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How Do Observers of Victimization Preserve Their Belief in a Just World Cognitively or Actionally?

Findings from a Longitudinal Study
  • Barbara Reichle
  • Angela Schneider
  • Leo Montada
Part of the Critical Issues in Social Justice book series (CISJ)

Abstract

Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve. The belief that the world is just enables the individual to confront his physical and social environment as though they were stable and orderly. Without such a belief it would be difficult for the individual to commit himself to the pursuit of long-range goals or even to the socially regulated behavior of day-to-day life. Since the belief that the world is just serves such an important adaptive function for the individual, people are very reluctant to give up this belief, and they can be greatly troubled if they encounter evidence that suggest that the world is not really just or orderly after all” (Lerner & Miller, 1978, pp. 1030–1031).

Keywords

Cognitive Strategy Cognitive Reappraisal Unemployed Person Prosocial Action Disadvantaged Person 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Barbara Reichle
    • 1
  • Angela Schneider
    • 1
  • Leo Montada
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversität TrierTrierGermany

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