Skip to main content

Psychology as a Science

Resolving the Idiographic-Nomothetic Controversy

  • Chapter
The Individual Subject and Scientific Psychology

Part of the book series: Perspectives on Individual Differences ((PIDF))

Abstract

“What is the subject matter of this science?” is a proper methodological question to ask about any empirical science. The late Gordon W. Allport asked this question about the science of psychology in a special way, and thereby raised the old philosophical problem of whether scientific knowledge is knowledge of particulars or of universals. It was Allport’ oft-repeated complaint that psychology has given its attention only to universals, has neglected to study the individual, and has therefore been guilty of a serious failure in the fulfillment of its scientific task. Allport’ complaint and prescription are reflected in the following two brief quotations:

As long as psychology deals only with universals and not with particulars, it won’t deal with much—least of all human personality. (Allport, 1960, p. 146)

Psychology will become more specific, i.e., better able to make predictions, when it has learned to evaluate single trends in all their intrinsic complexity, when it has learned how to tell what will happen to this child’ I.Q. if we change his environment in a certain way. (Allport, 1940, p. 17)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Allport, G. W. (1937). Personality: A psychological interpretation. New York: Holt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allport, G. W. (1940). The psychologist’ frame of reference. Psychological Bulletin, 37, 1–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allport, G. W. (1942). The use of personal documents in psychological science. New York: Social Science Research Council.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allport, G. W. (1960). Personality and social encounter. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allport, G. W. (1961). Pattern and growth of personality. New York: Holt, Rinehardt & Winston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ansbacher, H. L. (1959). Causality and indeterminism according to Alfred Adler, and some current American personality theories. In K. A. Adler & D. Deutsch (Eds.), Essays in individual psychology (pp. 27–40). New York: Grove Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arlow, J. A. (1960). Psychoanalysis as scientific method. In S. Hook (Ed.), Psychoanalysis, scientific method, and philosophy: A symposium (pp. 201–211). New York: Grove Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fremantle, A. (1955). The age of belief: The medieval philosophers. New York: Mentor Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, M. S. (1955). Martin Buber: The life of dialogue. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kenny, A. (1963). Action, emotion, and will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kluckhohn, C, Murray, H. A., & Schneider, D. M. (Eds.). (1959). Personality in nature, society, and culture. New York: Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of topological psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Marx, M. H. (1964). Confusion in attitudes toward clinical theory. In M. H. Marx (Ed.), Theories in contemporary psychology (pp. 311–323). New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maslow, A. H. (1961). Existential psychology: What’ in it for us. In R. May (Ed.), Existential psychology (pp. 49–57). New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKeon, R. (Ed.). (1930). Selections from Medieval philosophers (Vol. 2). New York: Scribners.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyerhoff, H. (1962). On psychoanalysis as history. Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review, 49(2), 3–20.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, E. (1961). The structure of science: Problems in the logic of scientific explanation. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1962). Conjectures and refutations. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schutz, A. (1963). Concept and theory formation in the social sciences. In M. Natanson (Ed.), Philosophy and the social sciences: A reader (pp. 230–249). New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scotus, Johannes Duns (1967). The Oxford Commentary on the Four Books of the Sentences (Book II, Dist. III) In A. Hyman & J. J. Walsh (Eds.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages (pp. 560–604). New York: arper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turner, M. B. (1967). Philosophy and the science of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wahl, J. (1949). A short history of existentialism. New York: Philosophical Library.

    Google Scholar 

  • Windelband, W. (1921). An introduction to philosophy. London: Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolter, Allan B. (1967). Article on John Duns Scotus. In P. Edwards (Ed. in Chief), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (pp. 427–436). New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1986 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Franck, I. (1986). Psychology as a Science. In: Valsiner, J. (eds) The Individual Subject and Scientific Psychology. Perspectives on Individual Differences. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-2239-7_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-2239-7_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4899-2241-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4899-2239-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics