Abstract
The strategic nuclear arms control and verification process has developed significantly over the past twenty years. The U.S. has created a strong foundation resting on (1) impressive technological capabilities for detecting and monitoring Soviet strategic activities; (2) an intricate network of operational practices, agreed provisions and procedures; and (3) the extensive experience of the U.S. intelligence community in observing and interpreting Soviet strategic activity.
Verification is not something new. It is a continuation of our normal intelligence processes, because we are going to know about Soviet military forces and weapons, whatever it takes to learn of them, whether there is a treaty or not. We have to protect our country.
William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1973–1976
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References
Aspin, Les and Kaplan, Fred M. “Verification in Perspective.” In Verification and SALT. Edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980, pp. 177–192. In this chapter, the authors attempt to put the issue of verification of strategic arms agreements into perspective. They discuss the term “adequately verifiable” and stress “that levels of confidence and margins of error are inevitable...the important questions are how high can we make the levels of confidence and how narrow the margins of error.”
Buchheim, Robert W. and Caldwell, Dan. The US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission: Description and Appraisal. Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, Working Paper #2, May 1983. This paper describes the general functions of the SCC, outlines its past role in SALT and appraises its future.
Einhorn, Robert J. “Treaty Compliance.” Foreign Policy No. 45, Winter 1981–82, pp. 29–47. This article reviews Soviet compliance in implementing the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I, The Threshhold Test Ban Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention. It surveys problems in developing verification procedures for arms control agreements. The author stresses the need to promote confidence in the bureaucracy, in Congress, and among the people that the agreements are functioning well and that U.S. interests are being protected.
Farley, Phillip J. “Verification: On the Plus Side of the SALT II Balance Sheet.” In Verification and SALT. Edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980, pp. 221–228. In this chapter, the former deputy director of ACDA attempts to answer the questions what is “adequate verification?” and what are the military and political dimensions of “the success or failure of verification?” The author stresses the contribution of SALT (particularly SALT verification agreements) to U.S. intelligence capabilities and to increased confidence in strategic stability.
Fisher, Roger. Improving Compliance with International Law. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1981, 370 pp. Fisher’s study includes an assessment and several examples dealing with military treaties and how to approach and respond to an incident of noncompliance in accordance with the international legal system.
Goldblat, Jozef. “Verification and Enforcement of Arms Control.” SIPRI, London: Taylor and Francis, 1982, pp. 285–316. This chapter outlines the role of verification in arms control agreements. It explains how bilateral and multilateral agreements are monitored, and addresses the issues of treaty violations and institutional structures for verification.
Harris, William R. A SALT Safeguard Program — Coping with Soviet Deception Under Strategic Arms Agreements. RAND Report, P8388, September, 1979.17 pp. Also in Verification and SALT. Edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980, pp. 129–142. The author presents a skeptical view of the relative importance of verification while stressing the need for warning of Soviet “breakout” (attempts to upset the balance of nuclear deterrence). Harris asks the question whether SALT would “help or hurt the United States in obtaining strategic warning, including timely breakout warning?”
Katz, Amrom. “The Fabric of Verification: The Warp and the Woof.” In Verification and SALT. Edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980, pp. 193–220. In this updated and abridged version of the author’s report for the Heritage Foundation, the former head of the Verification and Analysis Bureau in ACDA presents an outline of the role of verification in arms control agreements by using historical examples and emphasizing the limitations of verification. Katz stresses that possible Soviet covert deployment of strategic forces has not been given adequate attention and poses a major problem for verification.
Kruzel, Joseph J. “Verification and SALT II.” In Verification and SALT. Edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980, pp. 95–110. The author emphasizes that arms control agreements depend upon confidence in compliance. He uses SALT II as a case study in determining “how much confidence is enough.”
Lowenthal, Mark. “U.S. Organization for Verification.” In Verification and SALT. Edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980, pp. 77–94. In this chapter, the author outlines the formal structure of U.S. SALT verification efforts. Lowenthal emphasizes, however, that the “formal structure described here is but a general framework within which verification is handled and that the actual functioning of the system will not always correspond to this structure.”
Meyer, Stephen M. “Verification & Risk in Arms Control.” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4, Spring 1984, pp. 91–110. Meyer attempts to develop a complete understanding of the fundamental relationship between verification in arms control and risk to U.S. national security. He does this by examining the assumptions and premises of those who contend that a less than 100% verifiable treaty cannot be in the national interest.
SIPRI. “A Role for Satellites in Verification of Arms Control Agreements.” In World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1980. SIPRI. London: Taylor and Francis, 1980, pp. 187–208. Summarizes the proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency and provides several extensive tables describing U.S. and Soviet satellite systems. In addition, it provides a brief description of several categories of U.S. and Soviet satellites.
“The Soviet Approach to Arms Control.” In Challenges for U.S. National Security. Report prepared by the staff of the Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1983, pp. 1–24. This section notes and briefly analyzes the relative Soviet indifference towards verification.
“Strategic Arms Limitation: The Soviet View.” Survival. Vol. 20, May-June, 1978, pp. 121–127. A Soviet commentary (from the February 11, 1978 issue of Pravda) reflecting the Russian view in the arms control process. It includes a section on verification where the author claims any U.S. questions on Soviet compliance are designed to sabotage the agreement. In addition, the author asserts that “When it signs an agreement, the Soviet Union strictly and unswervingly observes its commitments.”
Wallop, Michael. “Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements: So What?” Strategic Review, Summer 1983, pp. 11–20. The U.S. Senator from Wyoming thinks that the debate over Soviet violations of arms control agreements is primarily quibbling over technicalities. The fundamental issue concerns U.S. national security after decades of arms control efforts. Wallop believes that arms control should be viewed in terms of its effects on U.S. military strength and not vice-versa.
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Scribner, R.A., Ralston, T.J., Metz, W.D. (1985). The Principles and Tasks of Verification. In: The Verification Challenge. Birkhäuser, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6678-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6678-0_2
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