Abstract
This chapter applies to one specific safeguards system: By general agreement international nuclear materials safeguards are organized in such a way that the plant operators generate all data necessary for the establishment of a material balance and report them to the safeguards authority. Since this authority cannot be sure that these data are not falsified so that the material balance appears to be correct, it has to verify the operator’s data with the help of independently observed or performed measurements. If there are no significant differences between the operator’s reported data and the inspector’s findings, then the safeguards authority establishes the material balance with the help of the operator’s data. According to this structure of the safeguards system, a plant operator or a state who wants to divert material has two principal strategies to divert this material: Either he simply diverts material without any data falsification and expects the measurement uncertainty of the balance data to cover this diversion, or he falsifies the balance data by an amount corresponding to this desired amount of material and expects the measurement uncertainty of both his own and the inspector’s measurements to cover the falsification. Naturally, he can use both strategies in a way which is most favorable to him.
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© 1986 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Avenhaus, R. (1986). Verification of Materials Accounting Data. In: Safeguards Systems Analysis. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0577-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0577-2_5
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