Abstract
Psychology often surprises us; moreover, it is a discipline which attracts many people to its banner. It is difficult to see how it could do either if the burden of Smedslund’s central thesis were correct. I believe that he is wrong, although the issues he raises are of great interest and importance; I shall work my way toward my main argument by discussing a couple of points with which I am in at least partial agreement.
Title with apologies to Putnam (who got there first).
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Most realists would accept some version of this view, although many would want to abjure talk of necessity. It is Kripke, of course, who is primarily responsible for the revival of essentialist ideas; see his ‘Naming and Necessity,’ in D. Davidson and G. Harman (Eds.), Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1972, pp. 253–355).
I provide such an argument in The Autonomy of Psychology (forthcoming).
I find it hard to believe that Smedslund means to include all propositions of commonsense psychology in the category “noncontingent,” as his iized definition suggests; what, for instance, of “He cold-shouldered John because of his jealousy”? I assume he means general propositions.
I have expanded on this point in a number of places, most recently in “Functionalism, Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophical Topics, 1981, 12,147–167. See also the excellent work by G. Mandler and W. Kessen, The Language of Psychology (New York: Wiley, 1959).
It will be clear that I am assuming that a tenable distinction can be drawn between theoretical and observational statements; this needs argument, but I think it can be done.
J. A. Gray, Elements of a Two-Process Theory of Learning (London: Academic Press, 1975), p. 347.
See also D. Dennett, “Intentional Systems,” Journal of Philosophy, 1971, 68, 87–106.
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Wilkes, K.V. (1984). It Ain’t Necessarily So. In: Royce, J.R., Mos, L.P. (eds) Annals of Theoretical Psychology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9191-4_24
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