Equilibrium Bidding Strategies under the English and the Second-Price Auctions

  • Soo Hong Chew
  • Naoko Nishimura


When bidders have independent private valuations of a deterministic auctioned object, the revenue equivalence between the English auction and the second-price auction, is known in the auction literature.1 Several papers investigated bidding behavior when there is uncertainty in the value of the auctioned object. Chew (1989) observes that the symmetric Nash equilibrium bid under the second-price auction may not be demand revealing when bidders do not possess expected utility preferences. He further provides condition on bidders whose preferences exhibit the betweenness property to optimally bid less than their reservation values. Karni and Safra (1989) show that the Nash equilibrium bidding behavior under the English auction is demand revealing if and only if bidders’ preferences satisfy betweenness.


Nash Equilibrium Indifference Curve Bidding Strategy English Auction Equilibrium Bidding 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Soo Hong Chew
    • 1
  • Naoko Nishimura
    • 2
  1. 1.Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyHong Kong
  2. 2.Shinshu UniversityJapan

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