Abstract

In this chapter the existing literature on the political influence of interest groups will be reviewed and discussed. Section 2.1 provides a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature. This overview yields an elaborate assessment of the actual importance of interest groups for the formation of governmental policies. There appears to be ample empirical evidence that interest groups affect the political decision-making process significantly. Since a vast number of empirical studies is reviewed, covering a wide variety of issues, this overview also indicates the themes in the literature concerned with the positive analysis of interest group influence. In that way also most of the supposedly relevant determinants of the behavior of interest groups and their influence are enumerated.

Keywords

Interest Group Public Choice Policy Position American Political Science Review Campaign Contribution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Randolph Sloof
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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