Abstract
Process-based certification standards such as IEC 61508 and DO-178B are often criticised for being highly prescriptive and impeding the adoption of new and novel methods and techniques. Rather than arguing safety based on compliance with a prescribed and fixed process, product-based certification standards require the submission of a well structured and reasoned safety case. Ideally, the safety case presents an argument that justifies the acceptability of safety based on product-specific and targeted evidence. However, the role of process assurance should not be underestimated even in product arguments. Lack of process assurance can undermine even the seemingly strongest product safety evidence. However, unlike the SIL-based process arguments, the process argument of the type we suggest are targeted and assured against specific safety case claims. In this way, a close association between product and process safety arguments can be carefully maintained. This paper shows how integrated process and product safety arguments can be achieved using the modular features of the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Armstrong J and Paynter S (2004). The deconstruction of safety arguments through adversarial counter-argument. Proceedings of the Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, 23rd International Conference, SAFECOMP 2004, Germany, September 21–24, 2004 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3219 Springer 2004)
Civil Aviation Authority (2003), SW01-Regulatory objective for software safety assurance in air traffic service equipment, CAP 670: air traffic services safety requirements, published by the UK Civil Aviation Authority, 12 June 2003
EUROCAE (1994). ED-12B/DO-178B: Software considerations in airborne systems and equipment certification. EUROCAE, 1994
Caseley P, Tudor N and O’Halloran C (2003). The case for an evidence based approach to software certification. Safety Standards Review Committee, UK Ministry of Defence, 2003
Hall A (1990). Seven myths of formal methods. IEEE Software archive, Volume 7, Issue 5, 1990
Kelly T P (1998). Arguing safety — a systematic approach to safety case management. DPhil Thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of York, UK, 1998
Kelly T P (2001). Concepts and principles of compositional safety cases. COMSA/2001/1/1, Research report commissioned by QinetiQ, 2001
McDermid J A (2001). Software safety: where’s the evidence?. Proceedings of the Sixth Australian Workshop on Industrial Experience with Safety Critical Systems and Software, Australian Computer Society, 2001
Redmill F (2000). Safety integrity levels — theory and problems, lessons in system safety. Proceedings of the Eighth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, 1–20 Redmill F and Anderson A (eds), Southampton, UK, Springer Verlag, 2000
UK Ministry of Defence (2004). 00–56 Safety Management Requirements for Defence Systems, Part 1: Requirements, Issue 3. UK MoD, 2004
Weaver R A (2003). The safety of software — constructing and assuring arguments. DPhil Thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of York, UK, 2003
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag London Limited
About this paper
Cite this paper
Habli, I., Kelly, T. (2007). Achieving Integrated Process and Product Safety Arguments. In: Redmill, F., Anderson, T. (eds) The Safety of Systems. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84628-806-7_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84628-806-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-84628-805-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-84628-806-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)