Abstract
Tor hidden services have grown too rapidly so that anonymous users cannot verify the authenticity of Hidden Services. Meanwhile, there are many unsafe factors in the centralized directory management mode, and the service content and configuration can be detected and monitored by automated scripts. Faced with the above problems, this paper based on the current Tor domain name communication management model, proposed a new Hidden Service Domain Name System—HSDNS, which using SOR node decentralized management, then replace the top-level domain name as “.hs” to increase the anti-scanning property of the original domain name, introduces the PoW competition mechanism to enable registrants to get readable unique domain name among the whole network. On this basis, the random number provided by the BTC blockchain guarantees random competition and enhances the anti-registration attack, in the meantime, Merkle Tree hash detection mechanism is used to open verification service of domain authenticity, and finally verify model analysis results through the ExperimenTor simulation platform, and it shows that HSDNS model has decentralized management, service anti-scanning, domain name uniqueness and authenticity verification and so on.
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Fund project: National key research and development program (2016YFB0801601).
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Meng, Y., Fei, J., Chen, Y., Zhu, Y. (2018). A Domain Name Model of Anonymous Network Hidden Service. In: Sun, X., Pan, Z., Bertino, E. (eds) Cloud Computing and Security. ICCCS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11066. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00015-8_10
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