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Neuropsychiatry and the Philosophy of Mind

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Abstract

We have seen that neuropsychiatry produces problematic empirical data, research designs, clinical practices, and, most importantly, ethical implications. However, its negative philosophical impact is more than ethical; neuropsychiatry distorts other aspects of philosophy as well.

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Notes

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© 1994 Donald Mender

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Mender, D. (1994). Neuropsychiatry and the Philosophy of Mind. In: The Myth of Neuropsychiatry. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6010-8_3

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