Abstract
Recent research in experimental economics suggests that simple models of learning can have nontrivial practical implications. For example, our research suggests that learning models can be used to design optimal pricing policy (Haruvy & Erev, 2000), efficient rule enforcement rules (Perry, Erev & Haruvy, 2000; Shany & Erev, 2000), efficient bonus systems (Haruvy, Erev, and Perry, 2000) and even optimal gambling devices (Haruvy, Erev, and Sonsino, 2000).
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Haruvy, E., Erev, I. (2002). On the Application and Interpretation of Learning Models. In: Zwick, R., Rapoport, A. (eds) Experimental Business Research. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5196-3_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5196-3_12
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