language are obsolete (often magical). Russell 1923 , opening, says, vagueness boosts the unnoticed implications of our assertions and awareness of it improves thinking.
- 9.
PI, § 249: “(Lying is a language game that needs to be learned like any other.)”
- 10.
Moore’s open defense of metaphysics makes it hard to ascribe to Wittgenstein the view that all the metaphysicians he knew were impostors. His condemnation is thus too vague.
- 11.
Hermann 2015 , §2.5.3 takes it for granted that language games are moral when he presents moral disagreements as disagreements about the proper rules of some games. This obviously does not hold for tricksters. O’Connor 2002 , 22, states this explicitly and explains it (on the assumption that language games are authoritative by consent, thus presenting Wittgenstein as a conventionalist in ethics). Referring to PI, §249, about lying as a language-game, Searle 1969 , 324 said, “I think Wittgenstein was wrong when he said that lying is a language game that has to be learned like any other.” It may be advisable to view lying as following rules of a language-game akin to the conduct of cheating chess players. We will all agree that to lie is different from to be a liar. Wittgenstein’s use of his term “language-game” is highly problematic.
- 12.
Hintikka 2004 , 89, said, some idiosyncrasies of Wittgenstein did matter, such as his dyslexia. Now an author’s dogmatism or anti-dogmatism may signify, and, as a character-trait, it appears in diverse strategies for responding to criticism. It is often idiosyncratic, especially in writers who serve as objects of cults (Copleston 2002 , 7). Hintikka’s extensive writing on Wittgenstein, include mention of many and detailed personal characterizations. He avoided referring to the uncontested report that Wittgenstein was regrettably “a thoroughly disagreeable character” (Vinten 2015 , note 13; Pascal 1973 , 23). The most that gentle Hintikka could bring himself to say is, Wittgenstein was impatient.
- 13.
- 14.
The explicit appeal to readers’ intuition is new with the mature Wittgenstein. Findlay 1984 , 1 says, “a comprehensive critique of the thought of Wittgenstein from a standpoint which recognizes him to be, both in his earlier and his later thinking, a systematic philosophical thinker... is not so easy since the mature Wittgenstein professed to have no doctrines and theories, but rather only a method to lay to rest such doctrines and theories.” Hintikka seems to have agreed, but he viewed Wittgenstein as a rationalist, and as a matter of course. See also Cavell 1976 , Ch. 1 and Nieli 1987 , 71, 105–6, 129, 176–9, 183.
- 15.
Stuart Hampshire undertook this venture: he found that Wittgenstein’s condemnation of metaphysicians as slum landlords is unfair to Spinoza; he tried to salvage from this condemnation whatever he could. More liberal is Bar-Hillel , who says (1962), he will not argue with philosophes who do not wish to speak clearly.
- 16.
Wittgenstein denies there the existence of language in Plato’s heavens but does not say that it is an institution: he speaks of life forms rather than of institutions. As to the advocates of informal logic, they treat texts in formal logic as if they were fully formal. Similarly, they often view Newtonian mechanics as formalized. (See Popper 1947a, b, c, 198.) What is a formal system and where it dwells they do not discuss.
- 17.
Lakatos divided mathematical research to pre-formal, formal, and post-formal; yet by “formal” he meant “axiomatized”, in oversight of the difference between Euclid and Hilbert .
- 18.
Gellner [1959] 2005, 25, 85, 160, 177, 186, 190, 196, 200, 230, 253: the tasks of analytic philosophy, he said, are trite and endless.
- 19.
“… even the most loyal of his disciples (and he exacted very high standards of loyalty) treat his passionate revulsion from the idea of himself as a philosophical theorist as… aberration…” (Pitcher 1968 , 10).
- 20.
PI, §§45–7: “We use the word ‘composite’ (and therefore the word ‘simple’) in an enormous number of different and differently related ways”.
- 21.
Empiricist philosophers still talk of colored patches, in ignorance of the ubiquitous spread effect. The classical empiricist effort to base science on sensations imposes the view of them as unanalyzable. Analyzing them is part of the study of their place in psychology and in physiology and in the study of their place in the arts and much more. This Wittgenstein noted in the only paper that he published (Wittgenstein 1929) and that he denounced with no explanation as soon as it appeared. Perhaps this rejection is due to Wittgenstein’s realization that this paper transcends the anti-metaphysical stance of his first book. The parts of human physiology (our sensory system) that serve as background to his system and that he had declared not given to articulation is thus articulated elsewhere. If so, then his refusal to explain his withdrawal of his paper is a suppression of this obvious truth. Incidentally, Pap 1950 presents this obvious truth as synthetic a priori knowledge.
- 22.
PI, §23: “It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)” This is a repudiation only of the book’s narrowness. Commentators understand this as his withdrawal of his picture theory and of his logical atomism!
- 23.
Mature Wittgenstein did not specify the mistakes in his early work, except perhaps to say that he admitted the criticism in Ramsey 1923 of the picture theory of meaning and the theory of atomic propositions that he (Ramsey) viewed as one. Ramsey also asked, what Wittgenstein’s view of negative atomic propositions was. Anscombe’s book on this has little success (Bar-Am and Agassi 2014) .
- 24.
Lewis and Langford 1932 studied modality to clarify the difference between a ├ b and a/b that is now a part of logic proper as the properly worded the deduction theorem. In their presentation, “├a” is “a is necessary”. Their study of modality involves more. For example, it raises the question, is “a is necessarily necessary” the same as “a is necessary”? Why this question signifies is still not clear.
- 25.
- 26.
PI, §309. See also PI, §123. “A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I do not know my way about’”. This is another example of a guru asserting an obvious falsehood for followers to interpret.
- 27.
PI, §66: “complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.” §67: “I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’”.
- 28.
In TLP, §5.5423 the Necker cube serves to illustrate ambiguity, explained as different facts perceived as one. In PI, §74 the same item serves to illustrate the influence of gestalts – stereotypes – on vision. So now we view (not different atomic facts but) different stereotypes in action. This is a shift away from empiricism (Gattei, 2008 , 18); most commentators ignore it. Leinfellner-Rupertsberger, 1990 , 856 is an exception: she asks, “How deep is this rift between Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophy?”
- 29.
Wittgenstein ignores the language game of courtship. The nearest to it here is in PI, §40–1; at the time it won a parody with innuendos in an oxford student publication.
- 30.
PI, §479. “The question: ‘On what grounds do you believe this?’ might mean: ‘From what you are now deducing it (have you just deduced it)?’ But it might also mean: ‘What grounds can you produce for this assumption on thinking it over?’”
- 31.
PI, §109: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” Wittgenstein never explained why he recommended the avoidance of bewitchment. Elsewhere he said, “One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. The difficulty is to remove the prejudice that stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice” (PI, §340). Here, it seems, we see Wittgenstein’s analysis sliding from Wittgenstein-style to Russell-style. Russell 1956b, 77 said that the claim for total freedom from all prejudice is humbug. A leading text on the need to avoid prejudice is Wheeler 200, 238, which is disappointingly slight.
- 32.
On Russell, see Kripke 2005 . For Wittgenstein see PI, §97:
Thought is surrounded by a halo. – Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought.
This is the problem of scope presented not as a problem but as a plain fact. “Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking ‘How do you mean?’ The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition” (PI, §353). This is his refusal to withdraw his verification principle that depends on the admission of the ideal language – the essence of language: it hovers over all of the output of mature Wittgenstein, except that (unlike the scientism of his young phase) it is verification in its ordinary sense. It is thus fallible, unlike Moore’s , yet Wittgenstein fell back repeatedly on the finality that is a claim for perfection. This is the last sentence he wrote on this earth (end of On Certainty): “To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end.”
- 33.
See PI, §§38, 68, 89, 92, 94, esp. §92.
- 34.
This is not to suggest the hypothesis that the same qualifier is tacit in Wittgenstein’s texts in every case; he was unsystematic about this, and unclear.
- 35.
This is not to deny that mature Wittgenstein demanded utter clarity. Indeed, he said, (PI, §133): “For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” As is well known, he always sought perfection (Pascal 1973 , 32). Here, however, we may read him to say, the perfection I seek is limited to the perfect exorcism of meatphysics.
- 36.
Wittgenstein 1961 Notebooks, entry for 29.5.15: “But is language the only language?”
- 37.
PI, §110; see Anscombe 1971 , §19. Cavell 1962 , 86 says, “Wittgenstein speaks of the illusions produced by our employing words in the absence of the language game which provides their comprehensible employment”. Hence, meaninglessness is capable of remedy by completion. Wittgenstein declared this none of his concerns (PI, §§91–2). His concern, he said repeatedly, was exposing the meaningless talk that comes out of efforts to cross the limits of language, and that is therefore irreparable. It is not that Cavell was ignorant; it is that paper is patient.
- 38.
Mathematics employs equivalence meta-theorems. The most famous is the meta-theorem in projective geometry: when the words “line” and “point” replace each other in a given theorem, the result is another theorem. Some equivalences are possible to read as within systems and as about them – Carnap’s demand to be clear about such choices notwithstandaing.
- 39.
- 40.
See Russell [1959a, b] 1995, 88. Floyd 1995 and Rodych 1999 against Hintikka, 1996, 101: “In general, he never managed to relate his problems and ideas with actual work in systematic logical theory. As a result, most of his speculations about logic and mathematics remained unfulfilled and frequently superficial.” Wittgenstein considered himself primarily a philosopher of mathematics and in this he impressed Georg Kreisel, Alan Turing and Hau Wang . Turing parted company with him. Kreisel expressed great disappointment in him in 1958. He softened this in his 1978, where he compared the views of Wittgenstein on the tradition of the foundations of mathematics favorably with the Bourbaki manifesto, no less.
- 41.
Bar-Hillel 1966 . Mach still played down paradoxes; Russell did the opposite. This should serve as a warning: presentations of paradoxes are usually mere sketches: it is in fully formal systems that they signify.
- 42.
The completeness of the clarification, Wittgenstein explains, is its having reached its goal, not in the sense that it has reached its limit. Thus, clarity serves diverse purposes, and the one that Wittgenstein cared about is the exclusion of metaphysics. Hence, if clarification has not reached its goal, it should continue with more vigor. How long?
- 43.
Williams 1968. Rorty 1971 refuted the argument that Williams had used, mentioning only earlier writers who had used it. Rorty also cites Strawson , who had presented skepticism as involving hostility to hypotheses. This holds for Pyrrhonism , not for skeptics like Maimon , Einstein , Russell and Popper .
- 44.
Kant took it for granted that Newton’s theory is knowledge, not hypothesis; Maimon disagreed, much to Kant’s annoyance. Worse, Maimon said the same of Kant’s system contrary to Kant’s disclaimer (Preface to first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason): “in this sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible … everything which bears the least semblance of a hypothesis must be excluded”.
- 45.
Russell’s plan to reduce all philosophy to logic did not include the exorcism of metaphysics. He stated that (with Spinoza as a possible exception) all theories of substance are false. Hence, there is a need to restate Descartes ’ mind-body problem with no reference to substance. This move replaces one problem with another; it is thus not anti-metaphysics.
- 46.
- 47.
PI, pp. 214–15: “When I read a poem or narrative with feelings … the sentences have a different ring. … But the figurative employment of the word cannot conflict with the original”. Wittgenstein has here a valid argument against Descartes , who in the mood of universal doubt had said that he might be dreaming; not so: dream-life is not as comprehensive as waking-life. This is a strong argument, but it is answerable. Some oriental philosophers said, life itself is but a dream. Gibson and Huemer 2004 , 9 rightly argue that Wittgenstein considered art informative but not explicitly so, and this includes the verbal arts. (P. 187 there is an impressive discussion of a Wittgenstein text, refuted by Hintikka 1958 , 88 as he has shown mundane “the only language I understand” to have become through sheer mistranslation the intriguing “the language that I alone understand”).
- 48.
The philosophy of Thales – all is water – was initially untestable, yet the decomposition of water has refuted it. Likewise, quite possibly the Shoah refuted the excuses for evil of Leibniz ’ Theodicy. See next note.
- 49.
The standard claim is that the physico-theological proof for the existence of God, the argument from design, is commonsense. The same holds for the counter-argument from the Shoah.
- 50.
Let me repeat: PI, §255: “The philosopher treats a question; like an illness.” This is a pun on “treat”.
- 51.
Commentators have observed repeatedly that the greatest and most conspicuous change in Wittgenstein’s output is in style. Yet they seldom note in this context the revulsion he had against technical terminology. The reason is that they erroneously considered technical his specific terms, private language, family resemblance and language games. The revulsion is due to the philosophy that, as Russell was the first to note, Wittgenstein shared with Pascal and Tolstoy , whose philosophy expresses the wish to return to pre-critical innocence. Its inaccessibility does not prevent yearning for it. Wittgenstein had an advantage over them all (with the possible exception of Kafka ), as he admitted that we have lost access to it: PI, §426: “We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it because it is permanently closed.” We can take comfort, however, in our ability approach it in small details, in life’s byways, he implied, by emulating him. This explains his view of himself as the Galileo of philosophy. Kafka, incidentally, had a similar view but without self-aggrandizement.
- 52.
Sextus mentioned the argument from empirical facts repeatedly as an invalid solution to the problem of induction; Hume too argued against it. To his last days Wittgenstein was painfully aware of all this.
- 53.
Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that all language games are/should be functional. Then, Émile Durkheim’s (anti-religious) functionalist reading of religion as symbolic is right too – as the religious language game.
- 54.
To repeat, Putnam presents Wittgenstein as a contributor to the philosophy of life. Ray Monk says Wittgenstein was a poet and a guru. The problem they were solving is, how can one praise Wittgenstein as an intellectual without ascribing to him any new idea? Russell did better: he praised Wittgenstein as an original thinker and as initially very serious.
- 55.
Russell 1912, Chapter 2. Relevant here is Russell 1918, 520, as well as his 1956a, 198 on the language of the Principia Mathematica. “Barring the omission of a vocabulary I maintain that it is quite a nice language. It aims at being that sort of language that, if you add a vocabulary, would be a logically perfect language. Actual languages are not logically perfect in that sense, and they cannot possibly be, if they are to serve the purposes of daily life. A logically perfect language, if it could be constructed … would be very largely private to one speaker.” Compare this to PI, §275: “I am saying: you have not the feeling of pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies ‘naming the sensation’ when one is thinking about ‘private language’. Nor do you think that really you ought not to point to the color with your hand, but with your attention. (Consider what it means ‘to point to something with the attention’.)” Possibly both have said the same thing about private language, but then with very different concerns.
- 56.
Descartes took for granted the (unproven) doctrine of prejudice of Francis Bacon (Agassi 2013, 116) .
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Agassi, J. (2018). Ordinary Language Analysis. In: Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Synthese Library, vol 401. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00117-9_10
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