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Neuropsychiatry and Numbers

  • Chapter
The Myth of Neuropsychiatry

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Abstract

Neuropsychiatrists confer a seeming validity on their ideas by linking them to numbers. The brain itself has been selected as an object of study because of its measurable dimensions: length, width, depth, weight, motion, temperature, and electrical charge. Indeed, the rising tide of neuropsychiatry might be best understood as little more than a search for one-to-one numerical correlations between mental symptoms and abnormalities within the brain. In this way, biological psychiatry tries to conform to demands of technical science for objectivity and quantitative exactitude.1

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Notes

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Authors
  1. Donald Mender M. D.
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© 1994 Donald Mender

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Mender, D. (1994). Neuropsychiatry and Numbers. In: The Myth of Neuropsychiatry. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6010-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6010-8_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-306-44652-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4899-6010-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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