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The Downside of Machine Metaphors

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The Myth of Neuropsychiatry

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Abstract

Is it meaningful to ask how many subunits, circuits, and cross-connections among channels1 will turn a computer into a mind? Is it possible to measure how complicated computing machines need to be in order to attain consciousness?

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Notes

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  1. Donald Mender M. D.
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© 1994 Donald Mender

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Mender, D. (1994). The Downside of Machine Metaphors. In: The Myth of Neuropsychiatry. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6010-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6010-8_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-306-44652-8

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