Advertisement

Key Management in Wireless Sensor Networks

  • Yee Wei LawEmail author
  • Marimuthu Palaniswami
Chapter
Part of the Computer Communications and Networks book series (CCN)

Abstract

In wireless sensor networks, cryptography is the means to achieve data confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. To use cryptography effectively, however, the cryptographic keys need to be managed properly. First of all, the necessary keys need to be distributed to the sensor nodes before the nodes are deployed in the field, in such a way that any two or more nodes that need to communicate securely can establish a session key. Then, the session keys need to be refreshed from time to time to prevent birthday attacks. Finally, in case any of the nodes is found to be compromised, the key ring of the compromised node needs to be revoked and some or all of the compromised keys might need to be replaced. These processes, together with the policies and techniques needed to support them, are called key management. In this chapter, we explore different key management schemes with their respective advantages and disadvantages.

Keywords

Sensor Node Message Authentication Code Global Broadcast Birthday Attack Exclusion Basis System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. 1.
    Abdalla M, Bellare M (2000) Increasing the lifetime of a key: A comparative analysis of the security of rekeying techniques. In: Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2000, volume 1976 of LNCS, pp. 546–565. Springer, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Bollobás B (1985) Random Graphs. Academic, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Chan H, Perrig A, Song D (2003). Random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks. In: Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    CNSS (2006) National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary, CNSS Instruction No. 4009, revised June 2006. http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssi_4009.pdf
  5. 5.
    Du W, Deng J, Han YS, Varshney PK, Katz J, Khalili A (2005) A pairwise key predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 8(2):228–258Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Eschenauer L, Gligor VD (2002) A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks. In: Proceedings of the Ninth ACM conference on Computer and communications Security, pp. 41–47. ACM, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Hu Y-C, Perrig A, Johnson D (2002) Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks. In: Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, pp. 12–23. ACM, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Javier Thayer Fabrega F, Herzog JC, Guttman JD (1998) Strand spaces: Why is a security protocol correct? In: Proceedings of The 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 160–171. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Kim S-R (2005) Scalable hash chain traversal for mobile devices. In: Computational Science and Its Applications – ICCSA 2005, volume 3480 of LNCS, pp. 359–367. Springer, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Law YW, Corin R, Etalle S, Hartel PH (2003) A formally verified decentralized key management architecture for wireless sensor networks. In: Proceedings of the Fourth IFIP TC6/WG6.8 International Conference on Personal Wireless Communications (PWC 2003), volume 2775 of LNCS, pp. 27–39. Springer, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Liu D, Ning P, Li R (2005) Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 8(1):41–Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Moharrum M, Eltoweissy M, Mukkamala R (2006) Dynamic combinatorial key management scheme for sensor networks. Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, 6(7):1017–1035. Wiley, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Padró C, Gracia I, Molleví SM, Morillo P (2002) Linear key predistribution schemes. Design, Codes and Cryptography, 25:281–298Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Perrig A, Szewczyk R, Wen V, Culler D, Tygar JD (2001) SPINS: Security protocols for sensor networks. In: Proceedings of the Seventh Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, pp. 189–199. ACM, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Zhu S, Setia S, Jajodia S (2006) LEAP+: Efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks. ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, 2(4):500–528Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Electronic EngineeringThe University of MelbourneVictoriaAustralia

Personalised recommendations