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Values for Multialternative Games and Multilinear Extensions

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Power Indices and Coalition Formation

Abstract

We generalized the Banzhaf value in multialternative games defined by Bolger. We developed a new vallue, called a Banzhaf-like value, based on the axioms similar to those of the Bolger value. Like the derivation of the Banzhaf value, we modified one of the axioms of Bolger. We also applied Owen’s multilinear extension to the multialternative games to show that this application gives a Banzhaf-like value as well.

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References

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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Ono, R. (2001). Values for Multialternative Games and Multilinear Extensions. In: Holler, M.J., Owen, G. (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4893-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-6221-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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