Abstract
This article presents an analysis of Freud’s psychological theory. Freud’s system is comprised of six classes of propositions. Four of them are empirical, dealing with (1) observable behavior, (2) introspectively observable behavior, (3) inferrable behavior, and (4) empirical generalizations. The other two classes are (5) theoretical or hypothetical constructs and (6) praxiological or applied propositions.
Hypothetical constructs form the backbone of all theoretical systems. Freud introduced seven of them, namely, (1) epistemological realism, (2) monism, (3) energetism, (4) determinism, (5) economy, (6) pleasure-unpleasure continuum, and (7) the constancy principle.
There are good reasons for developing fresh concepts in keeping up with the progress of scientific research, but Freud’s original contribution must be preserved and respected as a pioneering work that has inspired fruitful psychological research by followers, dissidents, and opponents.
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© 1984 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Wolman, B.B. (1984). Psychoanalysis as a Scientific Theory. In: Royce, J.R., Mos, L.P. (eds) Annals of Theoretical Psychology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9191-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9191-4_6
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