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Venture Financing

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Nurturing Science-based Ventures

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Abstract

A fundamental characteristic of many entrepreneurial ventures is the imbalance between the resources currently controlled and those needed to capitalize on the opportunities. Few ventures truly face pure financing problems, but rather more complex “resourcing” issues, i.e., how to gain access to the extensive collection of resources needed to succeed, such as management skills, distribution channels, networks, technology, and the like. In many instances, money will indeed provide access to those resources. But when there are funding constraints, where access to finance is not unlimited or is associated with huge costs, it becomes critical to use the fundraising exercise in a more creative manner, as a holistic approach to resourcing the firm. This chapter will focus on how to develop a proper financing strategy for early-stage, higher risk ventures, which investors to target, and how to develop a compelling investment case.

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(2008). Venture Financing. In: Nurturing Science-based Ventures. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84628-874-6_3

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