Pursuing Compliance

Society’s Tools
  • Joseph F. DiMento
Part of the Environment, Development, and Public Policy book series (EDPE)


The explanation of noncompliance is not that society lacks strategies for promoting environmental goals. Indeed, public policy’s arsenal of sanctions and incentives is full. But the nature of the carrot or stick is not the most important factor in influencing business behavior. To understand this point it is first necessary to inventory available strategies. Choices theoretically range from draconian criminal sentences to subsidies for compliance. In reality, a variety of actors constrain choices in ways which we present in the following chapters. But it is useful to know the range of options for achieving compliance.


Economic Incentive Criminal Penalty Criminal Sanction Environmental Violation Civil Suit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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    Throughout this chapter we offer specific arguments for each approach to compliance. Some criticisms apply to several approaches; they are summarized under the heading with which they are most frequently associated.Google Scholar
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    A large percentage of surveyed enforcers (54%) reported that their agency seeks publicity on selective enforcement activity. Surveyed enforcers discussed in Chap. 2, p. 36.Google Scholar
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  47. 47.
    This view was offered in the enforcer survey, discussed in Chap. 2, p. 36.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph F. DiMento
    • 1
  1. 1.University of California, IrvineIrvineUSA

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