Abstract
Having defended the distinction between reasons and causes often and having argued that psychological explanations cannot ignore the former (Robinson, 1976, 1978, 1979), I can only commend Rychlak for recognizing the distinction and for developing certain theoretical implications arising from it. Before examining his version of the distinction and the theoretical uses to which he puts it, however, a few words must be devoted to the historical passages in his essay.
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References
Robinson, D. N. An intellectual history of psychology. New York: Macmillan, 1976.
Robinson, D. N. Psychological explanation: Reasons or causes? Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, 1978.
Robinson, D. N. Systems of modern psychology: A critical sketch. New York: Columbus University Press, 1979.
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© 1984 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Robinson, D.N. (1984). On Reasons and Causes. In: Royce, J.R., Mos, L.P. (eds) Annals of Theoretical Psychology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9191-4_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9191-4_13
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