Abstract
We have seen that neuropsychiatry produces problematic empirical data, research designs, clinical practices, and, most importantly, ethical implications. However, its negative philosophical impact is more than ethical; neuropsychiatry distorts other aspects of philosophy as well.
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Notes
Donald Palmer, Does the Center Hold? (Mountain View: May-field, 1991), pp. 18–23.
Frattaroli, pp. 73–76.
Donald Palmer, Looking at Philosophy (Mountain View: May-field, 1988), pp. 4–32, 69.
Diane Collinson, Fifty Major Philosophers (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 17–18.
Anthony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), pp. 88, 203.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, pp. 36–37.
Stephen Priest, Theories of the Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 99.
Hearnshaw, p. 115.
Capra, pp. 105–107.
Thorne, ed., p. 975.
Thomas Hobbes, “Of Sense,” in The Philosophy of Mind, eds. Brian Beakley and Peter Ludlow (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), p. 11.
Aviel Goodman, “Organic Unity Theory: The Mind-Body Problem Revisited,” American Journal of Psychiatry 148:5 (May 1991), p. 554.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, p. 159.
Priest, p. 100.
Collinson, pp. 51–56.
Flew, pp. 150–152.
Priest, pp. 100–101.
Hearnshaw, pp. 115–116.
Thorne, ed., p. 593.
Palmer, Does the Center Hold? pp. 153–159.
Priest, p. 98.
Palmer, Does the Center Hold? p. 158.
U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?,” in Beakley and Ludlow, eds., The Philosophy of Mind, pp. 33–39.
Priest, pp. 102–115.
Epiphenomenalism is said by some to approach a “weak” form of dualism.
John Eccles, “A Critical Appraisal of Mind-Brain Theories,” in Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience, eds., Buser and Rougeul-Buser (Oxford: Elsevier, 1978), p. 349.
Goodman, p. 554.
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Priest, pp. 3–4.
Palmer, Does the Center Hold? pp. 160–161.
Eccles, p. 348.
Flanagan, p. 222.
Palmer, Does the Center Hold? pp. 158–159.
Eccles, p. 350.
Palmer, Does the Center Hold? pp. 352–353.
Priest, p. 98.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, pp. 4–32, 69.
Flew, pp. 41–44.
Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), pp. 647–659.
Geoffrey Warnock, “Berkeley, George,” in Gregory, ed., The Oxford Companion, pp. 82–83.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, pp. 36, 192–194.
Priest, p. 79.
Ibid., pp. 80–97.
Collinson, pp. 96–100.
Flew, pp. 139–143.
Richard Gregory, “Hegel,” in Gregory, ed., The Oxford Com-panion, p. 308.
Russell, pp. 730–746.
Roger Scruton, Prom Descartes to Wittgenstein (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 165–180.
Peter Singer, Hegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 1–8.
Collinson, pp. 81–86.
Gregory, “Hume, David,” in Gregory, ed., The Oxford Companion, pp. 319–320.
Flew, pp, 153–156.
Russell, pp. 659–674.
Scruton, Prom Descartes to Wittgenstein, pp. 120–133.
Collinson, pp. 89–94.
John Cottingham, “Kant, Immanuel,” in Gregory, ed., The Oxford Companion, p. 406.
Flew, pp. 189–194.
Russell, pp. 701–718.
Scruton, Prom Descartes to Wittgenstein, pp. 137–164.
Roger Scruton, Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 1–10.
Flanagan, pp. 40, 64.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, pp. 192–194.
Priest, p. 79.
Palmer, Does the Center Hold? pp. 181–201.
E. T. Bell, Men of Mathematics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 35–52.
Collinson, pp. 57–60.
John G. Cottingham, “Descartes, René,” in Gregory, ed., The Oxford Companion, pp. 189–190.
Flew, pp. 89–92.
Russell, pp. 557–560.
Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein, pp. 29–49.
René Descartes, “Passions of the Soul Brain,” in Beakley and Ludlow, eds., The Philosophy of Mind, p. 110.
Eccles, pp. 351–353.
Jerry Fodor, “The Mind-Body Problem,” Scientific American 244 (January 1981), p. 114.
Goodman, pp. 554–555.
Hutchinson, p. 25.
Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein, pp. 123, 125–126.
Leibnitz also had mathematical interests and created a computing machine, though his innovations in symbolic logic were overlooked for more than a century and a half. His substantial contributions in developing the calculus were also given short shrift for many years.
E. X. Bell, pp. 117–130.
Collinson, pp. 57–60.
Flanagan, pp. 40, 64.
Flew, pp. 198–202.
Fodor, p. 114.
Goodman, pp. 553, 555.
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G. MacDonald Ross, Leibnitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 3–27.
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Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein, pp. 67–77.
Ralph Walker, “Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr Von,” in Gregory, ed., The Oxford Companion, pp. 57–60.
Priest, pp. 85–111.
Goodman, pp. 556–558, 561.
Flanagan, pp. 14–16, 31, 42–43, 58–62, 217–220.
Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (London: Penguin, 1967), pp. 34, 61–62, 104, 212.
Ibid., pp. 50, 64–67, 190, 205, 211, 216–217.
Palmer, Does the Center Hold? pp. 134, 136–137.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, p. 159.
The “wilderness” of endlessly emergent dualisms has its roots in the writings of John Stuart Mill, who alluded to emergence in this philosophy, and of Henri Bergson, who extended emergent concepts specifically to biological evolution. A modern psychiatrist has speculated that current attempts to frame human selfhood within an emergent scheme fuel psychiatry’s conceptual “oscillations” (Freed-man, pp. 860, 866; Goodman, p. 554; Hearnshaw, p. 121).
Eccles, pp. 348–350.
Fodor, pp. 116–117.
Goodman, pp. 554–561.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, pp. 163–169.
Priest, pp. 150–182.
Collinson, pp. 69–73.
Flew, pp. 334–337.
Joanna North, “Spinoza, Benedict (Baruch) de,” in Gregory, ed., The Oxford Companion, pp. 737–739.
Russell, pp. 569–570.
Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein, pp. 50–66.
Baruch Spinoza, “Ethics,” in Flew, ed., Body, Mind, and Death, p. 146.
Erwin Schrödinger, My View of the World (Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press, 1983), pp. 43, 214.
Eccles, pp. 348–350.
Goodman, pp. 554–561.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, pp. 4–32, 69, 163–169.
Priest, pp. 150–182.
Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind (New York: Crown, 1981), p. 20.
Priest, pp. 22, 155.
Flanagan, p. 341.
Koestler, p. 201.
David Oldroyd, The Arch of Knowledge (New York: Methuen 1986), p. 24.
Palmer, Looking at Philosophy, p. 80.
Priest, pp. 81–82.
E. T. Bell, pp. 362–377.
Edna Kramer, The Nature and Growth of Modern Mathematics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 368–400.
Ibid., pp. 401–433.
Ibid., pp. 368–401.
Tony Rothman, “The Short Life of Evariste Galois,” Scientific American 246 (April 1982), pp. 136–149.
W. W. Sawyer, A Concrete Approach to Abstract Algebra (New York: Dover, 1959), pp. 77–78.
Lawrence Sklar, Space, Time, and Spacetime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 50.
Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), p. 3.
Herbert Bernstein and Anthony Phillips, “Fiber Bundles and Quantum Theory,” Scientific American 245 (July 1981), p. 125.
P. Davies, Space and Time in the Modern Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 9–10.
Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory, p. 3.
Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 84–85.
Ibid., pp. 92–94.
John Briggs and F. David Peat, Looking Glass Universe (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 60–62.
Feynman, p. 84.
Goodman, p. 561.
Hearnshaw, p. 127.
Hutchinson, p. 25.
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© 1994 Donald Mender
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Mender, D. (1994). Neuropsychiatry and the Philosophy of Mind. In: The Myth of Neuropsychiatry. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6010-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6010-8_3
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