Set Games

  • Harry Aarts
  • Yukihiko Funaki
  • Kees Hoede
Chapter

Abstract

In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is introduced. In a set game the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of a real number. For this class of games we will define the notion of value, being a solution concept and also several axioms. Furthermore we will study values for set games that satisfy the so-called additivity axiom which is the analog of the additivity axiom of the Shapley value.

Keywords

Cooperative Game Solution Concept Power Index Coalition Formation Grand Coalition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Harry Aarts
    • 1
  • Yukihiko Funaki
    • 2
  • Kees Hoede
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Mathematical SciencesUniversity of TwenteEnschedeThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Faculty of EconomicsToyo UniversityTokyoJapan

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