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Game-theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups pp 45–73Cite as

Game-Theoretic Preliminaries

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Abstract

In their survey of theoretical models of interest groups Potters and Van Winden (1996) distinguish four different approaches. One of these concerns a strand of literature that focuses on the influence of interest groups through the transmission of information (Austen-Smith, 1997, separates out the same class). The models discussed in subsequent chapters all follow this approach. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it intends to give the reader some feeling and intuition for models of strategic information transmission. Second, in this chapter a basic model is discussed that forms one of the building blocks for the extended models analyzed in subsequent chapters. Third, this chapter is meant to give the reader somewhat more detailed insight in the existing literature in this area.

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  1. University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Randolph Sloof

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  1. Randolph Sloof
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Sloof, R. (1998). Game-Theoretic Preliminaries. In: Game-theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5307-3_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5307-3_3

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