Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games:The Case of EU Procedures
Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to assess actors’ influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. By a subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for instance, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.
KeywordsEuropean Union Cooperative Game Power Index Coalition Formation Vote Rule
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