Skip to main content

Allocation of Railroad Capacity Under Competition: A Game Theoretic Approach to Track time Pricing

  • Chapter
Transportation and Network Analysis: Current Trends

Part of the book series: Applied Optimization ((APOP,volume 63))

Abstract

The reorganization of the European railway sector following the application of Directive 440 requires devising an infrastructure access mechanism for competing transport operators. This paper proposes a market-based approach to railroad track allocation and capacity pricing, formulating a three-stage game-theoretic model where transport operators request their preferred schedules to the infrastructure manager and set the final prices for the transport services on the basis of actual schedules and access tariffs. The latter are simultaneously computed by a non discriminatory mechanism which maximizes the value of the timetable of each operator. Access tariffs are based on the congestion degree each train imposes on the system.

The model is validated by numerical simulations showing the impact of congestion externalities on access tariffs, final service prices and operators’ profits.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Ben Akiva, M. and S. Lerman. (1985). Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Applicati on to Predict Travel Demand, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bowers, P.H. (1996). Railway Reform in Germany. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 30: 95 - 102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brooks, M. and K. Button. (1995). Separating Transport Track from Operations: a Typology of International Experiences. International Journal of Transport Economics, 22: 235 - 260.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carey, M. (1994). A Model and Strategy for Train Pathing with Choice of Lines, Platforms and Routes. Transportation Research, 28B: 333 - 353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crew, M.A. and P.R. Kleindorfer. (1987). The Economics of Public Utility Regulation. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dobson, G. and P.J. Lederer. (1993). Airline Scheduling and Routing in a Hub-andSpoke System. Transportation Science, 27: 281 - 297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harker, P.T. (1991). Generalized Nash Games and Quasi-Variational Inequalities. European Journal of Operations Research, 54: 81 - 94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harker, P.T. and S. Hong. (1990). Two Moments Estimation of the Delay on a Partially Double-Track Rail Line with Scheduled Traffic. Journal of Transportation Research Forum, 31: 38 - 49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harker, P.T. and S. Hong. (1994). Pricing of Track Time in Railroad Operations: an Internal Market Approach. Transportation Research, 28B: 197 - 212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kraay, D.R. and P.T. Harker. (1995). Real-Time Scheduling of Freight Railroads. Transportation Research, 29B: 213 - 229.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levin, R.C. (1981). Railroad Rates, Profitability, and Welfare under Deregulation. Bell Journal of Economics, 12: 1 - 26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McFadden, D. (1981). Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice, in C. Manski and D. McFadden (eds.) Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morrison, S.A. (1983). Prices and Investment Level for Airport Runways. In T.E. Keeler (ed.) Research in Transportation Economics, pp. 103 - 130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nash, C. (1993). Rail Privatisation in Britain. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 27: 317 - 322.

    Google Scholar 

  • Odijk, M.A. (1996). A Constraint Generation Algorithm for the Construction of Periodic Railway Timetables. Transportation Research, 30B: 455 - 464.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R. (1975). Re-Examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4: 25 - 55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vickrey, W. (1969). Congestion Theory and Transportation Investment. American Economic Review, 59: 251 - 260.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winston, C. (1983). The Demand for Freight Transportation: Models and Applications. Transportation Research 17A: 419 - 427.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bassanini, A., La Bella, A., Nastasi, A. (2002). Allocation of Railroad Capacity Under Competition: A Game Theoretic Approach to Track time Pricing. In: Gendreau, M., Marcotte, P. (eds) Transportation and Network Analysis: Current Trends. Applied Optimization, vol 63. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6871-8_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6871-8_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5212-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-6871-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics