Distributive Justice in a Real World

  • Russell Hardin
Part of the Critical Issues in Social Justice book series (CISJ)

Abstract

Most of moral theory has traditionally been about individuals and addressed to individuals (Hardin, 1989a). But most of what matters in life seems to depend on institutions, including the institutions of the modern economy that makes the average person in advanced industrial states splendidly wealthy, institutions that are dearly sought in much of the rest of the world. Much of the most interesting moral theory in recent decades has been focused on institutions, at least in principle—there is often no serious account of any institution, there is merely recognition that institutions must be in place if moral outcomes are to be achieved. A serious institutional morality must take institutions into account at the outset, in the very foundations of the theory.

Keywords

Criminal Justice Procedural Justice Distributive Justice Political Theory Moral Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Russell Hardin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PoliticsNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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