Abstract
The reorganization of the European railway sector following the application of Directive 440 requires devising an infrastructure access mechanism for competing transport operators. This paper proposes a market-based approach to railroad track allocation and capacity pricing, formulating a three-stage game-theoretic model where transport operators request their preferred schedules to the infrastructure manager and set the final prices for the transport services on the basis of actual schedules and access tariffs. The latter are simultaneously computed by a non discriminatory mechanism which maximizes the value of the timetable of each operator. Access tariffs are based on the congestion degree each train imposes on the system.
The model is validated by numerical simulations showing the impact of congestion externalities on access tariffs, final service prices and operators’ profits.
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Bassanini, A., La Bella, A., Nastasi, A. (2002). Allocation of Railroad Capacity Under Competition: A Game Theoretic Approach to Track time Pricing. In: Gendreau, M., Marcotte, P. (eds) Transportation and Network Analysis: Current Trends. Applied Optimization, vol 63. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6871-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6871-8_1
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