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The Actors

  • Joseph F. DiMento
Part of the Environment, Development, and Public Policy book series (EDPE)

Abstract

Compliance is a human activity outcome. People perform all the activities and transfer all the messages that create compliance, undercompliance, or over-compliance. With varying degrees of autonomy, people determine those procedures, standard and otherwise, that create or avoid environmental violations. To understand compliance one must understand variation among the individuals and groups involved in the regulatory process. Variations among people who fill roles in government, in the business firm, and in advocacy groups are especially significant when norms are both divergent and in transition. This is the case in environmental law.

Keywords

Support Group Wall Street Journal Enforcement Action American Business Environmental Violation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph F. DiMento
    • 1
  1. 1.University of California, IrvineIrvineUSA

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