Systems for Philosophy

  • Bill Cameron


The aim of this paper is to explicate the concept’ system’ as a working tool for the practice of analytical philosophy. System is defined as a mode of description, as a description of a conceptual holism. Some of the implications of this are considered.


Actual World System Description Possession Condition Material Implication Counterfactual Conditional 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bill Cameron
    • 1
  1. 1.University of GlasgowGlasgowUK

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