Abstract
In the fall of 1982, lawyer Norman Perl, along with three investigators from his law firm and former Aetna Insurance adjuster Willard Broune, stood trial in Minnesota on nineteen counts of mail fraud and conspiracy.1 Perl, representing women injured by Dalkon Shield contraceptive devices, had filed many claims against Aetna Insurance and the A.H. Robins Co., developer of the Shield. Perl had placed Broune on his own payroll at the same time that he was negotiating with him as the adjuster of the women’s cases. The government charged Perl with fraud on the grounds that the financial relationship with Broune negated adversarial responsibility to give “loyal and undivided services” to his two clients, that is, the women and the insurance company. The case was complicated by the fact that the government did not allege that Perl agreed to settlements that were too low for his clients or that Broune settled for amounts that were higher than Aetna should have paid. Lasting eleven weeks, the trial was marked by acrimony between prosecution and defense lawyers and arguments about the admissibility of evidence. Everyone, lawyers and observers, agreed that it was a complicated case.
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Notes
See Anderson, D. (1982, December 26). Jurors broke rules in Dalkon lawyer’s trial. Minneapolis Tribune, p. 1A, 6A, 7A.
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© 1986 Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar
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Hans, V.P., Vidmar, N. (1986). Jury Competence: Twelve People of Average Ignorance?. In: Judging the Jury. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6463-2_8
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