Abstract

As observed in Chapter 2 interest groups typically use several means to influence government policy. For instance, interest groups may use words (threats) to convince a policymaker. However, when such threats are not successful, it becomes necessary for the interest group to carry out the threat in order to influence policy. Casual observations suggest, just like the quote above, that especially newly organized (starting) interest groups first have to show their teeth, like a strike in case of a union, before they arrive at an established position. Interest groups with an already recognized position, on the other hand, typically seem to rely on verbal persuasion and informal contacts. In the present chapter we try to provide a rigorous game-theoretical underpinning for these observations obtained from casual empiricism.

Keywords

Interest Group Weak Type Equilibrium Path Equilibrium Payoff Strong Type 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Randolph Sloof
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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