Lobbying Politicians or Bureaucrats?

  • Randolph Sloof
Chapter

Abstract

According to Laffont and Tirole (1991, p. 1090) one methodological limitation of the theoretical literature on interest groups is that most models mainly focus “...on the ‘demand side’ in their study of political and regulatory decision-making, in that all the action takes place on the side of interest groups. By ‘blackboxing’ the ‘supply side’ (the political and regulatory institutions), they have ignored a crucial agency relationship between politicians and their delegates in the bureaucracy.”2 In this chapter the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is explicitly taken into account when studying the choice an interest group has between lobbying politicians or lobbying bureaucrats. On the one hand, the internal organization of government has an impact on the way in which interest groups may try to influence political decision-making On the other hand, when deciding on whether to delegate policy authority to bureaucrats or not, politicians may take the potential influence of interest groups on bureaucrats into account. From this perspective the internal organization of government and (the potential for) interest group influence are interrelated. This chapter presents a model that analyzes this latter relationship.

Keywords

Interest Group Distributional Loss Signaling Game Revolving Door Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aghion, P. and J. Tirole, 1997, Formal and real authority in organizations, Journal of Political Economy 105, 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Austen-Smith, D., 1993, Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes, American Journal of Political Science 37, 799–833.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Austen-Smith, D., 1995, Campaign contributions and access, American Political Science Review 89, 566–581.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Austen-Smith, D. and J.R. Wright, 1992, Competitive lobbying for a legislator’s vote, Social Choice and Welfare 9, 229–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Banks, J.S., 1991, Signaling games in political science (Harwood, Chur).Google Scholar
  6. Bawn, K., 1995, Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures, American Political Science Review 89, 62–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Breton, A., 1995, Organizational hierarchies and bureaucracies: An integrative essay, European Journal of Political Economy 11, 411–440.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Calvert, R.L., 1985, The value of biased information: A rational choice model of political advice, Journal of Politics 47, 530–555.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Calvert, R.L., McCubbins, M.D. and B.R. Weingast, 1989, A theory of political control and agency discretion, American Journal of Political Science 33, 588–611.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Che, Y.K., 1995, Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion, Rand Journal of Economics 26, 378–397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Choate, P., 1990, Agents of influence (Simon and Schuster, New York).Google Scholar
  12. Chubb, J.E., 1983, Interest groups and the bureaucracy (Stanford University Press, Stanford).Google Scholar
  13. Crain, W.M., and R.E. McCormick, 1984, Regulators as an interest group, in: J.M. Buchanan and R.D.Google Scholar
  14. Tollison, eds., The theory of public choice II (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor) 287–304.Google Scholar
  15. Epstein, D. and S. O’Halloran, 1994, Administrative procedures, information and agency discretion, American Journal of Political Science 38, 697–722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Epstein, D. and S. O’Halloran, 1996, Divided government and the design of administrative procedures: A formal model and empirical test, Journal of Politics 58, 373–397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Farrell, J. and R. Gibbons, 1989, Cheap talk with two audiences, American Economic Review 79, 1214 1223.Google Scholar
  18. Fiorina, M.P., 1982, Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?, Public Choice 39, 33–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Fiorina, M.P., 1985, Group concentration and the delegation of legislative authority, in: R.G. Noll, ed., Regulatory policy and the social sciences ( University of California Press, Berkeley ) 175–197.Google Scholar
  20. Gilligan, T.W. and K. Krehbiel, 1987, Collective decisionmaking and standing committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 145–193.Google Scholar
  21. Gilligan, T.W. and K. Krehbiel, 1989a, Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee, American Journal of Political Science 33, 459–490.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Gilligan, T.W. and K. Krehbiel, 1989b, Collective choice without procedural commitment, in: P.C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of strategic choice in politics ( The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor ) 295–314.Google Scholar
  23. Gilligan, T.W. and K. Krehbiel, 1990, Organization of informative committees by a rational legislature, American Journal of Political Science 34, 531–564.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, 1991, The politics of government decisionmaking: A theory of regulatory capture, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1089–1127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Lagerlöf, J., 1997, Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare, European Journal of Political Economy 13, 615–637.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Legros, P., 1993, Information revelation in repeated delegation, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 98117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Letterie, W. and O.H. Swank, 1997, Learning and signalling by advisor selection, Public Choice 92, 353–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Mazza, I, and F. van Winden, 1998, An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government, Working Paper TI 98–007/1 ( Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam).Google Scholar
  29. Milner, H.V. and B.P. Rosendorff, 1996, Trade negotiations, information and domestic politics: The role of domestic groups, Economics and Politics 8, 145–189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Mo, J., 1995, Domestic institutions and international bargaining: The role of agent veto in two-level games, American Political Science Review 89, 914–924.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Niskanen, W.A., 1971, Bureaucracy and representative government (Aldine Atherton, Chicago). Peacock, A., 1994, The utility maximizing government economic advisor: A comment“, Public Choice 80, 191–197.Google Scholar
  32. Potters, J., 1992, Fixed cost messages, Economics Letters 38, 43–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Riker, W.H., 1985, Comment (on: Group concentration and the delegation of legislative authority, by M.P. Fiorina), in: R.G. Noll, ed., Regulatory policy and the social sciences ( University of California Press, Berkeley ) 197–199.Google Scholar
  34. Rogoff, K., 1985, The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169–1189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Salant, D.J., 1995, Behind the revolving door: A new view of public utility regulation, Rand Journal of Economics 26, 362–377.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Salisbury, R.H. and P. Johnson, 1989, Who you know versus what you know: the uses of government experience for Washington lobbyists, American Journal of Political Science 33, 175–195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Schlozman, K. and J. Tierney, 1986, Organized interests and American democracy ( Harper and Row, New York).Google Scholar
  38. Sloof, R., 1997, Competitive lobbying for a legislator’s vote: A comment, Social Choice and Welfare 14, 449–464.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Sloof, R., 1998, Interest group influence and the delegation of policy authority, submitted to: Economics and Politics.Google Scholar
  40. Spiller, P.T., 1990, Politicians, interest groups, and regulators: A multiple-principals agency theory of regulation, or “let them be bribed”, Journal of Law and Economics 33, 65–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Tirole, J., 1994, The internal organization of government, Oxford Economic Papers 46, 1–29. Van Schendelen, M.P.C.M., 1988, De markt van politiek en bedrijfsleven (Kluwer, Deventer ).Google Scholar
  42. Vogel, D., 1978, Lobbying the corporation. Citizen challenges to business authority ( Basic Books, New York).Google Scholar
  43. Wilson, G.K., 1981, Interest groups in the United States ( Clarendon Press, Oxford).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Randolph Sloof
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AmsterdamThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations