The winner-takes-all: an alternative view of CEO incentives
The research on executive remuneration offered by Kaplan, Conyon and Schwalbach1 and Hall certainly provides for interesting reading. In fact, each contributes positively to our understanding of executive pay packages in practice. Instead of offering a comment on each paper individually, however, I employ an alternative strategy. When these papers are considered jointly, they provide a platform that is well suited to consider international contracting issues, as well as investigate an alternative model of managerial incentives. To this end, I suggest three questions below and attempt to provide preliminary answers by drawing upon the findings of the authors’ collective work.
KeywordsChief Executive Officer Stock Option Executive Compensation Managerial Incentive Compensation Contract
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