Game Theoretical Analysis

  • Rudolf Avenhaus


In this chapter the activities of a safeguards authority are modeled in terms of a noncooperative two-person game with the authority as the first and the operator as the second player. Both for sequential and for nonsequential safeguards procedures it is shown that the general game can be analyzed by means of two auxiliary games. In the nonsequential case the first auxiliary game no longer contains the payoff parameters of the two players, and thus, dealing only with random sampling and measurement error problems, provides solutions which are suited for practical applications. In the sequential case the situation is more complicated: Only under rather restrictive assumptions does one again get the independence of the payoff parameter values.


False Alarm Equilibrium Point False Alarm Probability Original Game Game Theoretical Analysis 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rudolf Avenhaus
    • 1
  1. 1.Federal Armed Forces University MunichNeubibergFederal Republic of Germany

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