Work Motivation, Institutions, and Performance

  • Simon Gächter
  • Armin Falk


Many economically important contracts are incomplete. This holds in particular for the employment relationship. Very often the labor contract just stipulates a wage payment and leaves out many details that actually determine performance (see, e.g., Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988)). Under conditions of incompletely specified obligations and only weak or absent explicit performance incentives the issue of motivation arises.


Intrinsic Motivation Effort Level Work Motivation Repeated Interaction Incentive Contract 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Simon Gächter
    • 1
  • Armin Falk
    • 2
  1. 1.FEW-HSGUniversity of St. GallenSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of ZürichSwitzerland

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