Abstract
This introductory note discusses the main arguments that motivate the growing interest in power indices and the theory of coalition formation that also determine the selection of contributions to this volume. The main arguments are those of substantial growth in the application of power indices to political institutions, especially the European Union, the intensive discussion of the monotonicity properties of various indices, and the probabilistic interpretation of power, coalition formation, and power measures.
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Holler, M.J., Owen, G. (2001). Why Power Indices and Coalition Formation?. In: Holler, M.J., Owen, G. (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_1
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