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Externalities and Alternative Auction Rules for Access to Rail Networks: Some Evidence from the Laboratory

  • Paul J. Brewer
Chapter

Abstract

Externalities involve an economic environment where the consumption of resources by a user may create benefits or costs for another user. Two types of externalities are key features of railroad scheduling: conflict externalities and synergy externalities.

Keywords

Optimal Allocation Positive Externality Incomplete Market Combinatorial Auction Auction Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul J. Brewer
    • 1
  1. 1.Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyHong Kong

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