Game-Theoretic Preliminaries

  • Randolph Sloof


In their survey of theoretical models of interest groups Potters and Van Winden (1996) distinguish four different approaches. One of these concerns a strand of literature that focuses on the influence of interest groups through the transmission of information (Austen-Smith, 1997, separates out the same class). The models discussed in subsequent chapters all follow this approach. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it intends to give the reader some feeling and intuition for models of strategic information transmission. Second, in this chapter a basic model is discussed that forms one of the building blocks for the extended models analyzed in subsequent chapters. Third, this chapter is meant to give the reader somewhat more detailed insight in the existing literature in this area.


Public Choice Policy Position Cheap Talk Signaling Game Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Randolph Sloof
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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