The Discursive Approach

Abstract

In the preceding chapters, I have tried to demonstrate that the orthodox theory of action is a formulation of the theory implicit in commonsense explanations of behavior. I have raised what I take to be serious questions about the empirical foundations and the internal logic of the orthodox/commonsense theory. As a foundation for an alternative approach to social action, I proposed that we view internal states, such as intention, motivation, and emotion, as members’ concepts. This proposal, in turn, led to a consideration of sociologically viable approaches to meaning and to rules. I refer to this alternative to the orthodox approach as discursive sociology. Discursive sociology focuses on the interpretive systems and practices through which members deal with behavior. By investigating members’ explanations of behavior, I have tried to achieve some preliminary insight into the nature of these interpretive systems and practices. Discursive sociology is an approach, not a theory or an analytic system. It is the general alternative to a motivational sociology of action. The crucial feature of the discursive approach is that behavior is viewed as meaningful by virtue of its articulation with a system of discourse rather than by virtue of its being “meant” or motivated.

I now suspect that there are no general sociological propositions...and that the only general propositions of sociology are in fact psychological.

Homans (1964, p. 817)

I assume that the proper study of interaction is not in the individual and his psychology, but rather the syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another.

Goffman (1967, p. 2)