Lobbying or Pressure?
As observed in Chapter 2 interest groups typically use several means to influence government policy. For instance, interest groups may use words (threats) to convince a policymaker. However, when such threats are not successful, it becomes necessary for the interest group to carry out the threat in order to influence policy. Casual observations suggest, just like the quote above, that especially newly organized (starting) interest groups first have to show their teeth, like a strike in case of a union, before they arrive at an established position. Interest groups with an already recognized position, on the other hand, typically seem to rely on verbal persuasion and informal contacts. In the present chapter we try to provide a rigorous game-theoretical underpinning for these observations obtained from casual empiricism.
KeywordsInterest Group Weak Type Equilibrium Path Equilibrium Payoff Strong Type
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