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Madness and Alienation

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The Myth of Neuropsychiatry

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Abstract

Local symmetry offers some hope for mind-body rapprochement in a way that transcends the pitfalls of older philosophical models. Locally invariant principles retain the positive features of neutral monism as a “flat” linear limit but also include nonlinear “curvature” to make room for intrinsic intentionality Gauge field concepts thus get us a fair distance beyond the horizon of neuropsychiatry However, in the form presented so far, local subject-object symmetry still has a few inadequacies that need more ironing out. This can be done by generalizing the concept of an intentional gauge field yet further.

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Notes

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Mender, D. (1994). Madness and Alienation. In: The Myth of Neuropsychiatry. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6010-8_9

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