Abstract
The chapter is a culmination, and to some extent an extension of, the discussion and analyses in the previous chapters comprehending philanthropy and the third sector (e.g. history, structure, features, legal boundaries) vis-à-vis human security (highlighting the practices and challenges) in all 47 Muslim majority countries (MMCs) in Africa and Asia. In addition to the introductory section and a short concluding section, the chapter is divided into three major sections. The first main section undertakes analyses of TSO density and roles. The analyses in the next section incorporating the features of zakat management, third sector legal environment, and the TSO density creates a ‘third-sector capability measure (TCM)’ to establish its relationships with selected human security criteria. The next section analyses the underlying factors causing differences in the third sector and their human security roles in MMCs. It argues that the influence of tribal power in economic, political, and social matters create a model of its own – a ‘kinsociational’ state or governance model. The chapter and the book conclude that the road for the third sector towards regaining its past human security roles in MMCs is long, but unfortunately winding because of the protective inherent social structure in some, or contrived political platforms in some other.
The author is grateful to Professors Paul Dekker and Annette Zimmerman for comments helpful in improving the discussion, analyses, and expressions in this chapter. The reviewers, however, are not responsible for shortcomings of the chapter, if any. The author also acknowledges the support provided by a research assistant Khalid M. Faris Al Shimmari, in extracting and compiling data from the World Bank database.
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Notes
- 1.
The term ummah originally referred to the residents of Medina, but has increasingly been used to refer to “nation (a community of believers) without boundaries” as well as all human beings, descendent of the same parents, with “mutual obligations of respect and decent behavior” (Hanafi, 2002: 59).
- 2.
CMR—Child Mortality Rate; LEB—Life Expectancy at Birth; ALR—Adult Literacy Rate; and PCR—Primary (school) Completion Rate.
- 3.
TSOs’ involved in goods and service delivery can be seen as national aib or shame signifying the government’s failure in such responsibilities. The concept is fundamental to a tribal system where the family members are to be taken care of. Seeking help or even applying for economic employment is seen as that family’s failure in supporting the “dependants” to cause aib or shame for the family head (Harry, 2007: 136). The governments are not ready to acknowledge the service gaps, by allowing the TSOs as alternate service providers.
- 4.
Borrowed from Chang (2008) that also provides a fascinating discussion of this phenomenon in international development.
- 5.
Due to possible effects of climate, as other studies clearly show, geographical location influences features and health quality, including the expectancy at birth (LEB), see ElJaouhari and Hasan (2012).
- 6.
It seems that this achievement by people of Syria is likely to diminish because of the political crisis sweeping the country since 2011 that continued till the writing of this chapter in early 2014.
- 7.
Higher world ranking for Gender Inequality Index (GII) than that of the Human Development Index (HDI), see Table 12.4.
- 8.
Islam emphasizes learning without any differentiation in educational opportunities for boys and girls because Prophet Muhammad said “acquiring knowledge is compulsory for all Muslim men and women.”
- 9.
The inheritance law suggests female are to receive a half-of the counterpart male’s share in inheriting a deceased estate. This code applies to the will and division of deceased estates, but not for heba (gift)—transfer of ownership of property or goods during the lifetime of the donor (see Chap. 3). Women, however, can own and keep her property separate even within a marriage; a wife also is not to bear any financial responsibility of the family (Hasan, 2007).
- 10.
“Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means” (Al Qur’an, 4:34).
- 11.
“O ye who believe! Ye are forbidden to inherit women against their will. Nor should ye treat them with harshness, that ye may take away part of the dower ye have given them, -except where they have been guilty of open lewdness; on the contrary live with them on a footing of kindness and equity. If ye take a dislike to them it may be that ye dislike a thing, and God brings about through it a great deal of good.” (Al Qur’an, 4:19).
- 12.
The local law does not restrict the women from driving, but the Mutawa police (under the “Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice”) books the women drivers for “breaking the tradition” (claiming that the freedom of driving will destroy the society’s control over women’s private “behavior” to spread “vices” in the country).
- 13.
See, an opinion piece by Tariq A. Al Maena (Fresh Look at Saudi Women’s Rights), Gulf News, 2 December 2012.
- 14.
Also known as “Al ash-Sheikh” or the family of “The Sheikh” (a respectful code used to refer to Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab).
- 15.
The Salafi group also controls the Council of Senior Ulama; the General Committee for Issuing Fatwas, Da’wa, and Irshad; the Ministry of Islamic Affairs; the Supreme Headquarters for the Council for International Supervision of Mosques; and the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice (and its implementing arm—the mutawa police); school religious education; Islamic universities in Mecca, Medina, and Riyadh; the Ministry of Hajj (pilgrimage); the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf). The Salafi scholars also influence the Ministry of Finance (through zakat), print and electronic media, and the military through (religious indoctrination), see Yamani (2008).
- 16.
Analyzed in good details in “Trampling on the Rights of Women” by Tariq A. Al Maeena, a Saudi commentator, in the Gulf News, 24 October, 2010, who basically is suggesting that “The Saudi Judiciary has been the bastion of conservative clerics who are resisting attempts to codify the Sharia.”
- 17.
Recent suggestions by mufits in Egypt and Saudi Arabia of women’s breastfeeding coworkers (in Egypt) or the family drivers (in Saudi Arabia) to satisfy the “khalwa code” (that forbids women from “mixing” with ghair Mahram, i.e., who the woman can marry) to create a milk–child–mother relationship (with coworker or the family driver making them Mahram, i.e., cannot marry) are criticized for the muftis’ desire to dictate women how they “should dress, walk, talk, and interact with others” (cf. a subeditorial piece by Mohammed AlMezel in the Gulf News, 17 October, 2010).
- 18.
Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (all except Bahrain, Tunisia, Turkey) (Marston et al., 2005: 205).
- 19.
Bahrain, Iran, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (Marston et al., 2005: 205).
- 20.
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan (Marston et al., 2005: 205)
- 21.
In Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia women in public may face physical attacks for “immodest” dress (Marston et al., 2005: 205). Saudi Arabia, however, has Mutawa or “religious police” to enforce gender segregation and dress codes.
- 22.
In some countries, for example, Bangladesh or Pakistan, women, especially in rural areas, irrespective of their religious background, always accompany male family members for fear of sexual harassment or for security reasons.
- 23.
Noteworthy the claim of Prime Minister Erdogan “we are real seculars” because “I am not-a seculat person, but I govern a secular state” (Akkaya, 2012).
- 24.
For example, prevailing morality in Nigeria is described as “good if they benefit a few thousand kin at the expense of the nation” (Collier, 2010: 54).
- 25.
There have been an assumption that the authoritarian systems have been restrictive to TSOs (Salamon & Anheier, 1997), but only in civil law countries because of a lack of “social origin” (Salamon & Anheier, 1996) of the third sector or community sector resulting from strong state or tribal/ethnic control. It seems, however, that in MMCs under study the traditional role of the people matters, not the legal system of the country.
- 26.
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Oman, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the UAE, and Uzbekistan.
- 27.
Taqwah is not occasional remembrance, rather is undertaking every action only to seek God’s pleasure (thus business activities, for goods and service delivery with socially or environmentally responsible actions, to earn God’s pleasure, become ibadah), see Chap. 3.
- 28.
A person authorized to issue fatwas—religious edicts—on contemporary issues or on matters not covered by the existing literature.
- 29.
They ignore the fact that even in the early days of Islam hudud laws were not implemented in the case, for example, of stealing (because the government was ready to accept failure that forced people to the crime) (Ali, 1964).
- 30.
For more see Al Qur’an 5:1.
- 31.
For example, the category “Those in bondage or to free slaves” has been expanded to include: to free Muslims from ignorance; to free a Muslim community from a very oppressive condition; and to free those trapped in prostitution (see Chap. 5).
- 32.
Kahf (2003) suggests a solution to this issue: zakat can be given to a poor person on condition that the recipient use it for health services. Medicine can also be given because medicine is something that a poor can own. Thus, zakat money cannot be given to a health center to provide medical service to the poor by hiring a doctor. One can also provide shelter with zakat money on condition that he or she will be made owner of that house (Kahf, 2003: 85).
- 33.
The term in Shi’a Muslim theology relates to the concept of imamah—the leadership of the community after Prophet Mohammad that begin with Imam Ali ibn Abu Talib.
- 34.
The Holy Kaba was sieged during annual hajj pilgrimage in 1979 by hundreds of armed Muslim radicals from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the USA calling an end to Saudi Monarchy. The rulers needed authorization to break the siege because Islam prohibits violence inside the area. Dozens were executed after summary trials.
- 35.
This paragraph is based on Hasan, 2012a.
- 36.
On an average one mosque for every 500/600 people (as evident in South Asia) may add up to at least 1.6 million mosques in MMCs for about one billion Muslims (see Hasan, 2012a). At least one imam and one muezzin (one who calls the call to prayer, adhan) for each mosque have huge religious influence on local communities. There is no organized education or training program for potentially millions of such religious leaders.
- 37.
This community assignment does not draw much pay but brings in perks. For example, free meals, fees for leading many rituals in life-cycle ceremonies (e.g., birth, marriage, or death).
- 38.
The system requires all expatriate employees to have a kafala or sponsorship. The civil businesses and unskilled workers end up having a citizen as “legal guardian” (“patron”) responsible to the respective government for their “clients”; skilled workers are sponsored by the employers.
- 39.
Weak state data are from Rice, Susan E., and S. Patrick (2008). Index of State Weakness: In the Developing World, 2008, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Nos. 1–3 Failed states; 4–28 critically weak states; 29–56 weak states.
- 40.
It can be noted, however, that this finding is contrary to some earlier assertions in reference to TSOs in the low income countries, like “reflecting the generally authoritarian politics of the country, it should therefore come as no surprise to learn that the legal structures for nonprofit activity have been quite restrictive” (Salamon & Anheier, 1997: 16–17).
- 41.
Tribal structure influences security situation in many MMCs. For example, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Talibans in Afghanistan, or other extremists cannot be defeated because of the reluctance (if not non-cooperation) of their fellow tribesmen in the state security apparatus or even in the defense force.
- 42.
The “third wave” of democratization, that began in 1974 (Huntington, 1991) has been, argued by some, as democratizing backwards by introducing competitive elections before establishing rule of law, institutions of civil society, and accountability of the governors (see, Hasan, 2006; Rose & Shin, 2001).
- 43.
In some political parties the phenomenon is constitutionally explicit. For example, constitutions of the two largest political parties in Bangladesh (forming successive elected governments in the country) use the term, which the party members and sympathizers “proudly” remind the critiques.
- 44.
The State Support Score (SSS) is a combination of three criteria: sources of government power (Column, 3, Table 12.1) by: Election (score—5), Heredity (4), Transition (3), Selection (2); Military in Politics (Column 4, Table 12.1): Yes (5), No (2); Tribal influence in social, economic, and political systems (Column, 5, Table 12.1): Nil (5), Low (3), Medium (2), High (0). Total maximum score: 15.
- 45.
TCM is created using three sets of scores. Feature of zakat management in the country (Column 7, Table 12.1): Mandatory—5, Formal—4, Informal—2; the character of TSO laws (Column 8, Table 12.1): Enabling—5, Neutral—4, Restrictive—2; TSO Density score 1—<10.0; 2—10.1–25.0; 3—25.1–50.0; 4—50.1–100; 5—100.1+. 5 (Column 9, Table 12.3). Total highest possible TCM: 15. Please note TSO density (per 100,000) population is discussed in Chap. 6.
- 46.
Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Tunisia.
- 47.
This model is different from a “consociational” model or “consociationalism” (where the inherent idea is democratic coexistence through power-sharing by varied interests, religions, and ideologies); or that of “confessionalism” (political coexistence of various “confessional” groups) as in Lebanon.
- 48.
There are already models of government’s initiatives in reforming Islamic system of human relationships. For example, many Muslim majority countries have improved family laws to suit the present day needs making it compatible to respective civil laws within the basic principles of Islam. For an excellent discussion and analysis of major “transition and transformation” in family law all over the world, readers may like to see An-Naim (2002).
- 49.
The phenomenon is analyzed in Hasan (2011) to some extent.
- 50.
TSOs were formed in Libya and Lebanon in 1878. That is why these countries had democracy before they fell to the armed forces (Libya) or faced religious conflicts (Lebanon). Lebanon and its TSOs have survived well but Libya lost the “third sector” due to the military, tribal influence, and the imposition of a new “closed ideology” after the “revolution” in 1973.
- 51.
Egypt has membership third sector organization (Muslim Brotherhood, MB) that is why the first election result went to its political party. The government banned the MB (again) in 2013 terming it a “terrorist group” and “accusing it of orchestrating a wave of violence to destabilize the country.” Its political party (Freedom and Justice Party) has been dissolved by Egypt’s Administrative Court because “the party’s leaders had already been accused, and in some cases convicted, of murder and inciting violence” (The Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2014).
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Hasan, S. (2015). Philanthropy and Human Security in MMCs: Characteristics, Relationships, and Challenges. In: Hasan, S. (eds) Human Security and Philanthropy. Nonprofit and Civil Society Studies. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2525-4_12
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